- June 10, 2026
- 8:09 pm
- Israel, World News
Europeans are no longer sure that the US will protect them in case of war
In Europe, there was not just a political dispute about Donald Trump, NATO, or defense spending. There was a psychological shift: residents of European countries increasingly doubt that the United States will automatically come to their aid if their country is attacked.
This is an important signal not only for Brussels, Warsaw, Berlin, Kyiv, or Paris. For Israel, this survey also sounds like a serious warning. In a region where Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, proxy networks, and the constant threat of multi-front war are nearby, security cannot be built solely on the promises of allies.
On June 10, 2026, the European Council on Foreign Relations — ECFR — published a study Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves. The survey was conducted in May 2026 among the adult population of 15 European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The total sample consisted of 19,481 respondents.
The main figure looks sharp: only 11% of Europeans now consider the US a true ally. Back in November 2024, it was 22%, and about six months before the current study — 16%. That is, the decline in trust in America is not a random spike, but a steady downward trend.
Meanwhile, 25% of respondents already see the US as either a competitor or an adversary. About half of the European public perceives America not as an ally, but as a ‘necessary partner’ — a country they have to cooperate with but no longer trust as they used to.
This is a very important difference.
Europe has not become completely anti-American.
It does not want to burn bridges with Washington. But it has stopped looking at the US as a force that will always come first, always save, and always fulfill previous commitments without political conditions.
In none of the 15 countries does the majority believe in American assistance
The most alarming part of the study concerns the direct question of security: will the US help if a country is attacked?
According to ECFR, the majority in none of the 15 surveyed countries now believes that the US will necessarily come to help in case of an attack. This is almost a historical shift for Europe, which has lived under the American military umbrella for decades after World War II and especially during the Cold War.
Even Poland, usually considered one of the most pro-American states in Europe, shows caution. There, only 37% of respondents said they are fully or sufficiently confident in American military assistance. This is more than in many other countries, but even in Poland, there is no majority that calmly says: yes, America will definitely protect us.
In Spain, the figure is even lower — about 12%. On average, across all 15 countries, the level of confidence in US assistance is about 23.8%. In other words, less than a quarter of Europeans truly believe that Washington will automatically stand by their country in the event of a military threat.
Against this backdrop, trust in neighbors is growing.
In all countries except Bulgaria, the majority of respondents are confident that at least some European partners will help them in case of an attack. The average figure for this question is about 65.1%. Europe is looking less across the Atlantic and more at its own continent.
Why this is important for Israel: an ally does not replace one’s own strength
For Israel, this European fear of US unreliability is not an academic topic. Israel has been building a strategic partnership with America for decades. This partnership is real, deep, and vitally important: military aid, diplomatic support, joint missile defense projects, coordination on Iran, arms supplies, political protection on international platforms.
But the European survey reminds of an unpleasant thing: even the strongest ally acts based on its internal politics.
The US has elections, Congress, the White House, public opinion, war fatigue, economic crises, isolationist sentiments, and its own strategic interests.
Israel, especially after October 7, 2023, clearly saw that in the moment of catastrophe, the first hours, the first decisions, and the first strikes have to be endured independently. Allies can help, support, send ammunition, provide diplomatic resources, participate in repelling missile attacks. But they do not replace one’s own army, intelligence, missile defense, civil resilience, economy, and political will.
This is the main lesson for Israel.
The alliance with the US needs to be cherished, strengthened, and developed.
But it cannot be turned into a substitute for one’s own security strategy.
A small country in a tough region cannot afford to live in the illusion that someone else will always decide its fate.
Europeans are only now coming to what Israel has long known in practice: security begins not with declarations, but with the readiness to defend oneself. NATO, treaties, alliances, and diplomacy are important, but in a critical moment, preparation, armament, technological advantage, societal mobilization, and the ability to act quickly are decisive.
This is why for the Israeli audience, NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency this story is important not as European statistics, but as a mirror. If even large European countries are beginning to doubt that the US will necessarily protect them in case of an attack, Israel cannot afford strategic complacency.
