Did Iran request Geran-5 from Russia for war with Israel and the USA? What is actually known

Russia is increasingly changing the air war in Ukraine: instead of the usual slow “Geran” drones, which Ukrainian air defense has learned to shoot down in large numbers, there are more jet devices in attacks. They are faster, fly higher, are more difficult for cheap interceptor drones, and are already forcing Ukraine to rebuild its air defense system.

From Shahed to Geran-5 – and back to Iran: how the war in Ukraine creates a new threat for Israel

On September 13, 2026, the Financial Times detailed this transition and specifically highlighted Geran-4 and Geran-5. In the Ukrainian information space, another formulation appeared almost immediately: “Iran requested new Geran-5 from Russia specifically for the war against Israel and the USA”. Here, caution is needed. The FT material confirms a sharp technological leap in Russian “Geran” drones, but publicly available data does not allow us to assert that Tehran has placed a specific order for Geran-5. Earlier, in the spring, the FT did report that Russia had begun transferring strike drones to Iran and that Tehran was interested in Russian improvements to Iranian technology. The type of devices supplied was not definitively named at that time.

The difference seems small, but for us, it is fundamental. It’s one thing to confirm the Russian-Iranian movement of technology in the opposite direction. It’s another to write that Geran-5 is already being sent to Iran’s arsenal when this cannot yet be proven.

The author of the material is NAnews Editorial.

Iran gave Russia Shahed. In four years, Russia turned it into something else

The first Shahed-136 of Russian use was discovered in Ukraine back in September 2022. The body already had the Russian designation “Geran-2” at that time. Then Russian production appeared, its own series, different electronics, new warheads, modems, navigation, cameras — and at some point, the word “copy” stopped adequately explaining what was happening.

Recently, CSIS very accurately described the Russian model of working with Geran: it is not a single finished design that was made once and stamped for years. The change goes to the front, it is tested there, information returns to the engineers; what worked quickly goes into series. What didn’t work — was discarded, done differently. Sometimes literally a week passed between the installation of a new block and the use of the device.

For war, this is an unpleasant scheme. For Israel — too, since the original technology came from Iran.

We have already analyzed in detail how the war in Ukraine became a testing ground for the future war against Israel and the USA. Now this formulation looks even more literal: Iran transferred the original system to Russia, Russia received four years of application against the constantly changing Ukrainian air defense, and already Russian improvements began to interest the original supplier.

Not even a circle. Rather, such a military spiral.

Geran-5 is no longer the “moped” that Ukrainians are used to hearing

Geran-5 was first recorded in Russian combined strikes on Ukraine in early January 2026. And externally, it is not at all the familiar triangular Shahed-136.

The device has a long cylindrical body, straight wing, tail assembly, and a turbojet engine. Ukrainian military intelligence believes that structurally it is much closer not to Shahed-136, but to another Iranian device — Karrar. So even the origin here has become more complicated: Geran-5 is part of the Russian “Geran” line, but it is not literally an enlarged copy of Shahed-136.

According to the current card of the Ukrainian War&Sanctions project, the maximum take-off weight of Geran-5 reaches 850 kg, the warhead is about 90 kg. The cruising speed is indicated within 450–600 km/h, the range is approximately 950 km, the flight time is up to two hours, the maximum altitude is up to 6 km.

This is already an important boundary. The usual piston “Geran” is relatively slow, it can be accompanied for a long time, a mobile group can be directed to it, or a cheap interceptor drone can be launched. When the target goes 500–600 km/h, the time becomes much less.

And here there is no need to invent a superweapon. Geran-5 can be shot down, Ukraine shoots them down. It’s just that doing it cheaply and massively is already significantly more difficult.

Why Ukrainian 60% cannot be read as “Geran-5 breaks through air defense in four out of ten cases”

One of the most widespread figures today is about 60% of intercepted jet drones versus 90–95% of regular piston ones. The figure is real, but it is often retold incorrectly.

The representative of the Ukrainian Air Force, Yuriy Ignat, spoke specifically about the overall effectiveness against jet UAVs, not about the statistics exclusively for Geran-5. In August, Russia was already using such devices almost daily, and the number of jet targets increased sharply. According to data provided by ISW/CTP, in August alone, Russia used more than 2,800 jet drones; they accounted for about 56% of Russian long-range drones that month.

So the formula “Ukraine shoots down 60% of Geran-5” is too crude. More correctly: the Ukrainian side estimates the current interception result of the entire class of jet strike UAVs at about 60%, while for slower piston devices, the figure is around 90–95%.

For Israel, this clarification is also important. These percentages cannot be taken and transferred to the IDF. Different radars, different aviation, completely different territory, different defense echelons.

But physics still remains physics: a target that flies three times faster leaves fewer minutes for a decision.

Chinese engine and “Kometa”: what’s inside

The heart of Geran-5 is the Chinese turbojet TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A with a thrust of about 200 kgf. Ukrainian intelligence also discovered in the device the Russian jamming-resistant navigation system “Kometa-M12” with a 12-element antenna, inertial navigation, Tracker V3 based on Raspberry Pi and 3G/LTE modems, as well as the Chinese MESH modem Xingkay Tech XK-F358.

MESH communication here needs to be explained separately. Several devices or nodes can support the network and transmit data through each other, complicating the simple scheme “jammed GPS — drone got lost”. This does not mean absolute invulnerability to electronic warfare, of course not, but the task for defense becomes more challenging.

The Financial Times also writes about another direction of development of new Russian jet devices: thermal imaging cameras, automatic target recognition, guidance elements using AI, jamming-resistant navigation solutions. Here, too, one should not mix all options into one box and claim that any found Geran-5 has the same standard set. Series change, equipment too.

This is precisely the Russian bet: not a perfect expensive drone, but many drones that are constantly slightly different.

