Russia profits from chaos: why peace in the Middle East is postponed again

While Israel discusses the threat of Iran, the US tries to maintain a diplomatic channel, and the Gulf countries consider the risks to oil terminals, LNG supplies, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Russia remains a less visible but highly interested participant in this story. In news about the Middle East, Tehran, Washington, Jerusalem, Doha, Riyadh, or Abu Dhabi are more often mentioned, but behind the line of diplomatic statements and military threats, there is another question: who benefits from the region not becoming too calm.

The answer is not limited to Iran.

Ukrainian economist Vitaliy Shapran in a column on June 27, 2026 for “Glavcom” (ukr.) draws attention to this layer of conflict: the Middle East is not only politics, religion, missiles, allies, and opponents, but also one of the energy hearts of the planet. Therefore, every new round of tension around Israel, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz affects not only the security of the region but also the price of oil, the price of gas, the income of exporters, and Russia’s ability to continue financing the war against Ukraine.

For Israel, this is not an abstract economic theory because the Iranian threat has long been part of the daily security strategy. For Ukraine, this is also not a foreign topic because the Russian military machine depends on money, and the Kremlin receives money, among other things, when global energy markets remain nervous and expensive.

That is why the conversation about peace in the Middle East today cannot be separated from the conversation about Russian oil.

The Middle East is not only war but also the price of energy.

When Israel talks about the Middle East, it is most often about things that have a direct impact on people’s lives: missile threats, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran’s nuclear program, the security of the northern and southern borders, hostages, IDF operations, cabinet decisions, US pressure, and the position of international organizations. This is natural because Israel lives within this reality, not observing it from the outside.

But this same reality has another level that often remains outside the usual news feed. This is energy.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most important maritime corridors in the world. The International Energy Agency indicates that in 2025, about a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade passed through it, and the possibilities of bypassing this route are limited: there are practically only working alternative pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, this route remains critically important for export.

Therefore, any threat in the Persian Gulf area instantly becomes not only military or diplomatic news but also a signal for global markets. If tankers go smoothly, fear decreases. If there are threats to the strait, ports, oil terminals, gas infrastructure, or shipping, the market begins to factor in risk, and risk almost always means a higher price.

It is at this moment that the Middle East becomes part of Russia’s war against Ukraine—not directly, not through the front map, but through the financial system of war.

Why instability benefits Russia

The Russian economy is still heavily dependent on energy exports. Sanctions, price caps, discounts for buyers, logistics restrictions, and the transition to new markets have complicated Moscow’s usual trade model but have not canceled the main thing: oil, petroleum products, gas, and coal continue to bring Russia huge money.

According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, in May 2026, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports rose to 726 million euros per day, despite the fact that export volumes remained roughly at the level of April. This is an important detail: revenue growth can occur not only due to an increase in physical supplies but also due to price conditions, which means any regional instability capable of supporting prices becomes an economic resource for Moscow.

For the Kremlin, this is not an accounting trifle. A full-scale war against Ukraine requires a constant flow of money: missile production, component purchases, military payments, occupation administration maintenance, equipment restoration, drone launches, mobilization expenses, and support for the defense industry. When oil and gas bring more income, the Russian system finds it easier to withstand sanctions pressure and continue the war.

Therefore, peace in the Middle East can be bad news for Russia.

If the region calms down, the Strait of Hormuz operates without threats, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries can more confidently plan supplies, and global markets stop living in anticipation of a big war, the energy risk premium decreases. For consumers, this is good; for importing countries, it is a relief; for Ukraine, it is additional pressure on the Russian budget, but for Moscow, it means losing part of the financial oxygen.

Here the main thesis appears: Russia may not control every episode of the Middle Eastern crisis, but it knows how to use instability and is interested in it not disappearing too quickly.

Iran and Russia: two different threats that increasingly work together

For Israel, Iran is a strategic threat associated not only with the nuclear program but also with a network of allies, proxy structures, and armed groups that have been acting against Israeli security for years. In the Israeli perception, Iran is not an abstract player but a source of real threats: from missiles and drones to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and pressure on regional routes.

For Ukraine, Iran has also long ceased to be a distant topic. Iranian Shaheds have become one of the symbols of Russia’s war against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure, and civilian population. Reuters reported that Shaheds imported by Russia from Iran appeared in Ukrainian skies shortly after the full-scale invasion of 2022, and now Russia produces thousands of such drones monthly at its own factories.