Europe does not want to replace NATO, but wants to depend less on the US
Interestingly, Europeans do not demand to immediately replace NATO with a fully European defense structure. According to ECFR, only 29% of respondents consider it a good idea to create a defense organization only for Europe instead of NATO. About 28% are against it. The rest do not yet have a firm position.
This shows not a revolution, but pragmatism. Europe does not want to break with the US. It hopes that transatlantic relations can improve after the end of Donald Trump’s presidency. Most respondents believe that relations between Europe and America will likely get better after Trump.
But at the same time, Europeans no longer want to remain without their own key to the house. In the study, this is compared to the image from the movie Home Alone: the child is left home alone, realizes that protection has disappeared, and is forced to strengthen the house himself. Europe does not want to remain without America forever, but it can no longer pretend that nothing has changed.
Hence the support for more independent defense. Europeans generally support increased defense spending, reducing dependence on the US in security matters, buying European weapons, and more serious European defense policy. Only in Poland do the majority of voters consider it a good idea to buy more American weapons.
In some countries, there is growing readiness to even discuss a European nuclear deterrent potential. According to ECFR, in Denmark and Italy, attitudes towards this idea have warmed, and the British, who previously firmly opposed the idea of sharing their nuclear arsenal, are now roughly evenly divided.
Another important indicator is the attitude towards common debt for defense spending.
Europeans, including voters of ruling parties in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, mostly support the idea of joint European debt to finance defense. For Europe, where talks about common debt have always been politically painful, this is a significant shift.
But there are limits here. When people are faced with a choice between defense and other social spending, the answers become more cautious. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, the majority or a significant part of society does not want military spending to grow at the expense of domestic needs. That is, Europeans are ready for greater independence, but not ready to automatically pay any price.
Ukraine, Russia, energy, and a new Europe without previous illusions
A separate part of the study concerns Ukraine.
Europeans in most countries continue to support Ukraine in its self-defense against Russian aggression. In many countries, Ukraine is perceived either as an ally or as a necessary partner with whom Europe needs to strategically cooperate. Moreover, almost everywhere, the attitude towards Ukraine is now better than the attitude towards the US, except in Poland and Hungary, where there are separate complex bilateral issues with Kyiv.
But support for Ukraine does not mean readiness for any steps. According to ECFR, Europeans mostly do not support sending their troops to Ukraine after a possible peace. It is especially important that the majority in Germany, France, and Poland — three key countries of European defense — oppose such a scenario.
Also, there is no stable consensus in Europe regarding Ukraine’s accession to the EU ‘in the current context’.
This does not mean that Europeans reject EU expansion altogether. For example, the attitude towards western expansion, including the possible return of the UK to the EU, is much softer. But eastern expansion causes more concern.
Strong resistance to eastern EU expansion is noticeable in Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In Estonia, France, Germany, and Poland, public opinion is more divided. In the Netherlands, which is usually considered skeptical of expansion, the public even slightly leans towards supporting eastern expansion, but without great enthusiasm.
For Ukraine, this is a complex signal. Europeans support its fight against Russian aggression but do not want to automatically take on all the risks — neither military, nor institutional, nor financial. Therefore, Kyiv and its allies will have to explain support for Ukraine not only through morality but also through the security of Europe itself.
Russia as a lesson in dependency: Europeans do not want to return to Russian gas
Another important conclusion of the study concerns energy. Despite rising prices, anxiety over a new energy crisis, and pressure on living standards, most Europeans do not want to return to dependence on Russian oil and gas.
Support for returning to Russian energy is more noticeable only in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy, as well as among some far-right electorates in other countries, including AfD in Germany and National Rally in France. But overall, across the continent, the majority prefers to develop their own European energy, especially renewable sources and other domestic energy sectors.
For Israel, this block is also important.
National security today is not only about the army. It is energy, infrastructure, cyber defense, logistics, ports, gas fields, power grids, water resources, backup systems, arms production, and the ability of the economy to withstand a long crisis.
Europe after 2022 paid dearly for its dependence on Russian energy resources. Now a significant part of society understands: cheap gas from an aggressive power can turn out to be very expensive when war begins. For Israel, which lives in a region of constant threat, this is not theory, but a practical formula for survival.
