Ukrainian wheat is going to Israel again: exports have almost doubled under the Russian blockade of ports

Ukraine sharply accelerated wheat exports in the first days of September 2026, and Israel was among the destinations for new shipments. From September 1 to 3, the country exported about 116.8 thousand tons of wheat, or almost 39 thousand tons per day, while the average daily figure for August was about 20 thousand tons. Along with Israel, Tunisia, Egypt, and Indonesia were named among the destinations for the first September batches.

But there is a fundamental boundary in this figure: the rate of shipments in the first three days of September almost doubled compared to the average August rate, not the entire Ukrainian export and certainly not the export specifically to Israel. The volume of the Israeli batch is not disclosed separately. For NANews, something else is more important: Ukrainian wheat is physically reappearing on the Israeli route at a time when the normal operation of Ukraine’s main maritime export channel is seriously disrupted by Russian attacks.

Author: R.Verter. What interests me here is the point of contact between the two countries: for Ukraine, grain is export, money, and the opportunity to continue the agricultural cycle, while for Israel, it is one of the elements of the country’s food security, which receives most of the necessary grains from abroad.

In August, it was 612 thousand tons. September started quite differently.

In the entire month of August, Ukraine exported about 612.7 thousand tons of wheat. The largest buyers were Spain — 118.2 thousand tons, Egypt — 116.1 thousand tons, and Algeria — 78.1 thousand tons; these three countries accounted for about half of the August volume. Already in the first three days of September, the geography partially changed, and the daily supply rate increased from about 20 to 39 thousand tons.

This is a good result for a few separate days, but it does not yet cancel out the heavier statistics of the season. As of September 4, since the beginning of the 2026/27 marketing year, Ukraine exported 1.794 million tons of wheat compared to 2.987 million tons a year earlier — almost 40% less. The total export of grains and legumes was 3.913 million tons compared to 4.544 million tons on the same date last year.

It turns out not to be a contradiction, but two different time scales. The season as a whole is still significantly weaker than last year’s, but the beginning of September shows that Ukraine is trying to accelerate exports again under different logistical realities.

What Russia did to the usual route

For Ukrainian wheat, the problem today arises not so much in the field as between the elevator and the sea vessel. In July, Russian forces, according to the Ministry of Development of Ukraine, inflicted 67 strikes on port infrastructure, attacked civilian ships directly in ports 35 times, and another 22 times — ships passing through the Ukrainian sea corridor. Only in the first days of August, the agency reported five more attacks on port infrastructure, three on civilian ships in ports, and two on ships in the corridor.

Back in June, NANews wrote that the intensification of Russian strikes could reduce Ukraine’s monthly grain exports by about a third, as the main bulk of large shipments passed through the deep-water Black Sea ports. At that time, the industry warned: some cargoes can be transferred to the Danube, but such a route is less powerful and more expensive. Russian attacks on ports could reduce Ukraine’s grain exports by a third — NANews

After the subsequent escalation, this risk ceased to be a calculation on paper. The entry of merchant ships into Ukrainian Black Sea ports was stopped on July 23 due to the threat of Russian attacks, after which agricultural exports had to be urgently redirected to the Danube, railways, and land routes.

The Danube and railways save exports — but do not replace the sea

From August 1 to 26, Ukraine exported 1.423 million tons of grains, oilseeds, and processed products via alternative routes. At first glance, the volume is impressive, but the Ukrainian government estimated it at about a third of the potential need for this period.

The gap with grain was even greater: 822 thousand tons were exported — about 21% of the potential volume. Approximately 600 thousand tons of all agricultural products were transported by rail and the Danube route, while road transport provided about 80 thousand tons, as a truck becomes too expensive a channel for mass cheap cargo.

The cost of bypassing is already measured quite specifically. Ukraine’s Minister of Agrarian Policy Taras Vysotsky said that alternative logistics have increased by at least $50 per ton. For one truck or a small container, this is just an additional expense, but when exporting millions of tons of grain, it is already about hundreds of millions of dollars and a reduction in the purchase price that the Ukrainian farmer can ultimately receive.

Ukraine expects to receive about 80 million tons of grains and oilseeds in 2026, of which about 60 million tons are expected to be exported. Current alternative routes can ensure the export of about 30 million tons, so even a well-functioning Danube together with the railway does not reproduce the capabilities of a full-fledged sea corridor.

NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency

From Odessa through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean Sea

For the Israeli reader, it is important to imagine not an abstract map, but the route itself. Ukrainian grain from the ports of the Odessa region enters the Black Sea, then passes through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and ends up in the Mediterranean Sea, from where Israeli ports are already on a relatively short sea leg.

Therefore, events near Odessa are directly related to what is happening in Istanbul. In August, R.Verter already analyzed for NANews why Turkey did not close the Bosphorus for commercial shipping, how the Montreux Convention works, and why Ankara is trying to separate civilian trade from the expanding war in the Black Sea. Will Erdogan close the Bosphorus: what Turkey decided on the Black Sea straits — NANews

These are links in one chain. The Odessa port must receive and load the vessel, the sea must remain acceptable for the shipowner and insurer, Turkey must maintain commercial passage through the straits, after which the grain can reach the Mediterranean and, among other things, Israel.

