Is NATO “at war with Russia”? No. And this is important to understand – especially from Israel

Around Russia’s war against Ukraine, an old thesis has been revived in Russian public forums: “NATO is already at war with Moscow.”

This was written about on September 20, 2025, by Israeli military analyst Yigal Levin, and we have broken down this topic — from international law norms to historical parallels with Israel’s wars in the 1960s-70s, where the USSR flooded the Middle East with tanks and planes, but the war did not become “Soviet-Israeli.”

Today, much is similar: NATO trains and arms Kyiv but is not legally a party to the conflict — and the Alliance’s Secretary-General regularly emphasizes this. Meanwhile, Ukraine strikes refineries and logistics in Russia — and it is this, not the “collective West,” that causes fuel shortages and nervous comments in Moscow.

Key Facts and Discussion Framework

• NATO’s position is clear: helping Ukraine is legal and legitimate, but the Alliance is not a party to the war. “We support Ukraine’s right to self-defense… and this does not make us a party to the conflict,” the NATO Secretary-General has repeatedly stated.
• The right to armed assistance: under IHL/ICRC, the mere transfer of weapons and training does not turn a donor state into a “participant in the war.” The threshold is own strikes, troop deployment, command of combat operations, etc.
• Practice on the ground: Ukraine’s allies have trained tens of thousands of military personnel (Operation Interflex), created the NSATU command for coordinating assistance and training, and deployed the F-16 coalition — without deploying NATO troops in combat.
• Symmetry of assistance: Iran (Shahed UAVs and their localization) and North Korea (ammunition and ballistic missiles) help Russia. This is also assistance, not “entering the war.”
• Strikes on Russian energy are Ukraine’s work. A series of UAV attacks on refineries/ports (Kirishi, Primorsk, etc.) cuts processing and exports and already forces Moscow to discuss production cuts. This is Ukraine’s strategy to pressure war revenues — not “NATO strikes.”

What it means to be a “party to the conflict” under international law

International humanitarian law (IHL) distinguishes between support and participation. According to the ICRC, the supply of weapons/training/intelligence support does not make a state a party to the conflict; the line is crossed when the supporting state begins to conduct combat operations itself (strikes, troop deployment, effective command of one side’s operations).

Hence an important conclusion: The Alliance can expand assistance, coordinate training, repair, logistics — and still remain outside the formal status of a “warring party.” This is exactly how the NSATU architecture is built.

How Ukraine is being helped: training, coordination, aviation

Training and combat readiness

Since 2022, Operation Interflex in Britain and with partners has trained more than 56,000 Ukrainian military personnel — the largest program of its kind for London since World War II. The updated mandate is extended at least until the end of 2026.

Coordination through NSATU

At the Washington summit, the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) was created — a command that coordinates training, supply, and equipment repair. And again: “these efforts do not make NATO a party to the conflict.”

F-16 Aviation Coalition

Since 2023, the international F-16 coalition (Denmark, the Netherlands, etc.) has been operating, a European training center has been deployed in Romania, and aircraft supplies are increasing. This enhances the survivability of Ukraine’s airspace but does not change NATO’s legal status.

What Russia’s allies are doing: UAVs and missiles

Iranian Shahed

Since 2022, Iran has been supplying strike UAVs Shahed-131/136 (and their derivatives) and helping localize production in Russia; contracts worth billions have been concluded between the parties.

North Korean ammunition and BR

North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery ammunition, MLRS, and ballistic missiles, which has been recorded at the UN Security Council level and by independent analytical centers.

Logically, this is the same type of assistance as NATO countries’ help to Ukraine — but no one seriously says that “Iran and North Korea are at war against Ukraine” as parties to the conflict.

Historical parallel understandable to every Israeli

In the 1960s-70s, the USSR supplied Arab armies with hundreds of T-62 tanks and MiG-21 aircraft. Egypt received the MiG-21 as early as the early 60s; T-62s were massively sent to Egypt and Syria by the early 70s. There were even direct battles between Soviet pilots and the Israeli Air Force — the famous “Rimon-20” on July 30, 1970. However, the wars in textbooks are called Arab-Israeli, not “Soviet-Israeli.”

