- July 9, 2026
- 1:50 pm
- Brief news
Ukraine requests more Patriot missiles, the Middle East expends anti-missiles amid the Iranian threat, and PAC-3 production physically cannot keep up with the wars. Donald Trump’s statement about a license for Kyiv is important, but the main question remains: how to protect the sky today?
The world has entered an era of air defense shortages
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which show no end in sight, have exacerbated the air defense problem to the limit.
A few years ago, Patriot, THAAD, David’s Sling, Arrow, and other elements of modern missile defense were considered expensive but relatively “reserve” tools for large armies. Today they have become expendable materials in a major war.
Ukraine daily repels Russian attacks with missiles and drones. Israel and regional countries live in the reality of the Iranian missile threat. American bases and Gulf states are also forced to spend costly interceptors to repel strikes.
As a result, the main thing became clear: modern warfare consumes air defense missiles faster than Western defense industry can produce them.
According to data cited by Forbes Ukraine, the interception rate of ballistic missiles in Ukraine has sharply deteriorated: from almost 40% at the beginning of the year to 20% in spring and almost to zero by mid-summer. This does not mean that Ukrainian air defense has stopped working. It means that Ukraine has too few suitable means against ballistics.
The main tool that has proven effective against ballistic missiles at Ukraine’s disposal is the Patriot with PAC-3 missiles. They are capable of intercepting the most dangerous targets, including ballistic missiles that fly fast, change trajectory, and leave the defense system with only minutes to respond.
Patriot for Ukraine: an important statement, but not a quick answer
On July 8, 2026, at a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky during the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is ready to grant Ukraine a license to produce Patriot missiles. This became a noticeable political signal: Washington effectively acknowledged that the problem cannot be solved by supplies from existing stocks alone.
But between the phrase “we are going to give a license” and the first produced missile, there is a huge distance.
It’s not about simple assembly production or transferring ordinary documentation. The PAC-3 is a complex high-tech missile where the engine, guidance system, electronics, materials, software, quality control, and certification are critically important.
Even if a political decision is made quickly, export permits, coordination of sensitive technologies, training of specialists, construction of infrastructure, launch of a production line, testing, and certification will be required.
In the most optimistic scenario, this takes years. Not months.
And here arises another problem that cannot be forgotten: production security. Building a plant in Ukraine to produce such missiles during the hot phase of the war means creating a priority target for Russia. Any production site, component warehouse, testing base, or logistics hub can become a target for “Iskanders,” “Kinzhal” missiles, or drones.
Therefore, the idea of a license is correct, but its significance is primarily long-term. It is an element of Ukraine’s future security architecture, not an answer to tonight when Russian missiles are again flying over Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Kharkiv, or Lviv.
Production cannot keep up with the war
Lockheed Martin is already increasing the production of PAC-3 MSE. The company reported that in 2025 it delivered more than 600 such interceptors, and the US defense department announced plans to increase annual production from about 600 to 2000 missiles under a multi-year agreement.
On paper, this looks like a significant increase. In reality, it is still not fast enough for a world where several regions simultaneously expend anti-missiles in combat mode.
Ukraine needs PAC-3 to protect against Russian ballistic missiles. Israel and its regional allies face Iranian missiles and drones. Gulf countries also expend stocks amid attacks and threats from Iran. According to estimates cited by Western sources, the Middle Eastern escalation has already taken a significant portion of available interceptors and created additional pressure on US and allied stocks.
For Ukraine, this is especially painful.
Every PAC-3 missile fired in the Middle East does not reach Ukraine’s air defense calculation. Every batch that needs to be urgently replenished for American bases or allies in the Gulf pushes Kyiv back in line. This is not a matter of sympathy or diplomacy. It is the arithmetic of production, warehouses, and priorities.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly written that the wars of Ukraine and Israel cannot be viewed as two completely separate plots. Russia and Iran are connected not only politically. Their wars hit the same Western security system, forcing the US, Europe, and their allies to simultaneously protect the sky in different parts of the world.
Why PAC-3 is so important
PAC-3 MSE is not just “another missile” for the Patriot. Lockheed Martin describes this system as an interceptor with hit-to-kill technology, meaning a missile that destroys the target with a direct kinetic hit. It is designed to combat ballistic and other complex aerial threats.
That is why replacing PAC-3 with ordinary air defense means is impossible.
Drones can be shot down with cheaper systems. Cruise missiles can be intercepted by different defense echelons. But ballistics require a special level of response, radar, calculations, and interceptor missiles.
When such missiles are lacking, Russian terrorists get a window of opportunity. They can launch more ballistics, counting on Ukraine either being unable to intercept some targets or being forced to conserve the most expensive interceptors.
Thus, the war turns into a competition not only of armies but also of factories.
A license is needed, but Ukraine needs missiles now
Trump’s statement about a license to produce Patriot for Ukraine should not be underestimated. It is a step towards Kyiv’s long-term independence and an important signal to Russia: Ukraine should not just receive help but become part of the Western defense industry.
But this decision should not be overestimated either.
The license does not protect Ukraine’s sky today. It does not replace the supply of ready-made missiles. It does not negate the need to transfer additional Patriot, SAMP/T, NASAMS, IRIS-T batteries, missiles for them, and detection means to Ukraine.
Moreover, if anti-missiles are objectively lacking, Ukraine needs not only defensive but also long-range capabilities. The logic is simple: if it is impossible to intercept every missile in the sky, it is necessary to destroy launchers, warehouses, command posts, factories, and logistics of Russia’s missile program before launch.
This is not an alternative to air defense but its continuation.
Israel understands this logic well. Defense cannot be built only on interception. Even the most advanced missile defense system becomes vulnerable if the enemy can endlessly increase the number of launches. Therefore, the fight against the missile threat always includes several levels: intelligence, preventive pressure, strikes on infrastructure, sanctions, technological deterrence, and interception itself.
The same applies to Iran. As long as Iran’s missile program remains a tool of pressure on Israel, Gulf countries, American bases, and international trade, the Middle East will continue to burn through stocks of expensive interceptors. And this will directly affect Ukraine.
The issue is not only Ukrainian and not only Israeli
The air defense crisis has become global.
Ukraine shows how quickly a large country can come under constant missile pressure. Israel shows that even a powerful multi-layered defense system does not eliminate the threat of mass attacks. The Middle East shows that a regional war can deplete stocks produced over years in weeks or months.
The West lived too long in the logic of peacetime. Production lines were designed not for years of major war but for limited operations, export contracts, and gradual replenishment of arsenals.
This era is over.
If the US and Europe want Ukraine to withstand, Israel to be protected, and the Middle East not to turn into a constant missile duel, they will have to build a new industrial reality. Not with press releases, but with factories. Not with promises, but with contracts. Not with symbolic aid packages, but with mass production of missiles, radars, engines, guidance systems, and cheap means against drones.
The license for Patriot for Ukraine is the right step.
But it is a step into the future.
And the war is happening now.
That is why Kyiv needs ready-made missiles, additional air defense systems, and long-range weapons today. Because the Russian missile will not wait for certification, the completion of the plant, and the appearance of the first Ukrainian PAC-3.