- June 15, 2026
- 6:04 pm
- Israel
Once upon a time in Israel, Netanyahu attended the “Russia Day”. Then President Rivlin. Then the Foreign Minister. And now — a minister of the third political tier. This is not a break in relations. But it is no longer the same closeness. In diplomacy, such details are clear: the level of presence is falling, and with it, Russia’s ability to portray its former influence in Israel is also falling.
On June 11, at the Dan Tel Aviv Hotel, the Russian embassy in Israel held a state reception on the occasion of Russia Day, which is celebrated in the Russian Federation on June 12. The official message from the Russian embassy is published here: israel.mid.ru
At first glance, everything looked like a regular diplomatic protocol: hall, guests, speeches, veterans, embassy representatives, officials, religious figures, cultural program. The Russian side specifically emphasized that more than 300 guests attended the event.
But in diplomacy, the main thing is often hidden not in the number of people in the hall, but in the rank of those whom the state sends to the front row.
This is where the main political story begins.
The main honorary guest of the reception, as “officially determined” by the Russian embassy in Israel, “became” Mai Golan — Minister of Social Equality and Advancement of Women in Israel. She is an acting minister, a member of the government, and a representative of the ruling Likud party. She is not a private individual and not just a deputy who happened to be at the event.
But Mai Golan is not the Prime Minister, not the President, not the Foreign Minister, not the Defense Minister, not the Finance Minister, and not a representative of the security or foreign policy core of Netanyahu’s cabinet.
In terms of real political weight, this is a minister of the 3rd political tier.
This is what makes the reception interesting not as a social event, but as an indicator of the change in Russia’s status in the Israeli protocol.
A full hall without Israel’s top officials
The Russian embassy tried to show “scale”.
Quote:
“More than 300 guests attended the event. Among them were former Prime Minister of Israel E. Olmert, Senior Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Y. Livne, Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Y. Fuchs, head of the Nativ organization A. Shoham, head of the Main Directorate of the Israeli Police O. Abukasis, representatives of Israeli ministries and departments, the Coordinating Council of Russian-speaking compatriots’ organizations in Israel, the Israeli Association of Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, business and academic circles, veteran and compatriot movements, political and public figures, journalists”.
The list is long. But it does not cancel the main thing: the current political power of Israel at the level of the main honorary guest was represented by Mai Golan.
Ehud Olmert is a prominent figure, but he is a former Prime Minister. His presence can add weight to the event in a social or media picture, but he does not represent the current government of Israel.
Foreign Ministry officials are also an important channel. Their presence shows that diplomatic ties are not closed. However, this is not the Foreign Minister, not the Minister of Strategic Affairs, and not a politician making key decisions on the Israel-Russia line.
Therefore, the main conclusion is simple: Russia received the official Israeli protocol, but did not receive the political elite of Israel.
When Moscow wants to show the strength of influence, it needs not only flags, speeches, and a full hall. It needs top officials. This time there were no top officials.
From Netanyahu to Mai Golan: how the level of Israeli representation fell
To understand the significance of the 2026 reception, it is important to look not only at the fact of Mai Golan’s participation.
In diplomacy, a separate event often becomes understandable only in comparison with previous years. And this is where the main thing is visible: the level of Israeli representation at events for Russia Day has gradually decreased.
In 2018, Russian diplomacy in Israel could show a completely different picture. Then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attended the event. This was the maximum political level: not a minister, not an official, not a department representative, but the head of the Israeli government. For Moscow, such participation was a strong symbol — next to the Russian national holiday stood the first person of the Israeli executive branch. In protocol terms, there is almost nothing higher than this level for the government.
In 2019, the level also remained high. The event was attended by the President of Israel Reuven Rivlin, as well as government representatives. The President in Israel does not manage the cabinet like the Prime Minister, but his participation has enormous state and symbolic weight. This is not departmental presence, but state representation at the level of a national symbol. For Russia, it was still a picture of high closeness: Russia Day in Israel remained an event where figures of the first state tier come.
In 2020, the main honorary guest was the Foreign Minister of Israel Gabi Ashkenazi. This is no longer the Prime Minister or the President, but still a very high diplomatic level. The Foreign Minister is the person directly responsible for foreign policy, international contacts, and the official tone of relations with other states. For Russia, the participation of the Israeli Foreign Minister meant that Russia Day retained a serious protocol status.
