What Israel Has Not Learned from Ukraine: FPV Drones, Hezbollah, and the Cost of Military Bureaucracy

FPV drones have become a war that cannot be postponed

In the Israeli publication ‘Basheva’, an important text by Leonid Baratz was published under the headline ‘What Have We Not Learned from Ukraine?‘. The material was published on May 31, 2026, and raises a painful question for Israel: why a country with one of the strongest defense industries in the world has become vulnerable to Hezbollah’s cheap FPV drones.

For the Israeli audience, this topic no longer seems theoretical. In recent months, reports beginning with the words ‘allowed for publication’ are increasingly associated with drone strikes. What Ukrainian soldiers experience every day on the front against Russia is gradually becoming part of Israel’s northern reality — only now through the threat from Hezbollah.

Ukraine saw this war earlier

FPV drones as a mass weapon have shown their destructive effectiveness precisely in the war of Russia against Ukraine. There, they have turned not into an exotic, but into a daily tool of the front: cheap, accurate, massive, and psychologically heavy for soldiers.

That is why repatriates from Ukraine, seeing the footage of October 7, 2023, and subsequent attacks in northern Israel, asked the same question: how did a country that closely follows wars and technologies not learn the main lesson from the largest war in Europe in the last eight decades?

According to military observer David Hendelman, Israel did study this topic. And not superficially. One of the recently retired officers, as noted in the publication, wrote 54 documents solely on the topic of FPV drones.

The Alma Center, which researches security threats to Israel in the northern direction, warned of this danger back in September 2024. In May 2025, the head of the operational management issued a clear directive for preparation. On paper, everything looked serious.

But then began the part that is too well known in Israel: a lot of understanding, a lot of documents, a lot of approvals — and too few quick practical solutions.

Expensive systems do not always save from a cheap threat

Israel has invested billions of dollars for decades in advanced electronic warfare systems, protection against ballistic missiles, suppression of enemy air defenses, and complex technological solutions. This is logical for a country accustomed to thinking in terms of large threats: missiles, aviation, long-range systems, state armies.

The problem is that the FPV drone breaks the usual logic of defense.

It is not a ballistic missile, not a fighter jet, and not an expensive strategic-class drone. Often it is a simple construction from available components, including Chinese-made ones, which can cost tens and hundreds of times less than the means used to intercept it.

The economy of war works against Israel

In such a situation, a dangerous asymmetry arises. Hezbollah can use cheap drones to exhaust Israel, while the IDF and the security system are forced to respond with expensive means, spending ammunition, resources, and time.

This is not only a military problem but also an economic one. If the enemy launches a cheap device, and a means costing tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars is required to destroy it, it already imposes an inconvenient model of war on Israel.

For readers of NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency the Ukrainian experience is especially important here. Ukraine has already gone through the stage when it became clear: small threats cannot be answered only with large systems. Separate detection means, cheap and massive solutions, mobile protection for units, and quick adaptation to a specific front are needed.

In this, Ukraine today can be not just an object of support, but a source of practical knowledge for Israel.

What Ukrainians are already using on the front

The ‘Basheva’ publication includes a conversation with Igor Kraiss — a Ukrainian Jewish military and drone defense instructor. He talked about the means that have already become almost mandatory equipment on the Ukrainian front not only for soldiers but also for volunteers, journalists, and civilians working near the line of hostilities.

One example is the ‘Chuyka’ system produced by BlueBird Tech, which has NATO codification. It is installed in a vehicle or at a position, passively scans radio frequencies, and displays on the screen the video signal transmitted by the drone. That is, the soldier can see approximately what the enemy FPV operator sees.

Another example is ‘Dziga’, a system with acoustic and radio sensors. It warns several fighters at once and indicates the direction of the approaching threat. It is not a ‘magic button’, but such solutions give the infantry precious seconds, which often decide the question of life and death on the front.

There is also a more complex threat — drones on fiber optics. They do not transmit a radio signal, so conventional electronic warfare means and radio interception systems are almost powerless against them. To combat such devices, Ukrainians use acoustic sensors, thermal imaging means, and field methods, including attempts to physically cut the cable.

Israel needs to buy, learn, and quickly produce its own

The main conclusion from this story is unpleasant but simple: Israel cannot wait for a perfect domestic solution if the threat is already at the border. When soldiers in the north face Hezbollah’s FPV drones, bureaucracy, departmental disputes, and technological pride become too expensive a luxury.

Ukraine has already created a whole set of means for the real war of small drones. These solutions were born not in presentations, but in trenches, under strikes, in conditions of constant adaptation of the enemy. That is why they have special practical value.

What can be done right now

Israel has money, technological capabilities, and a strong defense industry. Therefore, the logical path looks dual: to purchase Ukrainian solutions now and simultaneously create Israeli analogs adapted to the frequencies, tactics, and conditions of Hezbollah.

One of the devices mentioned in the material costs about 750 dollars. In Ukraine, such means are often bought by the military or volunteers themselves. For Israel, with its defense budget, this is not an unaffordable amount, especially if it concerns the protection of soldiers, vehicles, strongpoints, and civilian areas at the border.

But it’s not just about purchases. Israel will have to change its mindset.

A cheap threat no longer means a secondary threat. A small drone can stop a unit, destroy equipment, strike an observation post, disrupt a column’s movement, and create psychological pressure disproportionate to its price.

Three lessons from the Ukrainian front

The Ukrainian experience also provides simple tactical rules.

If an FPV drone is already approaching, you cannot run in a straight line — this makes a person an easy target for the operator. You need to change direction sharply, seek cover, and break the line of sight of the camera.

At night, the danger does not disappear, and often increases. Thermal imaging cameras allow seeing people in complete darkness, so the usual feeling that night protects no longer works in modern warfare.

And one more rule: you cannot approach a fallen drone, even if it looks ‘dead’. The operator may be waiting for the moment to detonate, and the device itself may remain dangerous.

For Israel, this is not Ukrainian exoticism, but a practical scenario for the near future. Hezbollah is learning, Iran is supplying technology and experience to its proxies, and the Russian-Iranian connection has already shown how quickly drone warfare changes the battlefield.

Israel knows how to create complex systems, but now it needs not only great technological superiority but also quick grassroots protection. Such that can be placed on a vehicle, in a strongpoint, in a unit, next to a soldier.

While the big answer is still being developed, the Ukrainian lesson sounds harsh and simple: those who survive are those who notice the drone faster, hide faster, jam faster, learn faster, and do not wait until the threat becomes a national tragedy.