Similarly, in 1973, the US conducted the airlift Nickel Grass, transferring tens of thousands of tons of weapons to Israel — and yet did not become a “party to the war.”

This parallel helps to soberly assess today’s discussion: massive assistance is not yet participation in the war.

What is happening now: strikes, provocations at borders, and still — not “NATO vs. Russia”

• Ukrainian strikes on refineries and ports occur in waves, sometimes simultaneously on multiple targets (Kirishi refinery, Primorsk, objects in the Volga region and Bashkortostan). Recent days have seen new hits and fires; this is immediately visible in the oil market.
• Russia provokes NATO at borders: drones in Poland and Romania, MiG-31 incursions into Estonian airspace, and subsequent Tallinn requests for consultations under Article 4. This is serious, but not a NATO war with Russia.
• Energy outcome: Kyiv’s strikes have already reduced processing and export of petroleum products in Russia to minimal military levels; the industry is discussing forced production cuts. This is the result of Ukraine’s long-range campaign.

Direct quotes from Yigal Levin

“I was surprised to learn that there is an opinion among Z-people that, well, what are you happy about (referring to drones on Poland and MiGs on Estonia), if NATO and Europe have long been at war with us.”

“I always thought that the tale that NATO is fighting against Russia is a tale for fools, to please the stupid and poor, but no, this take is being pushed even by not the stupidest people there.”

“This… logic, which is awkward to analyze, — because, for example, it turns out that Israel in the 50s-70s was not at war with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, etc., but with… drum roll… the USSR itself.”

“And just as the Arab-Israeli wars are not called Soviet-Israeli, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a war only between Russia and Ukraine.”

“But assistance and help, even massive, as it was with the USSR… do not turn the helper into a participant in the conflict.”

“Your factories are being hit by Ukraine, your refineries are burning because of Ukraine, your headquarters are blowing up because of Ukraine… And the fact that it is being helped (as you are by various Irans) does not diminish this simple fact.”

(We deliberately presented the statements in the author’s original style; the opinion is journalistic and may contain harsh formulations.)

Why the thesis “NATO is at war” is so persistently propagated

Because it solves several tasks of Russian propaganda at once:

1. Remove responsibility for failures at the front (“we are not fighting Ukraine, but the entire NATO”).
2. Legitimize strikes on civilian targets as a “response to the West.”
3. Undermine support for Ukraine in NATO countries themselves — through the fear of “escalation.”

The historical memory of Israelis here is a good antidote. Israel remembers well: when tank armies armed by the USSR came at us, we considered the opponents to be specific armies and states, not the entire Soviet Union. And this is exactly the perspective that helps today not to get lost in the hall of mirrors of narratives.

What this means for the reader in Israel

• Information hygiene. See the headline “NATO is already at war with Russia” — look for the legal fact: where are NATO troops? where are their strikes? where is their command of Ukrainian operations? The answer today: none.
• Understanding risks. Provocations at the Alliance’s borders will continue — Poland, Romania, the Baltics already feel this. But for now, it’s about testing defenses, not a war with NATO. For Israel, the parallel is obvious: when an adversary “probes” air defense/missile defense, it does not mean “war is declared on the entire alliance.”
• Economic reality. Fuel shortages in Russian regions and oil price fluctuations are the result of Ukraine’s campaign on refineries and ports. For businesses in Israel, this means potential volatility in logistics and energy prices — we monitor the dynamics.

Assistance can be enormous — and it was in Israel’s history, and it is happening today with Ukraine. But massive assistance ≠ participation in the war.

For NATO to “fight,” the qualitative level of involvement must change — own forces, own strikes, own command. As of September 20, 2025, this is not the case; and the Alliance itself emphasizes this.

Meanwhile, it is Ukraine — with its own hands, brains, engineers — that is taking out warehouses, headquarters, and refineries deep in Russia, nullifying convenient myths.