In 2021, the main honorary guest was Gila Gamliel, then Minister of Environmental Protection. This is already a noticeable decrease compared to the Prime Minister, President, and Foreign Minister. Gamliel was an acting minister and a representative of Likud, so her participation remained an official state gesture. But the Ministry of Environmental Protection does not belong to the foreign policy, defense, or economic core of power. Compared to 2020, this was a transition from the head of Israeli diplomacy to a minister of a sectoral, internal direction.
In 2022, the situation was transitional. This was already the year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the diplomatic background changed sharply. In open sources among the honorary guests was Ze’ev Elkin — then Minister of Construction, Jerusalem Affairs, and Heritage. Elkin is a politician of heavier weight than an ordinary technical minister: he knows the Russian direction well, was born in Kharkiv, and for many years dealt with issues of foreign policy, Jerusalem, and relations with the post-Soviet space. But still, this is not the level of the Prime Minister, President, or Foreign Minister. That is, Israel maintained an official channel, but did not elevate Russia Day to the highest state level.
In 2023, the Israeli government was represented at the reception by Gila Gamliel, now as Minister of Intelligence. Formally, the title of the position sounds more significant than ecology, but in the Israeli system, it is still not the same as the Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, or Prime Minister. It was a government representative, but not a figure setting Israel’s strategic course in relations with Russia, the USA, Europe, or Ukraine. Israel was present, but the level remained below the pre-war peak. Israeli media also wrote that the government of Israel was represented by Gamliel.
In 2024, at the reception in the Sergei Courtyard, a congratulatory speech from the Israeli government was delivered by the Minister of Agriculture Avi Dichter. His personal political weight is higher than it might seem from the name of the ministry: Dichter is a former head of the Shin Bet, former Minister of Internal Security, an experienced politician from Likud. But at that moment he represented the agricultural department, not the Foreign Ministry, defense, or the Prime Minister’s office. Therefore, 2024 can be considered intermediate: Moscow received a notable politician, but did not receive a figure from the foreign policy or security core of the current cabinet. Sources associated with the Sergei Courtyard and the Russian Orthodox Church indicated that the congratulatory speech from the Israeli government was delivered by Avi Dichter.
In 2025, the main honorary guest was Mai Golan — Minister of Social Equality and Advancement of Women. This is already a more obvious transition to the third political tier. Golan is an acting minister and a representative of the ruling Likud party, so her participation cannot be called private or accidental. But her ministry is not related to defense, foreign policy, finance, strategic planning, or regional security. For Moscow, this was an official Israeli gesture, but already without the previous political height.
In 2026, the picture repeated: the main honorary guest was again Mai Golan. The Russian embassy itself recorded this in an official message about the reception at the Dan Tel Aviv Hotel. More than 300 guests attended the event, including former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, senior officials of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, representatives of the police, Nativ, public, business, academic, and Russian-speaking organizations. But the current government of Israel was represented as the main honorary guest by Mai Golan. The Russian Foreign Ministry also published a message where she is named the main honorary guest of the reception.
This builds a clear ladder of the level’s decline. First — Prime Minister Netanyahu. Then — President Rivlin. Then — Foreign Minister Ashkenazi. Then — sectoral ministers and individual politicians: Gamliel, Elkin, Dichter. Finally — Mai Golan, a minister of the third political tier.
If earlier Russia could demonstrate the Prime Minister, President, or Foreign Minister at its national day in Israel, now the main honorary guest becomes a minister not associated with foreign policy and security. This is not a complete boycott, not a break, and not the closure of a diplomatic channel. But it is a clear signal: the previous level is no longer there.
That is why the reception at the Dan Tel Aviv Hotel in 2026 can be read in two ways. On the one hand, Moscow received the official presence of an Israeli minister. On the other hand, it did not receive Netanyahu, nor the President, nor the Foreign Minister, nor the Defense Minister, nor anyone from the political core of power.
In diplomacy, such a distinction matters. A full hall, a long list of guests, and festive speeches do not replace the rank of the main state representative. Russia tried to show the scale of the event, but it itself recorded in its message: the main honorary guest was Mai Golan.
