The Russian language of the new Mossad chief alarmed Moscow: why Roman Hoffman became a “problem” for Russia and Iran

The Russian state agency TASS disseminated material in which the appointment of Roman Hoffman as the director of ‘Mossad’ is presented as a significant change in Israeli intelligence strategy.

Russian analysts are particularly concerned not only about the military experience of the new head of Israeli foreign intelligence. They specifically highlight his background, fluency in Russian, understanding of the Soviet system, and ability to navigate the post-Soviet space without translators and lengthy analytical briefs.

But behind the loud formulations, it is important to see the line between facts, Russian assumptions, and outright propaganda.

What exactly did TASS disseminate on July 18

On July 18, 2026, TASS published material under the headline ‘Experts believe that the Russian direction is becoming a priority for Mossad’.

The state agency referred to experts from the Russian magazine ‘National Defense’. The initial analytical article was titled ‘Changing of the Guard: Roman Hoffman at the Helm of Mossad and the Transformation of Israeli Intelligence Imperatives on the Russian Front’. The full text is available only to magazine subscribers, but the main theses were extensively retold by TASS.

The main idea of the Russian authors is that Russia has allegedly long been one of the important but officially unnamed directions of Israeli intelligence work.

In their opinion, Hoffman’s arrival could give this direction new significance.

Russian analysts claim that the native of the Belarusian SSR understands Soviet and post-Soviet realities at the level of a ‘cultural code’. That is why the Russian language for him may become, as stated in the publication, ‘not a household skill, but a tool for strategically building a network of connections’.

This is an important formulation. It shows what Russian authors actually fear: not Hoffman’s origin as such, but his ability to understand the language of Russian bureaucracy, military, emigrants, representatives of post-Soviet elites, and people who are used to saying one thing publicly and something completely different in informal settings.

Three alleged levels of work against Russia

The authors of ‘National Defense’ divided the alleged work of ‘Mossad’ on the Russian front into three levels.

The first is called external neutrality and strategic calculation. This means maintaining contacts with Moscow while simultaneously, as Russian analysts suggest, indirectly supporting Ukrainian intelligence.

The second level is the so-called ‘crypto-diasporas’ and decentralized repatriation network. Russian authors consider more than a million Israelis born in the USSR or from families of immigrants from the former Soviet Union as a potential environment for obtaining information and forming contacts.

The third level they consider is technological monitoring: observing Russian armaments, military logistics, Moscow’s interaction with Tehran, and technologies undergoing combat testing in Ukraine and the Middle East.

At the same time, there is no evidence that ‘Mossad’ has indeed approved such a three-level strategy, according to Russian authors.

This is not a document of Israeli intelligence and not a statement from the Israeli government. This is a Russian assessment that the state agency TASS decided to bring into the public space.

Who is Roman Hoffman and why is his biography so interesting to Russia

Roman Hoffman was born in 1976 in the Belarusian SSR. He repatriated to Israel in 1990 and began serving in the IDF in 1995.

The main part of his military career is associated with armored forces. He commanded the 75th Battalion of the 7th Armored Brigade, the ‘Etzion’ Brigade, the 7th Brigade itself, the ‘Ha-Bashan’ Division, and then headed the National Training Center for Ground Forces. From 2024 to 2026, Hoffman served as the military secretary to the Prime Minister of Israel.

On October 7, 2023, upon learning of the Hamas terrorist attack, Hoffman left his home in Ashdod for the south of the country. He participated in a battle with terrorists and was seriously wounded.

Benjamin Netanyahu, explaining the choice of the new head of ‘Mossad’, noted his initiative, ability to act unconventionally, knowledge of the enemy, and ability to maintain secrecy. The Prime Minister also emphasized that Hoffman, as military secretary, constantly interacted with Israeli intelligence structures, including ‘Mossad’.

The decision to appoint Hoffman was announced in December 2025. On April 12, 2026, his candidacy was approved, and on June 2, he replaced David Barnea and assumed the position of director of ‘Mossad’. Official Israeli sources already in June called Hoffman the acting head of the intelligence service.

Not a career intelligence officer, but a combat commander

The appointment was discussed within Israel as well.

Hoffman did not climb the career ladder in ‘Mossad’ and is not a career officer of foreign intelligence. Netanyahu preferred him over candidates from within the organization, which sparked discussions about possible personnel changes and a new management style for the service.

However, it is this circumstance that Russian analysts perceive as an additional threat.

They suggest that the arrival of a combat general may mean a closer integration of intelligence, technological capabilities, and force operations. In April 2026, TASS already published the opinion of RANEPA expert Alexander Stepanov, who claimed that ‘Mossad’s’ activities regarding Russia might intensify, and the service itself might allegedly gain more opportunities for conducting military operations.

