The mechanics of “resetting”: why there are no riots in the Russian Federation, even though the war against Ukraine has long become a systemic humiliation of its own citizens

The question “why doesn’t Russia rebel” is being asked in Ukraine and increasingly in Israel, where the war in Europe is not seen as a “distant conflict” but as part of a common axis of threats: Moscow–Tehran (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, and other allied RF terrorist formations), suppression technologies, drones, missiles, sanctions, Syria. On the surface, the answer seems simple: fear and propaganda. But that’s too narrow. NV report offers a set of explanations — weak horizontal connections, targeted “deals” of the state with families, a repressive environment, fatigue without organization. The essence is that the Kremlin has turned the war into a controlled conveyor, where the “human cost” does not turn into political action.

We will add our own analysis to this: which arguments really hold, where they are insufficient, and what might break the current model.

1) Disunity and lack of horizontal connections — this is not a metaphor, it’s infrastructure

The argument about “weak horizontal connections” often sounds like a psychological diagnosis, but in reality, it is institutional. Protest is not an emotion, but logistics: where to gather, how to spread information, who organizes legal protection, who coordinates mutual aid, where are the media channels, how to collect money, how to connect different cities.

In Russia, this infrastructure has been systematically dismantled for years: public organizations were declared “foreign agents,” independent media were closed, local activists were imprisoned, any “self-organization” was labeled as a threat to the state. The result: even if there are many dissatisfied people, they do not form an active network. This explains the paradox: high fatigue coexists with a low capacity for collective action.

Another important point: disunity is not a “national character,” but the result of policy. The regime encourages atomization: let people compete with each other for resources, status, safety. Disunited people are easier to control. This is not unique to Russia; it is a standard tool of authoritarian systems that fear not protests, but solidarity.

2) “Deals” with families and private compensation instead of public justice

The second pillar is targeted “tension relief” through money and administrative decisions. The family of a deceased person may receive compensation, benefits, “help” with documents. From a moral standpoint, this does not negate the tragedy. But from a management standpoint, it works: the pain becomes a private matter for the family, not a public conflict.

This mechanism has two bonuses for the authorities. The first is the neutralization of a potential pressure group. Relatives of the deceased could become a mass movement, as has happened in other wars. But when each case is “closed” separately, a unified subject does not form.

The second is the attachment of a person to the state. The family becomes dependent on payments and decisions of officials. This encourages silence: “just so it doesn’t get worse,” “don’t take away benefits,” “don’t start problems.” In an authoritarian system, even formal assistance often acts as a tool of control.

3) Fear is important, but not directly: fear is a network of small threats

Yes, repression suppresses protest. But the risk of prison is not as effective as the sum of small threats: job loss, problems at the university for children, pressure on business, fines, searches, “preventive conversations,” the risk of being listed as unreliable. This makes publicity toxic. A person may hate the war but chooses the strategy of “not sticking out.”

Here is an important detail: fear works as long as people believe that the regime has long arms and that resistance is pointless. As soon as there is a sense of the regime’s instability, fear begins to fail. Therefore, repressive regimes often appear “monolithic” right up to the moment when they break down sharply. Not because people suddenly became brave, but because fear ceased to be rational.

4) Propaganda is not the main engine. The main engine is the habit of powerlessness and the lack of experience of results

Explaining everything with propaganda is convenient, but it’s an oversimplification. Propaganda helps justify the war in conversation and reduces cognitive dissonance. But even many of those who do not believe the TV do not protest.

The reason is deeper: a significant part of society has no experience that protest brings change. If a person sees for decades that the authorities do not respond, elections do not change reality, rallies end in detentions — a habit of political helplessness forms. Not “I support,” but “I decide nothing.” This is the foundation of passivity.

The scheme looks cynical: the regime can tolerate growing discontent if this discontent is not organized and does not turn into action. Therefore, the authorities fear not criticism in the kitchen, but coordination on the street.

5) The war is unevenly distributed: capitals lived “as if nothing was happening” for a long time

Our key addition to NV’s logic is the unevenness of pain. The war in Russia has long been “smeared” across the periphery. Recruitment, losses, death notices, material incentives hit harder on poor regions, small towns, national outskirts. And large cities — especially Moscow and St. Petersburg — tried to live in showcase mode: cafes, shopping centers, services, holidays.

The regime does everything to prevent the war from becoming “capital.” Because the protest potential in capitals is higher: more people with resources, more connections, more media coverage. As long as the war remains “regional” in terms of human cost, the likelihood of a nationwide explosion is lower. This is not an excuse. This is an explanation of the mechanics.

6) The alternative to protest is departure, evasion, internal sabotage

Another reason for the “silence” is not because people are satisfied, but because the protest has gone into other forms. Some have left (including to Israel). Some have gone into “internal emigration”: silence, refusal to participate in politics, minimizing contact with the state. Some evade: relocations, fake certificates, gray schemes, avoiding military enlistment offices, refusal of publicity.

This slowly but steadily destroys the social fabric. The problem is that such “quiet protest” does not give an immediate political effect but undermines trust and manageability. The regime can live with this as long as it maintains forceful control and financial cushions.

7) The army as a mirror of society: money becomes a tool of coercion

NV describes an important point about the “contract model” and payments. On paper, this looks like a voluntary choice. In practice, more often — as economic coercion. When there is no decent work in the region, high payments for a contract turn into a trap. The regime buys the loyalty of poverty.

At the same time, the increase in payments is a sign of a problem, not strength. If recruitment were stable, there would be no need to constantly raise the price of human life. When the price rises, it means motivation falls, and the risk of refusal increases.

And then a toxic internal economy of the army appears: extortion, “paid” decisions, corruption, violence. This destroys morale and discipline. And this is also a factor that can lead to unexpected breakdowns — not necessarily mass riots in the squares, but to a loss of manageability within the institution that should be the regime’s support.

8) Does this mean there will be no rebellion? No. It means that rebellion depends not on morality, but on manageability

The most common mistake is to expect a rebellion as “moral retribution”: since the war is unjust, people must come out. In reality, mass protests arise when manageability breaks down: when the usual model “you endure — we maintain the appearance of normality” stops working.

Triggers that can really change the picture:

— Mobilization affecting large cities massively.
If the war ceases to be “regional” and becomes “capital,” the protest risk rises sharply.

— Economic blow that cannot be masked by payments and loans.
When incomes fall, jobs disappear, “peaceful” expectations collapse — passivity decreases.

— Management collapse in the regions.
If local elites stop “resolving” the consequences of the war, accumulated anger can become massive.

— Major military failure.
Not in the form of “news,” but in the form of a breakdown of the sense of control, when even apolitical people begin to think that the authorities are leading the country to disaster.

9) Why is this important to Israel

For Israel, the question is not academic. Russia has long ceased to be a “neutral player” and actively interacts with Hamas, with Iran, its terrorist proxies — Hezbollah, and other terrorists) and its military capabilities. Any strengthening or weakening of Russian stability reflects on regional threats: technology supplies, sanctions regimes, political deals in Syria, export of repressive practices.

As long as the Kremlin maintains internal stability through disunity and redistribution of pain, it can continue the war and simultaneously negotiate in the Middle East. But this model has a limit. When the war begins to “come home” — to capital families, to the economy, to everyday life — the regime faces what it fears most: not criticism, but a mass refusal to be governed.

This is precisely the practical meaning of the “zeroing theory.” The war turns into a mechanism that nullifies a person — their rights, safety, dignity, choice. But the system holds as long as the nullification remains individual, fragmented, “one by one.” As soon as it becomes collective and synchronous — the walls begin to crack.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency