Damascus is back on Kyiv’s diplomatic map: why Ukraine needs Syria and why it matters to Israel

On April 5, 2026, Ukraine and Syria took a step that seemed almost impossible not long ago: after negotiations in Damascus, the parties agreed to reopen embassies in Kyiv and the Syrian capital in the near future. At first glance, this looks like an ordinary diplomatic news, but in reality, it is about a much larger shift — from breaking relations after Assad’s support of Russian aggression to an attempt to build a new architecture of security, trade, and influence in the Middle East.

Why this news is more important than it seems

What exactly Kyiv and Damascus decided

According to Andriy Sybiha, during negotiations with the Syrian Foreign Minister, issues of security, logistics, trade, maritime routes, food stability, humanitarian and educational cooperation were discussed. The result was an agreement on the imminent reopening of embassies in Kyiv and Damascus.

Sybiha separately emphasized that the security of Europe and the Middle East are interconnected, and bilateral trade has already noticeably increased after the restoration of relations.

On the same day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Damascus with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Official Kyiv reported that the parties agreed to work together for greater security and new development opportunities, discussed the exchange of military and security experience, as well as Ukraine’s role as a reliable food supplier for the region. In addition to the bilateral meeting, there was also a trilateral format Ukraine-Syria-Turkey, where security and trade prospects were discussed.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important not only because Syria remains one of the key points on the map of Middle Eastern instability. More importantly, Kyiv offers the region practical experience in countering drone and missile threats, which is directly related to how, after Iranian attacks and regional turbulence, connections between the states of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East will be rebuilt.

How Ukraine and Syria reached this point

From relations in 1992 to political rupture

Formally, diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Syria were established on March 31, 1992, almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR and the international recognition of Ukrainian independence.

For many years, these relations remained operational: without special strategic closeness, but also without direct conflict. The situation changed as Bashar al-Assad’s regime became increasingly dependent on Moscow and turned Syria into one of the pillars of Russian policy in the Middle East.

The critical point came in the summer of 2022. On June 29, 2022, Syria officially recognized the so-called independence of the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, effectively siding with Moscow in the war against Ukraine. The very next day, Kyiv announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Damascus.

This was not a symbolic gesture, but a fixation of a simple reality: under Assad, Syria became part of the pro-Russian foreign policy axis.

The turning point began after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The new Syrian authorities began to seek other external supports, and Ukraine quickly tried to take advantage of this window of opportunity. Already on December 30, 2024, Sybiha arrived in Damascus and held talks on restoring bilateral relations. Then Kyiv announced preparations for the resumption of diplomatic ties, and on September 24, 2025, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, a joint communiqué on the restoration of diplomatic relations was signed.

The current agreement to open embassies is already the next, practical stage after the political decision last September.

Why Kyiv needs Damascus and why it is important for Israel

Security, logistics, grain, and a new regional reality

Ukraine has several reasons here. The first is security. Kyiv has accumulated unique experience in the war against Russian missiles and Iranian drones, and now seeks to turn this experience not only into a military advantage but also into a diplomatic resource.

Reuters directly writes that during the Middle East tour, Ukraine offers the region’s countries expertise in countering drones and missiles, and Syria shows interest in such an exchange. Against the backdrop of the weakening of the previous Syrian system and the attempts of the new authorities to build their power institutions, this is not just a gesture of courtesy, but a subject of real interest.

The second reason is food and trade. Ukraine consistently promotes itself as a reliable supplier of grain and other products for the region. Back in early 2025, Kyiv announced the delivery of 500 tons of wheat flour to Syria as part of the Grain from Ukraine initiative; according to Reuters, this aid was calculated for about 167 thousand Syrians for a month. Now the topic of food security is again sounding in negotiations as one of the central points.

For a country that has experienced years of war, shortages, and infrastructure destruction, this is not abstract diplomacy, but a matter of survival.

The third reason is logistics and the new geopolitical map.

Sybiha separately spoke about trade and maritime routes as a sphere with great potential. And this is perhaps one of the most interesting signals. Kyiv clearly looks at Syria not as a lost territory of the Assad era, but as a possible entry point into a new regional configuration, where Turkey, Arab countries, and Eastern Mediterranean states will newly divide influence, routes, and markets. NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this layer of history: it is not just about two embassies, but about the struggle for a place in the future Middle East, where the old Russian-Iranian contour weakens and new lines of partnership appear.

For Israel, this development cannot be considered secondary.

Any change in Damascus affects the entire northern belt of regional security. If Ukraine strengthens its presence in Syria as a supplier of experience, food, and a diplomatic channel, it means that more players interested in containing chaos, weakening Iranian pressure, and ousting Russian monopoly influence are entering the Middle Eastern equation. It is not a fact that this process will be quick. But it is already visible: Ukraine is trying to turn its own war and its own hard experience into a tool of foreign policy, and Syria — to use the new contact with Kyiv as part of the exit from international isolation.

The history of Ukrainian-Syrian relations in 2026 is essentially starting anew. And the question now is not only whether the embassy doors will open. The main question is whether this diplomatic reboot can turn into a sustainable alliance of interests — or whether the Middle East will again prove stronger than any agreements.

How Israel should relate to this

The Golan, southern Syria, and the Druze question do not give reason for romance

For Israel, the rapprochement between Kyiv and Damascus cannot be perceived in a black-and-white logic — as an unequivocally good or unequivocally bad news. Jerusalem still has its own tough conflict of interests with Syria.

Israel has held the Golan Heights since 1967 and extended its legislation to them in 1981; the US recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan in 2019, but most countries did not. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israeli forces also took new positions in the demilitarized zone and on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, explaining this with security issues.

Therefore, from the Israeli point of view, the main question today is not whether the new Syrian configuration is liked, but whether southern Syria will again be turned into a space of threats — Iranian, jihadist, or any other. For this reason, in negotiations with Damascus, Israel insists on the demilitarization of southwestern Syria and separately emphasizes the need to protect the Druze.

Syria, in turn, demands the withdrawal of Israeli forces from positions occupied after the fall of Assad and is not ready to legitimize either the new Israeli presence on Syrian territory or, even more so, the Golan issue.

A separate pain for Israel is the Suwayda region and the Druze south of Syria in general. In 2025, there was a major wave of violence there: according to the UN, more than 1,700 people were killed in one week, and almost 200,000 were forced to leave their homes. Already in March 2026, the Israeli army struck at Syrian government facilities, stating that it did so after attacks on Druze civilians.

Thus, for Israel, the issue of Syria is not only about maps, borders, and heights, but also about internal sensitivity around the Druze community on both sides of the demarcation line.

Did Israel bet on the Russian presence in Syria

To be honest, part of the Israeli establishment indeed viewed the limited Russian presence in Syria as the lesser evil. Reuters reported that in early 2025, Israel lobbied in the US for a model of a “weak and decentralized Syria,” where Russia maintains its bases as a counterbalance to growing Turkish influence and the new Islamist order in Damascus.

This does not mean that Israel wanted a “Russian Syria” as an ideal. Rather, it was about cold calculation: Moscow was considered a more understandable player than a Turkish protectorate or a chaotic southern Syria with an unknown balance of power.

But this is where the situation has already changed.

Even Israeli analysts from INSS now write that the return of Russia as a more noticeable power player in Syria does not meet Israel’s interests, because it can reduce its freedom of action — especially in intelligence, air defense, and operations on the Syrian front. It is directly stated there that Jerusalem should move away from the logic of using Russia as a balancer and instead focus on direct or Western-mediated dialogue with Damascus with closer coordination with the US and Europe.

What Israel should do now

Not “swallow what is,” but recognize the new reality without illusions.

The old Syrian model, where Russia was part of the familiar mechanism of checks, crumbled along with the Assad regime. Returning to that construction is no longer possible.

Therefore, for Israel, the rational line now looks different: not trying to preserve foreign presence in Syria, but achieving specific conditions — demilitarization of the south, a ban on Iranian and pro-Iranian infrastructure near its border, international guarantees for the Druze, and a strict de-escalation mechanism with the new Damascus.

That is why the Ukrainian-Syrian rapprochement for Israel does not necessarily have to be bad news. If Ukraine enters Syria not as a sponsor of chaos, but as a partner in security, logistics, and recovery, this potentially reduces the space for Iran, decreases the Russian monopoly, and makes the new Syrian authorities more dependent on pragmatic external ties rather than on a revanchist axis. For Jerusalem, this is not a reason to relax, but also not a reason to cling to the past. In such conditions, it is more beneficial for Israel not to resent the new configuration, but to firmly integrate into it on its own terms.