And where do the Western microchips come from

The analysis of Geran-5 revealed another unpleasant story. Ukrainian specialists identified components of American Texas Instruments, CTS Corporation, and Monolithic Power Systems, as well as German Infineon Technologies.

Moreover, the production dates of two CTS generators were determined: one was manufactured in February 2024, the other in September 2025. Therefore, the usual explanation about Russian electronics stocks purchased before the full-scale invasion no longer fits here.

This is not proof that the manufacturers themselves consciously sold parts to the Russian military-industrial complex. Modern electronics pass through distributors, intermediaries, third countries, resales — the chain can be long. But the end result lies physically in front of Ukrainian specialists: American and German components ended up inside the Russian strike device of 2026.

In the photo, the wingspan is 5.5 meters. And the Ukrainian database now says 3.2. Who made a mistake?

The infographic, which is now widely distributed, has an interesting detail. It indicates a wingspan of 5.5 meters, and this is not the author’s fantasy.

When the GUR first described Geran-5 in January, a length of about six meters and a wingspan of up to 5.5 meters were mentioned. These figures managed to get into dozens of publications.

But the current Geran-5 card in the official War&Sanctions database now shows different dimensions: length 6.5 meters, wingspan 3.2 meters. At the same time, speed, weight, 90-kilogram warhead, and range remained approximately in the same range.

Why the data changed, we did not find a separate public explanation. Therefore, NAnews will not choose a convenient figure and present it as indisputable: the early estimate is 5.5 m, the current intelligence card is 3.2 m.

This happens with new weapons that are studied from fragments, not from a factory passport.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency

Alabuga is already producing this not piece by piece

Here the story becomes really important. Geran-5 could be considered another Russian experiment if it were a matter of a few dozen devices.

But Ukrainian intelligence in August estimated the production of Geran-4 and Geran-5 at about 3,000 units per month at Russian enterprises, including production related to the Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan. At the same time, Russia stopped the production of Geran-3 and is transferring resources specifically to newer jet variants.

Here it is already visible why all this is being done. Ukraine built a relatively cheap mass interception of old Shahed/Geran-2 — Russia responds with a target that a cheap propeller interceptor finds difficult to catch.

Ukraine is creating faster interceptors. Russia will change something again.

And so in a circle, only the pace is increasing.

Moreover, Iran is already receiving Russian drones — this is not a theory

Here we return to Tehran. Back in March, the Financial Times, citing Western intelligence data, reported that Russia was preparing and carrying out a multi-stage transfer of drones to Iran amid the war with Israel and the USA.

What type was transferred then was not publicly definitively established. FT sources assumed Geran-2 — the Russian version of the original Iranian Shahed-136, but at the same time noted that Russian improvements were of particular interest to Iran: heavier payload, navigation, and jamming resistance.

This fits well with what NAnews had already discovered earlier. Russia supplies Iran through the Caspian Sea with ammunition, explosives, and drone components; we analyzed this route in more detail in the material about Russian military supplies to Iran through the Caspian.

It turns out to be a rather strange story with the authorship of weapons. Iran once provided the basis. Russia localized production. Ukraine forced it to modernize the device for years. Now some of these Russian solutions are going back towards Iran.

Who is copying whom in this chain is sometimes unclear.

What exactly should worry Israel here

Not the name Geran-5 itself. In Israel, sometimes the argument is too easily reduced to a specific missile or specific drone: can “Hetz” shoot it down, can a plane intercept it, is there enough range.

But the main threat is different — mixed mass raid.

Geran-5 has a range of about 950 km, so the launch location for a strike on Israel becomes critically important: not from every point in Iran can such a device even reach. But from the western regions of the country, the geography is already different, and Russia and Iran are simultaneously working on different ranges, carriers, and family variants.

Add to this the usual Shahed, cruise devices, and ballistic missiles. The defense has to classify the target in a few minutes, understand its trajectory, decide what exactly to intercept with, and not waste an expensive munition where a cheaper means could be used.

And then the next target comes. Then another twenty.

This is where Ukrainian 60% starts to be useful to Israel — not as a forecast of future Israeli losses, but as a warning about the change in the very economy of air warfare.

Ukraine in this story is no longer just a recipient of Western air defense

In four years, Ukraine has accumulated a huge amount of data on Shahed and Russian “Geran” drones: acoustic detection, electronic warfare, mobile groups, aircraft, cheap interceptor drones, choice of altitude and route. Some solutions turned out to be a dead end, some are produced in tens of thousands today.

And the Israeli army is already turning to Ukrainian experience in other segments of drone warfare. NAnews reported, for example, how Ukrainian methods of protection against FPV drones appeared in the practice of the IDF in northern Israel.

With Geran-4 and Geran-5, the exchange of such data becomes even more valuable. Israel has no reason to go through the same path of mistakes for four years that Ukraine has already paid for with destroyed objects, lost interceptors, and hundreds of real attacks.

Especially since the opponent, in essence, is a common supplier of technologies already from the second side.

First it was Iran → Russia. Now the arrows go both ways

In 2022, the scheme fit into one line: Iran supplies Shahed to Russia, Russia launches them at Ukraine.

In 2026, this line no longer works. The Iranian design came to Russia, the Russian industry reworked it, Chinese engines gave new speeds, the war in Ukraine provided a huge volume of combat feedback, and Russian variants and components are now going back to Iran. Western electronics somehow continue to get inside this chain.

Geran-5 in this sense is not just another Russian drone.

It is a thing born from several wars and several countries at once: Iranian technological line, Russian production, Chinese components, Western microelectronics, and Ukrainian sky as a place of many years of testing.

And if the next generations of this system really massively reach Iran, Israel will receive a weapon that learned to bypass air defense not on a training ground.

It learned this in Ukraine.