What this survey says about the new world order
The new European mindset can be described in one phrase: less trust, more independence. The US remains a crucial force, but faith in automatic American protection is disappearing. Europe has not yet become a fully independent military center, but it has already psychologically moved out of the old model where Washington always comes first.
For Israel, this should sound like a warning without panic. There is no need to destroy the alliance with the US; on the contrary, it needs to be strengthened. But at the same time, it is important for Israel to expand its own defense industry, invest in missile defense systems, interceptor missiles, drones, intelligence, cybersecurity, autonomous technologies, civil defense, northern and southern fortifications, energy resilience, and internal readiness for a long conflict.
The European survey shows that even rich and large countries are beginning to understand the cost of dependency. When an ally is far away, when its politics change presidents, when society is tired of external commitments, previous guarantees become less firm.
Israel cannot afford such luxury. For a country where distances are measured not in thousands of kilometers but in minutes of missile flight, security cannot depend solely on the mood of Washington, Brussels, or any other capital.
The main conclusion from the ECFR study sounds harsh but honest: allies are needed, but those who are ready to defend themselves survive. Europe is only coming to this. Israel lives with this lesson every day.
And if Europeans today wake up in a world without the previous American umbrella, it is important for Israel to see this not as someone else’s problem. It is part of the common reality of the 21st century, where declarations no longer replace strength, and international promises work only when a country has its own ability to withstand a blow.
Israel needs a new European contour: the EU and Ukraine as partners
For Israel, one of the ways out of the new global uncertainty is not to move away from the US, but to expand the circle of reliable partnerships. The American alliance remains key, but relying solely on Washington in 2026 is already too risky. If Europe itself begins to understand that security cannot be built on a single external guarantee, Israel all the more needs to act more broadly.
The first direction is the restoration of normal, strong, and partnership relations with the European Union. Not formally and not through mutual claims, but through practical interest: security, technology, cybersecurity, medicine, water solutions, energy, missile defense, counter-terrorism, and protection of critical infrastructure.
But for this, Israel will have to change its tone. It cannot demand Europe to understand Israeli threats while ignoring the European fear of Russian aggression, the war in Ukraine, and the collapse of the previous security system. If Israel wants Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and Prague to better understand the pain after October 7, it must itself more clearly understand the European pain after February 24, 2022.
Ukraine can become a bridge to a new Europe
Today, for many European countries, Ukraine is not just a state defending itself from Russia. It has become a symbol that war in Europe is possible again, and dictatorships are once again testing the democratic world for weakness.
Israel will have to more honestly reconsider the Ukrainian direction. Caution is understandable: Syria is nearby, Russian presence in the region, Iran, Hezbollah, and complex diplomacy. But excessive distance from Ukraine also has a price. It worsens Israel’s perception in Europe and creates the impression that Jerusalem wants understanding of its war but is not ready to speak clearly enough about another country’s war against an aggressor.
It is not necessarily about drastic steps. There are practical directions: humanitarian aid, medicine, rehabilitation of the wounded, early warning systems, protection of civilian infrastructure, cyber cooperation, demining, work with Ukraine’s Jewish heritage, and Ukrainian communities.
What Israel will have to change
Israel needs to stop looking at Europe only as a source of criticism and pressure. Yes, there are double standards in Europe, anti-Israel campaigns, and politicians who harshly condemn Israel but speak more softly about Hamas, Iran, or Russian aggression. But Europe is not homogeneous.
There are Eastern European countries, the Baltics, Germany, France, the Czech Republic, Poland, Scandinavia, Jewish and Ukrainian communities, defense companies, universities, technological centers, and municipal partnerships. Israel needs an accurate map of allies, opponents, and those with whom it can work.
The new formula should be simple: the US is the main ally, Europe is a strategic partner, Ukraine is an important direction. This is not a choice between Washington and Brussels. It is an attempt not to be left alone in a world where even the American guarantee is no longer perceived as automatic.
If Israel wants Europe to better understand the threats of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis, Israel needs to more clearly understand the European fear of Russia. In the new reality, security is built not on one big ally, but on a network of partnerships, trust, and mutual understanding.