This is the main indicator of the level’s decline. Israel left the protocol but removed the political height. Moscow received presence but did not receive the previous status.
For NAnews — Israel News Nikk.Agency in this story, the fact of the reception itself is not important. Embassies regularly hold national days, it is part of diplomatic routine. The rank is important. States often speak not with statements, but with whom they send to the hall.
And if earlier next to the Russian embassy one could show the Prime Minister, President, or Foreign Minister, now the main honorary guest becomes a minister not responsible for foreign policy, security, or strategic decisions.
What Russia said: holiday, Holocaust, and justification of war
Not only the composition of guests deserves special attention, but also the content of the speech by Russian Ambassador Anatoly Viktorov.
According to the embassy’s message, he spoke about the “millennial historical path” of the Russian state, “unbending will”, “patriotism”, “unity”, “diversity”, and “traditional spiritual and moral values”. He reminded of the first human flight into space, Russia’s contribution to the Victory over Nazism, the cessation of the horrors of the Holocaust, and Moscow’s role in shaping the modern system of international relations.
This is a classic set of Russian state rhetoric: history, Victory, space, traditional values, a special mission, and a claim to moral right to teach the world.
But then the main thing was said.
The ambassador, according to the message, stated that “all the goals of the special military operation will be achieved”. That is, at a state reception in Tel Aviv, there was no distancing from the war, but a confirmation of the course to continue Russian aggression against Ukraine.
For the Israeli audience, this is a particularly sensitive moment.
Russia is again speaking to Israel through the memory of the Holocaust, the Red Army, and the fight against Nazism. But in the same political framework, it justifies the war against Ukraine — a country where Jewish communities live, where there is a deep Jewish history, where under Russian strikes were cities, civilian buildings, cultural objects, universities, museums, and families with Ukrainian and Jewish roots.
Moscow uses the memory of World War II as a diplomatic shield. But this shield no longer hides the reality of today’s war.
Anti-Ukrainian block in Viktorov’s speech
In the embassy’s message, there is another important fragment. Viktorov emphasized that “the common duty of Russia and Israel” is to counter attempts to “rewrite history”, “diminish or distort the role of Red Army soldiers”, and also, as stated in the Russian text, “elevate Nazi collaborators-Ukrainian nationalists to the rank of national heroes”.
This is not a neutral historical phrase. This is a direct part of the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda line.
At an event where the main honorary guest was a minister of the Israeli government, the Russian ambassador essentially repeated Moscow’s key theses about the war against Ukraine: Russia is the “heir of Victory”, Ukraine is allegedly a space of “nationalists”, the war is allegedly forced and historically justified.
And here the question arises not to the Russian embassy. Nothing else can be expected from it.
The question is to Israel: what signal does the participation of an acting minister of the government send at an event where, alongside the memory of the Holocaust, the justification of the Russian war against Ukraine is heard?
Mai Golan: not the first row, but still a state sign
It is important not to simplify. Mai Golan is not the head of Israel’s foreign policy. She does not negotiate on Ukraine, does not determine Israel’s position on Russia, does not manage the army, does not answer for strategic dialogue with the USA or Europe.
That is why her presence shows the decline in the level of representation.
But on the other hand, she remains a minister. She sits in the government of Israel. She represents the ruling Likud party. Therefore, her participation cannot be reduced to the formula “just someone came”.
The correct assessment here is dual:
for Russia, this is no longer the previous high status; for Israel, it is still an official political gesture.
Moscow can record for itself: a minister of the Israeli government came.
But critics can respond: not a first-tier figure came, but a minister of the third political level.
And both parts are true.
That is why the article should not be about “Israel supported Russia”. That would be too crude and inaccurate. More precisely: Israel maintained the protocol channel but noticeably lowered the political rank of participation.
NAnews — Israel News Nikk.Agency considers this story precisely as an indicator of diplomatic balance: Israel does not want to completely close the door to Moscow, but also does not give it the previous picture of closeness with the top of the state.
