- January 15, 2026
- 7:21 pm
- Middle East
In Israel, the events in Iran are not viewed as an abstract “foreign revolution.” Here, there is a clear understanding of what happens when a regime decides to hold on at any cost. Israelis see in the Iranian protests not only a fight for freedom of speech or economic demands — they recognize familiar signs: communication shutdowns, city isolation, pressure on families, and attempts to erase the very fact of resistance.
This concern does not arise out of nowhere. Over the past years, Israeli society has learned to recognize early signals of authoritarian tightening. When the state first cuts off the internet, then breaks down protests by districts, and later declares silence as proof of “stability,” it is perceived not as a news hookup but as a recurring scenario. Iran today appears as another point in a chain that has already passed through other countries.
There is also a broader context. In Israel, it is well remembered that Iran was not always a state of ayatollahs and religious dictatorship. Before the 1979 revolution, it was a country with which there were complex but working relations, elements of regional partnership, and dialogue between societies. That is why the current protests are often perceived here as an attempt to return Iran to basic principles — freedom, justice, and the right of society to influence its own future.
Against this backdrop, the unprecedented protests in Iran have become not only an internal crisis of the regime but also a kind of test for its external allies. And it is here that the question of Moscow’s role is increasingly raised. Analysts point out: without direct troop deployment, without loud gestures, Russia has become one of the key factors allowing Tehran to maintain control over the streets and the information space.
This is not about classic military intervention. Russia acts differently — building a multi-layered protective contour for the Iranian authorities. This contour includes technology, weapons, digital tools, and, no less importantly, well-practiced methods of suppressing dissent. This is not improvisation. This set has been formed over the years.
In Moscow, mass protests are traditionally perceived as a threat capable of crossing national borders. The fear of “exporting revolutions” became part of political logic long before the war against Ukraine. That is why the experience of managing protest activity, accumulated within Russia, was consistently transferred to allied and dependent regimes. In 2025, this cooperation was formalized with agreements that legalized the exchange of control technologies — including over national segments of the internet.
Russia’s forceful presence in Iran’s security system is expressed in specific supplies. This includes lethal and conditionally “non-lethal” weapons. Units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij formations use Russian AK-103 rifles and Dragunov sniper rifles. This weapon is not intended for the front but for targeted use in urban environments — where protesters were just citizens on the street yesterday.
Assessing the real scale of casualties in conditions of total communication shutdown is extremely difficult. Representatives of human rights organizations spoke of an unprecedented level of violence for modern Iranian history. Opposition sources mentioned estimates of thousands of deaths over a short period. Verifying these figures is impossible precisely because the digital blockade has become part of the repressive strategy. But even without exact data, it is obvious: the scale of what is happening goes beyond the usual scenarios of protest suppression.
In the streets of Iranian cities, the appearance of heavy equipment, previously not associated with “police” operations, was recorded. T-72 tanks and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, adapted for urban conditions, became an element of intimidation. This is a signal not only to the protesters but to the entire society: the authorities are ready to use military means against their own population.
This picture is complemented by Russian-made helicopters. Transport Mi-17s and attack Mi-28s are used as tools of psychological pressure. Even without active fire, their constant presence over cities creates an atmosphere of total control. Low flights and continuous noise turn ordinary street presence into a risk.
A separate place is occupied by what is officially called “non-lethal” direction. After the 2022 protests, Iranian delegations actively studied in Russia the experience of using stun guns, flashbang grenades, and special means for force operations. These tools allow dispersing crowds and conducting mass arrests, reducing the visible political cost of a large number of deaths but not decreasing the level of violence and injuries.
By the end of 2025, cooperation reached a new level. According to investigations, Moscow secretly supplied Tehran with about forty “Spartak” armored vehicles. MRAP-class vehicles are designed for long-term operations in dense urban areas and were initially developed for Russia’s internal security forces. Their appearance in Iran became a direct borrowing of the internal control model, practiced in other countries.
The nature of the supplies underscores their sensitivity. Transportation was carried out by Il-76 aircraft along routes, trying to minimize international attention. This indicates the urgency of assistance precisely at moments of peak pressure on the regime.
However, experts consider the most significant contribution from Russia not to be armored vehicles or firearms, but assistance in creating a system of digital isolation. The internet shutdown, which began on January 8, 2026, showed a new level of control. Unlike previous years, communication was not just cut off. A model of managed connectivity was implemented: international access and mobile networks were paralyzed, but government services, banks, and internal resources continued to operate.
This scheme allows the regime to maintain the manageability of the economy and administration while depriving protesters of the ability to coordinate and transmit information outside. An additional element was the fight against bypass communication channels. The technologies used allow identifying and blocking encrypted traffic and selectively disconnecting communication in certain areas without affecting the rest of the country.
Cooperation with Russian IT companies provided Iranian special services with tools to disrupt protest coordination networks at early stages. This means a transition from reactive measures to preventive ones, where self-organization is suppressed before it becomes widespread.
In Israel, this picture is increasingly linked to the war in Ukraine. The same logic of imperial thinking, the same approach to suppressing resistance, the same belief in the power of isolation and fear. Putin’s Russia, waging war against Ukraine, simultaneously exports suppression technologies to other regimes. Iran becomes one of the key recipients of this “experience.”
The Israeli government has been pointed to this reality for several years now. Russia has long ceased to be a neutral player and partner. It cooperates with Israel’s enemies, arms them, and helps them stay in power. Nevertheless, at the level of political decisions, this is often ignored — for reasons of convenience, inertia, or the desire to postpone difficult conclusions.
That is why the conversation about protests in Iran goes far beyond one country. It concerns a global system of authoritarian mutual assistance, where suppression becomes an export product, and freedoms — a bargaining chip. Documenting this connection and its consequences is the task of journalism. This is what NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency writes about, considering events not in isolation but in their overall, alarming context.
