Iranian protests and the war in Ukraine: why the collapse of the ayatollah regime could hit Russia

The potential fall of the ayatollah regime in Iran could significantly alter the balance of power around the war in Ukraine — primarily because Iran has long been not just a political partner for Moscow, but a working “rear” for arms and sanctions evasion.

This is discussed in an analysis by RBC-Ukraine about the wave of protests in Iran and the possible consequences for Russia and Ukraine if power in Tehran changes.

The key thesis of the experts is simple and very practical: the disappearance of the current Iranian regime means the risk of breaking supply channels for military goods and components, including drones, as well as a blow to the schemes through which Moscow tries to maintain exports and purchases under sanctions.

Iran expert from the Israeli Institute for National Security (INSS), former Israeli intelligence officer Beni Sabti directly links the stability of the regime in Tehran with Russia’s capabilities on the Ukrainian front. In his assessment, if the current government in Iran collapses, the impact on Russia will be “very large” because Iran will cease to be a source of supplies — from drones to other necessary “supplies” for war.

Currently, according to sources and experts, Iran provides Russia with a significant part of what helps compensate for losses and maintain the pace of the war. In logistics, the route through the Caspian Sea is particularly highlighted — it is convenient because it provides an “Iran–RF” link without unnecessary transit risks and without direct dependence on Western control corridors.

But the story does not end with drones. Tehran, as emphasized in the material, also helps Moscow in sanctions “acrobatics”: through purchases and resales, through oil and fuel schemes, through gray chains where documents, intermediaries, and jurisdictions formally change — but essentially one meaning is preserved: to give Russia more breathing room under sanction pressure.

If this mechanism collapses, the damage to Russia could be double. First, what already works here and now will be lost: supplies, components, agreements, transport routes, intermediary networks. Second, the next regime in Iran (if it is more pragmatic and oriented towards exiting isolation) may not want to repeat the “alliance” model with Moscow, which brings toxicity and new sanction risks.

Iranian political scientist Amir Chahaki adds another layer — public sentiment. According to him, anti-Russian emotions are strong within Iran, and this is important not as a slogan, but as a factor for future foreign policy. If public demand requires distance from the Kremlin, it will be harder for the new government to explain maintaining previous ties.

Chahaki names two reasons for these sentiments.

The first is historical memory: in Iran, they remember periods when Russian policy was perceived as hostile, and when different empires divided influence over the country. This is not an academic topic for a textbook — it is an “emotional shelf” to which they easily return in times of crisis.

The second is the modern association of Russia with support for the ayatollah regime. The logic is simple: if the Kremlin is considered one of the external patrons of the current government, then the protest society automatically transfers irritation to Moscow. Chahaki emphasizes: many Iranians tend to blame Russia for their own problems, somewhat exaggerating, but at the same time seeing Tehran’s closeness to the Kremlin as a fact.

For Ukraine, this link is important in two directions. The first is military: fewer Iranian supplies and fewer opportunities to bypass sanctions mean stricter restrictions for Russia on war resources. The second is diplomatic and sanctions-related: a change of power in Tehran could accelerate the restructuring of regional alliances and make it harder for Moscow to maintain a “club” of countries willing to help bypass the rules.

For Israel, the topic is also not abstract. Iran is one of the key sources of security threats to Israel and at the same time one of the external factors fueling Russian resilience in the war against Ukraine. Therefore, a possible regime change in Tehran is not “someone else’s” news, but an event that could change both the Middle Eastern configuration and the European theater of war.

At the same time, the scenario “regime collapse = automatic victory for Ukraine” would be too straightforward. A transitional chaos may follow the regime change, some structures may remain, and foreign policy may not change instantly. But in any of the options for Moscow, the disappearance of the current Tehran as a reliable partner is a loss of a stable channel that worked against Ukraine and indirectly against Israel’s interests.

This is why the topic of Iranian protests is increasingly heard not only as an internal drama of the country but as a factor of a great war: when one authoritarian node begins to shake, it hits supply chains, sanction bypasses, and political “glues” on which Russia’s ability to continue aggression relies — and in this context, NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency notes: the possible collapse of the regime in Iran could become one of the events that change the situation around Ukraine.