- January 17, 2026
- 4:05 pm
- Middle East
The Wall Street Journal this week described Iran as a country where internal cracks have long been part of the political structure, rather than a “temporary problem.” The focus is not on Tehran’s foreign policy, but on what is happening inside: social fatigue, regional inequality, a multinational structure, and the chronic question of what will happen if the system begins to falter.
The logic of the material is simple and unpleasant. One of the few arguments that still helps the regime maintain power is the threat of state collapse. The authorities essentially tell society and elites: the alternative to the current order is not improvement, but chaos, division, and a war of all against all.
Iran is indeed multinational, and its borders have historically “stitched” different communities into one framework. But the key conclusion of the WSJ is that the differences between Iran’s regions today are primarily socio-economic: the level of poverty, access to resources, employment, youth prospects, quality of governance. It is not so much a dispute “over land” as a conflict over living conditions and the distribution of opportunities.
From this follows an important point: this type of tension can quietly and “non-locally” accumulate for a long time, and then suddenly erupt. In social crises, there is not necessarily one center, one leader, or one slogan. A chain reaction effect is enough, where local protests turn into a general wave, and the power apparatus can no longer extinguish outbreaks separately.
WSJ notes that sharp scenarios — from internal conflict to external intervention — cause concern among neighbors and major players. Russia and Turkey are mentioned as countries that, in such a situation, will act not out of sympathy for anyone, but out of calculation: any major turbulence around Iran carries risks of migration, smuggling, the growth of radical groups, disruptions in logistics and energy, as well as the redistribution of influence in Syria and the Caucasus.
At the same time, there is a double bottom in such anxiety. For external players, “stability” does not always mean peace and human rights. More often it means manageability: so that borders work, corridors do not collapse, and threats do not spread. That is why some countries may prefer not a weak Iran, but a predictable one — even if it is hostile.
For Israel, this makes the issue of destabilizing Iran not theoretical, but practical. Israel faces Iranian influence not in the form of abstract statements, but through a network of proxy structures, arms and technology supplies, militant training, as well as through the Syrian direction, where any change in balance has quick consequences on the ground.
If the regime in Tehran weakens, two opposite but equally dangerous effects are possible.
The first is “external escalation for internal control.” Regimes that feel threatened from within often increase external aggression to divert society’s attention, justify repression, and mobilize supporters around the image of an enemy. In such a scenario, pressure on Israel may increase through proxies, missiles, drones, and attempts at provocations.
The second is “management dispersion.” Weakening the center can make proxies more independent. When the vertical has worse control over money, logistics, and commands, individual groups begin to act according to their own logic — more nervously and less predictably. This increases the risk of incidents, mistakes, and escalation that starts “from below,” rather than as a deliberate decision from above.
There is also a third line, often forgotten in public discussions: technological and sanctions. Any turbulence around Iran increases the value of gray markets — components for drones, electronics, guidance systems, cyber tools. In reality, this means that threats to Israel may grow not only at the borders but also in the sphere of infrastructure protection, airspace, and critical systems.
Syria stands separately. The Iranian factor there does not live in a vacuum: it is connected with supply routes, influence on various groups, and attempts to establish a foothold closer to Israeli borders. Even “moderate” instability in Iran may lead some forces to try to compensate for the weakening with demonstrative activity precisely in the Syrian theater — because this is the fastest way to remind of themselves.
In this sense, the WSJ material is important not for predicting a specific outcome, but for showing the mechanism: the regime holds on by fear of chaos, and any sharp scenario inside Iran almost automatically becomes a regional crisis — from the Middle East to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. For Israel, this means increased uncertainty and the need to prepare for several trajectories of events that may seem opposite but lead to one thing: increased risk.
That is why the conversation about Iran’s internal stability is increasingly becoming part of Israel’s security agenda today — and it is in this light that this topic is fixed by NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency, linking “internal cracks” in Tehran with practical threats to the region.
