Ukraine after the war and Israel’s lesson: how security changes the economy forever

Oleg Vishnyakov — Honorary Consul of the State of Israel in the western region of Ukraine, businessman, owner of the Ultramarket (“Megamarket”) hypermarket chain

When a country lives under constant threat for years, security ceases to be a separate sphere. It no longer exists on its own, somewhere alongside the army, special services, and emergency budgets. It begins to define the very economic logic of the state.

This is essentially one of the main Israeli lessons for Ukraine. Defense is not just a heavy expense that has to be endured until better times. Under certain conditions, it becomes part of a sustainable state model, influences investments, shapes technological sectors, changes budget philosophy, and sets new rules for business.

For Ukraine after the war, this will not be an abstract debate among economists. It will be a practical, painful, and long-term question: can the country integrate security into the growth model without destroying the competitive economy and democratic mechanisms?

Security as a permanent item, not a temporary measure

Israel has lived for decades in a reality where defense spending can change but never disappears. They are not considered something exceptional that will one day end and allow a simple return to the previous budget. On the contrary, they are embedded in the very structure of the state.

For Ukraine, this is an especially important conclusion. Even if the active phase of the war ends, the threat itself will not automatically disappear. Risks will remain. This means that funding for the army, air defense systems, cyber protection, reserves, infrastructure resilience, and strategic productions will become not an emergency, but a permanent task.

Why the pre-war budget will no longer exist

After the war, the Ukrainian state is unlikely to think in terms of “returning to previous expenses.” This era is likely already closed.

The new budgetary reality will be built around security. And this means a tough choice: either raise taxes, redistribute resources even more strictly, or accelerate economic growth so that it can support both social obligations and defense burdens simultaneously. Essentially, there is no other option.

Moreover, for the Israeli audience, there is nothing unexpected here. Israel has long known the cost of such a balance. Every serious external threat automatically becomes an internal economic issue: what to finance first, how to retain investments, how not to undermine the labor market, how to maintain the stability of the private sector.

The defense industry can become not a burden, but a point of growth

One of the most important Israeli lessons is that defense is not only expenses. With the right policy, it can become a separate economic sector.

Israel did not just finance the army. It step by step built a defense industry, which then became part of the country’s export model. Many technologies born from military needs later entered the civilian sector and turned into commercial solutions for the global market.

From army to technology and export

Cybersecurity, surveillance systems, analytical platforms, unmanned technologies, risk management solutions, infrastructure protection — all of this in Israel has long gone beyond the purely military sphere. Security has become a source of engineering solutions, and engineering — a source of economic value.

Ukraine already has similar potential today. Military drones, electronic warfare, field communication systems, analytics in conditions of destroyed infrastructure, energy resilience, logistics under strikes — these are not just forced military developments. These are competencies that, with the right approach, can become the foundation of a new technological sector.

But between frontline experience and market economy, there is always a complex bridge. It cannot be built with slogans alone.

If the state does not create clear mechanisms through which military solutions can transition to the civilian market, if rules for the commercialization of developments, protection of investments, tax regime, and intellectual property do not appear, this potential may simply dissolve. Ukraine will gain unique experience but will not turn it into a long-term advantage.

This is where the phrase НАновости — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency sounds not like a formality, but as a reminder of the real connection between the two countries: Israel has long traveled the path where security became part of the economic model, and Ukraine is only approaching this crossroads — and the cost of a mistake here will be very high.

Strong state, investments, and the risk of militarization of thinking

There is another pattern shown by the Israeli experience. When security becomes a central theme, the state almost inevitably strengthens its role. Control increases. Regulation tightens. More decisions are made not by the market, but by state structures.

For Ukraine, this will be a particularly sensitive issue. After the war, society will likely find itself in a dual state. On one hand, there will be a strong demand for an effective, tough, capable state to protect. On the other — there will remain a fear of excessive concentration of power, manual control, and the blurring of institutions.

Why investors need not silence, but predictability

Israel has convincingly shown that investors are ready to work even in a country with constant security risks. But under one condition: the rules are clear, the judicial system functions, the state response is predictable, and the tax and regulatory environment does not change chaotically.

That is why for Ukraine after the war, the main question for an investor will not be the absence of threats as such. The main thing will be the quality of institutions.

If business sees transparent courts, a stable tax system, clear rules of the game in the technological and defense sectors, reasonable regulation, and working property guarantees, capital can come even in a challenging environment. If instead, uncertainty, manual intervention, and constant rule changes persist, no unique military experience will itself turn into an investment plus.

The social cost of the new model

Security is always not only about money but also about the question of social justice.

In Israel, high defense readiness has long been part of the social contract. It causes debates, political conflicts, tension between different groups, but at the same time forms a common understanding that the priorities of the state cannot be abstract.

In Ukraine, the post-war society will be especially heterogeneous. Veterans. Military families. People who survived occupation or shelling. Businesses that worked under risk. Citizens who went abroad and possibly returned. Each group will have its own idea of justice and how exactly the state should distribute resources.

From here will arise a very difficult discussion: who pays for security, who receives support first, which expenses are basic, and which can be postponed. This will not be an accounting dispute, but one of the central political conflicts of the post-war period.

The danger that is talked about less often

There is another risk. When security becomes the main argument in almost all decisions, it begins to influence not only the budget but also the political culture.

Israel constantly seeks a balance between the need for tough measures and the preservation of democratic rules. This balance is not perfect, not simple, and not given automatically. It has to be maintained anew.

Ukraine will likely also have to go through this stage. It will be necessary to simultaneously build a strong defense system, maintain an open economy, protect competition, not replace institutions with personal decisions, and not turn the entire state life into an endless mobilization regime.

This is no longer a technical, but a political question. A question of the maturity of the state.

Security after the war will not become a temporary exception for Ukraine. Quite the opposite — it will turn into a permanent framework within which economic decisions will have to be made.

And the main Israeli lesson here is crystal clear. Security can be not only an expense. It can become the foundation of a new strategy — but only if the country knows how to turn defense challenges into technologies, technologies into a market, and state power into working institutions, not into manual control.

For Ukraine, the choice will be tough. Either consider the defense sector a temporary forced measure and wait for a return to the past. Or recognize that the post-war economy will be different — tougher, more technological, more dependent on the quality of institutions, and much more closely linked to security issues.

It is this choice that will ultimately determine not only the pace of growth but also the political stability of the country. Not after someday. But immediately after the war.