On March 22, 2026, Iran’s exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi publicly appealed to Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, asking them not to strike Iran’s civilian infrastructure and to focus on the regime itself and its repressive apparatus. His statement came amid a sharp escalation around the Strait of Hormuz and after Donald Trump’s threats to strike Iranian power plants if Tehran does not unblock shipping within 48 hours.
He made the corresponding appeal public on March 22 on the social network X.
What exactly did Reza Pahlavi say
Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah and one of the most prominent figures in the Iranian expatriate opposition, stated that Iran should not be reduced to the Islamic Republic. In his logic, the country is not the regime, but the people and the future state after a change of power. Therefore, he said, it is necessary to continue pressure on the current system but not to destroy objects that belong to the civilian population and will be needed for the country’s recovery after the regime’s fall.
The essence of his appeal is crystal clear: strikes on infrastructure may weaken Tehran in the short term but simultaneously increase the cost of future transition for the Iranians themselves. Power plants, networks, civilian facilities are not only state assets but also the framework of everyday life for millions of people. It is this boundary that Pahlavi suggested not to erase.
This statement is also important because it fixes the position of part of the anti-regime Iranian camp: the fight against the Islamic Republic should not turn into a war against Iran itself as a country. For the Israeli audience, this is a fundamental nuance. It shows that even among the staunch opponents of the Tehran regime, there is a demand not for chaotic destruction but for a targeted dismantling of power.
Why his appeal was made right now
The context here is tough. Donald Trump demanded that Iran fully open the Strait of Hormuz for shipping within 48 hours, threatening otherwise to strike Iranian power plants. In response, Tehran threatened to completely close the strait and attack the energy and water infrastructure of the Gulf countries if the US implements this scenario.
So Pahlavi’s appeal did not appear in an academic discussion or at a calm moment, but right inside a crisis where the issue of civilian infrastructure has already become the subject of direct military threats. Against this backdrop, his formula — “protect Iran, eliminate the regime” — sounds like an attempt to separate the strategic goal from possible humanitarian and political damage.
Why this is important for Israel
For Israel, this story is not reduced to the words of an opposition politician in exile. Here, a real strategic question is touched upon: how to apply pressure on Iran in such a way as to weaken the regime but not destroy what will later become the foundation of post-Islamist Iran.
Israel has long assumed that the main threat is not the Iranian people but the regime, its military machine, nuclear program, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and proxy network throughout the region. In this sense, Pahlavi’s statement partly coincides with what many in Israel already consider fundamental: if the goal is to change the balance of power in the Middle East, then the strikes should be on centers of repression, military logistics, command nodes, and regime infrastructure, not on the civilian foundation of the country. This is no longer a slogan but a question of what Iran will remain after the crisis.
For readers of NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, another layer is important here. Israel lives in a region where the destruction of energy, water, ports, and logistics almost instantly goes beyond one country. A strike on major infrastructure in Iran could provoke a response against facilities in Gulf countries, shipping, oil prices, markets, and the safety of Israelis themselves. Reuters and AP directly write that the Iranian side is already threatening the energy and water facilities of US allies in the region if Washington strikes Iran’s energy system.
That’s why this topic is not theoretical for Israel. Here, the debate is not about a humanitarian abstraction but about how not to turn a military campaign against a dangerous regime into a regional chain reaction with unpredictable consequences.
Where the real boundary lies here
Pahlavi essentially proposes this framework: continue pressure but do not confuse the regime with the state and the people. In practice, this means focusing on repressive structures, military capabilities, command chains, and the political apparatus of the Islamic Republic. This is harder than just expanding the list of targets. But it is this logic that usually yields a clearer political result and leaves less room for Tehran’s propaganda that a “war of annihilation against the people” is being waged against it.
At the same time, it must be honestly said: in a real war, drawing an absolutely sterile line is almost impossible. Even strikes on objects considered strategic can hit the civilian environment. Therefore, Pahlavi’s statement is not a ready-made technical instruction but a political guideline. And today it sounds noticeably weightier than an ordinary post on a social network.
What this appeal means against the backdrop of Hormuz and Trump’s threats
The story with the Strait of Hormuz makes everything even sharper. Through this narrow corridor passes a significant portion of the world’s oil and gas, and therefore any escalation there instantly becomes a global problem. Against this backdrop, Trump’s threat to strike Iranian power plants and Tehran’s counter-threats against Gulf infrastructure show that the conflict has already gone beyond purely bilateral confrontation.
That is why Pahlavi’s appeal can be read as a political signal to several addresses at once. To Trump — that it is not worth substituting pressure on the regime with strikes on basic life support systems. To Netanyahu — that part of the Iranian opposition expects from Israel not maximum destruction but a precise strike at the center of the problem. To the West — that even in the camp of opponents of the Islamic Republic, there is an understanding: Iran after the regime will have to be not only liberated but also rebuilt.
The final conclusion here is simple, although unpleasant. Pahlavi is not asking to ease the pressure on Tehran. He is asking to make it smarter. For Israel, this is an important moment: in the current war, the question is no longer just how to stop the Iranian threat, but also what the region will be like the day after the regime is weakened. And if this perspective is indeed taken seriously, then words about preserving civilian infrastructure sound not like sentimentality but like cold calculation.