Thus, the July publication did not appear suddenly.

Russian state media have been forming the image of Hoffman as a person capable of turning ‘Mossad’ into a more active adversary of Russia for at least several months.

Why the Russian and Iranian directions really intersect

The most serious part of Russian analytics concerns the cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.

After the start of the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine, Iran became one of the key suppliers of military technologies to Russia. This primarily concerns the Shahed family of drones, components for their production, and missile programs.

The US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions against companies and individuals involved in the transportation and production of Iranian drones for Russia. The department’s materials also described the assembly of ‘Geran-2’ devices in Russia’s ‘Alabuga’, based on the Shahed-136 design.

The European Union also imposed restrictions in connection with Iran’s supply of drones and missiles to Russia. In January 2026, the EU Council adopted a new package of sanctions due to continued Iranian military support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.

For Israel, this is of direct significance.

The same Iranian defense enterprises, design bureaus, supply chains, and military structures create weapons not only for Russia but also for the IRGC, Hezbollah, Houthis, and other forces associated with Tehran.

Therefore, monitoring Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation is not a fantasy of Russian analysts. It objectively meets Israel’s security interests.

The war in Ukraine simultaneously provides a huge array of data on the real capabilities of Iranian weapons: their range, accuracy, navigation, resistance to electronic warfare, weaknesses, and changes in design.

It can be assumed that such information is valuable for Israeli intelligence and defense structures. However, this does not automatically mean that ‘Mossad’ participates in Ukrainian intelligence operations or coordinates strikes on Russian territory.

Accusations without presented evidence

In the April material of TASS, Alexander Stepanov claimed that many operations of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine were allegedly planned using the experience and with the direct participation of ‘Mossad’ employees.

No evidence of this claim was presented. There was also no official confirmation from Israel, Ukraine, or independent international sources.

For NANews — Israel News, it is fundamentally important to separate established fact from the Russian informational construct.

The fact is that Israel is interested in obtaining information about Iranian weapons and Russian-Iranian cooperation.

The assumption is that Hoffman may strengthen the Russian direction of ‘Mossad’s’ work.

And the claims of direct involvement of Israeli intelligence in Ukrainian operations remain accusations by Russian commentators, not supported by public evidence.

Russian-speaking Israelis are not an ‘intelligence mechanism’

It is particularly telling how Russian authors speak about Russian-speaking citizens of Israel.

Formulations about ‘crypto-diasporas’ and ‘unique intelligence mechanism’ essentially turn a huge and very diverse group of people into a potential agent environment.

Under one category fall repatriates of different waves, natives of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as Russians who left their country after 2022.

This is not only a simplification but also a dangerous logic.

Most Russian-speaking Israelis have nothing to do with intelligence. Knowledge of the Russian language, relatives in post-Soviet countries, or understanding of Soviet culture does not make a person a special service employee.

However, the TASS publication itself shows that in Russian military-political thinking, such people are increasingly perceived as a possible channel of influence, information, or connection.

In the future, such rhetoric may be used to increase suspicions towards Israeli citizens visiting Russia, Russian emigrants in Israel, and people supporting Ukraine.

NANews — Israel News considers it important to emphasize: the problem is not in the Russian-speaking community, but in the fact that the Russian propaganda system is accustomed to viewing any horizontal human connections through the prism of agency, control, and special services.

Has Moscow really become frightened?

It is not yet possible to speak of official fear of the Kremlin.

In the available materials, there is no statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, SVR, FSB, or the administration of the President of Russia that Hoffman’s appointment poses a threat.

There is something else: the Russian state agency twice in several months provided a platform for authors warning about the activation of ‘Mossad’ against Russia.

In April, it was about possible support for Ukrainian intelligence and the expansion of the service’s force functions. In July, it was already about the Russian direction as one of the priorities, work in the post-Soviet environment, and monitoring Moscow’s ties with Tehran.

This is not yet the official position of the Kremlin, but already a noticeable informational signal.

Russian analysts fear that at the head of ‘Mossad’ is a person who is harder to deceive with familiar formulas, demonstrative politeness, and talks about ‘traditional friendship’.

Roman Hoffman knows the Russian language, understands the origin of many Russian behavioral models, and has experience in interaction between political leadership, the army, and intelligence structures.

Upon completing his service as the military secretary to the Prime Minister, he stated that Israel has not yet achieved all its goals: ‘We are not finished yet’.

Hoffman’s appointment itself does not prove that Russia has officially become a priority target for ‘Mossad’.

But the reaction of Russian state media shows something else: in Moscow, they are already seriously considering such a possibility. And what especially worries Russia is that the Israeli intelligence is headed by a person capable of understanding the post-Soviet space not from the outside, but from within.