Israel itself grows only a small part of the necessary wheat

Here the story ceases to be only Ukrainian. According to the Foreign Agricultural Service of the US Department of Agriculture’s forecast for the 2026/27 marketing year, about 90% of Israel’s grain supply is provided by imports. Wheat imports are projected at 2.15 million tons, while domestic production is about 60 thousand tons.

Even more indicative is the structure of suppliers. The USDA estimates Russia’s share at about 70–80% of Israel’s wheat imports, and among the next main sources are Ukraine and Romania. Black Sea origin remains attractive due to relatively short logistics and competitive pricing.

Therefore, the September appearance of Israel among the destinations of Ukrainian exports is not just a line in brokerage statistics. Every truly available supplier reduces the Israeli market’s dependence on one origin, especially when supplies from the Black Sea basin simultaneously depend on military risks, freight, and shipping safety.

In Israel, Ukrainian grain has already become a political story

The relationship between the two markets also has a much more unpleasant side. In the spring, NANews closely followed the dispute over grain shipments that Ukraine linked to territories occupied by Russia and which came into focus after ships entered Israeli ports.

In May, the port of Ashdod demanded a clearer state policy regarding ships and cargoes with signs of connection to Russia or occupied territories of Ukraine. Therefore, the current supply of Ukrainian wheat is also important as a different trade model: not grain of dubious origin, but a new Ukrainian harvest that Ukraine itself exports through preserved logistical channels. Port Ashdod and cargoes with signs of connection to occupied territories of Ukraine — NANews

For Israel, the origin of the goods here has not only commercial significance. In a situation where the country is practically unable to meet its own grain needs with domestic production, it has to simultaneously think about price, supplier reliability, legality of origin, and the ability of the route to operate during wartime.

The blockade hits Ukraine first, then the buyer

The economic damage to Ukraine arises long before the foreign consumer feels the deficit. Grain that cannot be exported on time occupies elevators, freezes farmers’ money, and lowers domestic purchase prices precisely when farms need to finance the next production cycle.

The National Bank of Ukraine estimated direct losses of export revenue in the second half of 2026 due to the halt of sea exports at more than $2 billion. At the same time, the NBU expects that part of the delayed volumes will not disappear but will be exported later, in the first half of 2027; the problem is that until then, someone has to pay for storage, longer transportation, and frozen working capital.

For the importer, the mechanism works the opposite way. As long as Black Sea wheat is available, short sea logistics help keep the price down. If you have to buy further or pay increased military and insurance risks, it is not the Ukrainian field that becomes more expensive — it is the delivery of the goods to the final market that becomes more expensive.

Not just bread: where Israel will feel the grain risk

Linking any disruption directly to Ukrainian wheat with the price of a loaf of bread would be too simplistic. Israel imports grain not only for the milling industry: a significant part is used in feed rations, where wheat competes with corn, barley, and other crops depending on the price. The USDA estimates Israel’s total wheat consumption at about 2.3 million tons in 2026/27.

Therefore, the consequences of a possible deficit or expensive logistics may be longer — through feed, poultry, and livestock. It is not possible to reliably assert now that September’s Ukrainian supplies will reduce any specific price in Israel, but the presence of several competing origins objectively makes the market more resilient than dependence on one main supplier.

The Black Sea has long ceased to be only a Ukrainian problem

Ukrainian exports occupy such a place in world trade that a disruption quickly extends beyond its own market. If cheap Black Sea grain does not come out in the usual volume, buyers start looking for batches in other regions, and with distance, freight and final cost increase.

That is why the safety of commercial shipping is gradually becoming a separate international issue. In July, Ukraine raised the issue of Russian attacks on civilian ships and ports to the level of the International Maritime Organization, directly linking what is happening to the safety of world trade, not just its own export revenues.

For Mediterranean countries, this connection is especially short. Egypt, Tunisia, and Israel appear in the September geography of Ukrainian wheat not by chance: the Black Sea has historically been one of the closest major sources of grain for the region.

What the September 39 thousand tons per day actually mean

It is too early to say that Ukraine has already “broken through the Russian blockade.” Wheat exports since the beginning of the season remain about 40% below last year’s, alternative routes cover only part of the necessary capacity, and additional $50 logistics costs per ton seriously worsen the trade economy.

But the reverse formula — as if Russian attacks completely stopped Ukrainian grain — no longer corresponds to what is happening. Ukraine managed to increase the speed of shipments at the beginning of September almost twice compared to the average August, and Israel appeared among the destinations of the first batches of the new month.

For Ukraine, the next test is whether this pace can last longer than a few days and how much the Danube, railway crossings, and other routes can be expanded until full-fledged sea exports are restored. For Israel, the question is different: will Ukraine remain a real alternative supplier in a market where the country itself depends on imports for almost all grain and where 70–80% of wheat is now linked to Russian origin.

That is why the story of 116.8 thousand tons in three days is much broader than one successful export week. At one end of the route is the Ukrainian farmer who needs to export the new harvest despite Russian strikes. At the other end is Israel, for which the ability to buy grain from several countries, rather than relying on one channel and one supplier, becomes a very practical issue of food security.