Iran, the “Palestinian question” and Russia’s attempt to return to the regional game
In Viktorov’s speech, there was not only the Ukrainian block. The Russian ambassador also spoke about Moscow’s readiness to “facilitate the search for political-diplomatic solutions to the crisis” around Iran. He reminded of the “updated Russian concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf zone”.
The topic of the “Palestinian-Israeli problem” was separately mentioned — in the Russian formulation, based on the international legal framework, taking into account “Israeli security concerns” and “Palestinian aspirations”.
This is also not an accidental part of the speech. Russia is trying to present itself not as an isolated aggressor country, but as a player allegedly capable of participating in the resolution of regional crises — from Iran to the Middle East.
But in Israel, such a role of Moscow is perceived more and more complicatedly.
Russia maintains contacts with Iran. Russia is waging war against Ukraine. Russia uses anti-Western rhetoric. Russia tries to talk about Israel’s security while simultaneously building its own line with those forces that are a direct threat to Israel.
Therefore, words about “collective security” sound beautiful, but politically do not remove the main contradiction: Moscow wants to be a mediator while remaining a party to an aggressive war and a partner of the anti-Western camp.
Why a full hall does not equal influence
The Russian embassy separately emphasizes that ambassadors, diplomats, and representatives of military attachés from more than 30 “friendly states”, UN staff, representatives of Israeli city halls, honorary consuls, church figures, and Russian-speaking organizations attended the reception.
For a diplomatic report, this looks solid.
But massiveness does not always mean political success.
A full hall can show the activity of the embassy, the presence of old ties, work with compatriots, contacts with part of business, veteran, and religious circles. However, the main question remains the same: who came from the current top of Israel?
Not the Prime Minister.
Not the President.
Not the Foreign Minister.
Not the Defense Minister.
Not the Finance Minister.
Not the head of the strategic block.
The main honorary guest was Mai Golan.
This is not a protocol failure, but it is a clear lowering of the level compared to the years when Russian diplomacy could show the top officials of Israel next to it.
And in this sense, the Russian report itself provides material for the opposite conclusion. The embassy wanted to show scale. But if you read the text carefully, it shows a limitation: there is a hall, there is symbolism, there are speeches, but the previous political weight is no longer there.
What this means for Israel
For Israel, the situation is more complicated than a simple choice between “to go” and “not to go”.
Israel lives in a region where the Russian factor has long been associated with Syria, Iran, military coordination, the security of Jewish communities, repatriation, diplomatic channels, and the internal Russian-speaking audience. Therefore, Jerusalem often acts more cautiously than Kyiv or some European capitals would like to see.
But caution does not cancel the moral and political context.
When the Russian ambassador in Tel Aviv says that the goals of the so-called “special military operation” will be achieved, this is not just an internal Russian formula. This is a statement about the continuation of the war against Ukraine, made on Israeli soil, at an official state reception, in the presence of representatives of the Israeli system.
When alongside this the Holocaust, the Red Army, and the fight against Nazism are mentioned, a particularly sharp contrast arises. The memory of the catastrophe of European Jewry should not become a cover for modern aggression.
Israel has the right to pragmatic diplomacy. But Israeli society has the right to ask where the line between protocol and political signal lies.
Main conclusion: Moscow received the protocol, but did not receive the previous status
The reception for Russia Day in Tel Aviv took place. Russian diplomacy gathered guests, delivered speeches, showed veterans, church ties, Russian-speaking organizations, diplomats, and a cultural program with the support of the Moscow government.
But the main political signal was not in the number of guests and not in the festive rhetoric.
The main signal is in the level of Israeli representation.
Russia did not receive the Prime Minister of Israel at this reception.
Did not receive the President.
Did not receive the Foreign Minister.
Did not receive the Defense Minister.
Did not receive a figure determining Israel’s strategy.
It received Mai Golan — an acting minister, but a minister of the third political tier.
For Moscow, this allows saying: Israel was represented.
For an attentive observer, it says something else: Israel was represented, but no longer at the previous level.
This is not a break in relations. Not a diplomatic boycott. Not a demonstrative closing of the door.
But it is also not the closeness that Russia could show before.
In diplomacy, such details are clear: the level of presence is falling, and with it, Moscow’s ability to portray its former influence in Israel is falling.
Russia received a full hall. But did not receive the first row of power.