This means that Israel and Ukraine are not facing two completely separate stories. In one case, Iran threatens Israel through regional proxies, missile programs, and attempts to change the balance of power in the Middle East. In another case, Iranian technologies have become part of the Russian war in Ukraine, where drones attack cities, power plants, ports, and residential areas.

The Moscow-Tehran connection has become one of the key factors in the new international reality. Russia receives technologies, weapons, experience in circumventing sanctions, and political support from Iran, while Iran receives military cooperation, international cover, and the feeling that it is not left alone against the West, Israel, and their allies.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important: the Ukrainian front and the Middle Eastern front can no longer be considered as two unrelated lines on the map. They intersect through weapons, money, energy, sanctions, diplomatic deals, and the interests of authoritarian regimes.

Why peace may be postponed not only because of war

Peace is usually postponed because the parties are not ready for compromise, fear showing weakness, do not trust each other, or use the conflict in domestic politics. In the Middle East, all this is indeed present: historical traumas, religious symbols, the struggle for influence, fear of future threats, street pressure, interests of armies and intelligence services, competition of regional powers.

But today, another factor is added to this—economic benefit for external players.

When the region remains tense, global markets live in anticipation of a new strike, a new route closure, a new attack on infrastructure, or a new conflict between Israel and Iran. This fear can support oil and gas prices even when physical supplies continue. And if prices remain high, the Russian budget gets more opportunities to withstand sanctions and continue the war against Ukraine.

That is why the Kremlin benefits not necessarily from a big war, which can get out of control and hit Russia’s allies, but from managed instability: a sufficiently high level of anxiety for markets to be nervous, but not necessarily such a level of chaos that completely destroys trade and creates unpredictable consequences.

This is a subtle but important difference.

Russia does not need to be the director of every crisis to profit from its consequences. It is enough for it to maintain ties with Iran, strengthen anti-Western rhetoric, play on contradictions between countries in the region, use energy as a political tool, and present itself not as an aggressor but as a “necessary mediator” in a world it helps destabilize.

What this means for Israel

Israel is often forced to think in short cycles because the country’s security requires daily decisions. Alarm, strike, response, cabinet meeting, White House statement, conversation with allies, new threat from the north, new attack from the south—all this creates the feeling that the main thing is happening here and now.

But the big picture shows that the threat of Iran is not separated from Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Russia’s war against Ukraine is not separated from Iranian drones, sanctions, energy revenues, and the global struggle for influence. If Moscow and Tehran increasingly help each other, then Israel cannot view Russia as a neutral observer who simply “has relations with everyone.”

Russia is a participant in a big game where chaos can be a resource.

For Israel, this means the need to look more closely at any attempts by Moscow to act as a mediator or balancing force. When a state profits from expensive oil, cooperates with Iran, and wages war against Ukraine, its interest in “peace” in the Middle East cannot be perceived as automatically bona fide.

NAnews — Israel News considers this topic in exactly this context: Israel’s security today cannot be separated from the war in Ukraine because the same alliances, technologies, and financial flows work against democratic countries on several fronts at once.

What this means for Ukraine

For Ukraine, the Middle East is not a distant map and not a foreign regional drama. It is part of the same war for resources, the attention of allies, sanctions pressure, and the political will of the West.

When the world is distracted by a new crisis, it is harder for Ukraine to maintain the focus of international support. When energy prices rise, Russia gets more money. When Iran feels stronger, its cooperation with Moscow becomes more dangerous. When the Gulf countries and Israel live in a state of constant anxiety, the Kremlin gets additional space for diplomatic maneuvering and informational speculations.

In this sense, every conversation about peace in the Middle East has a Ukrainian dimension. If the region stabilizes, energy markets have less reason to panic, and the Russian budget loses part of the price support. If the conflict drags on, Moscow gets the opportunity to hold on longer to export revenues and simultaneously distract attention from its own crimes in Ukraine.

Therefore, Ukraine is interested not only in victory on the front but also in the world better understanding the economy of the Russian war. Missiles are not launched from thin air. Drones are not produced from statements. Armies are not maintained by propaganda but by money. And if part of this money comes from global fear of a new Middle Eastern war, then the Middle East becomes part of the Ukrainian agenda directly.

Why this is important for the Jewish and Israeli audience

For the Jewish and Israeli audience, this topic is painful also because Israel is used to living in a world where security often requires pragmatic relations with different countries. But pragmatism should not turn into illusion. When it comes to Russia, it is important to see not only its statements but also its real interests.

If Moscow benefits from high oil prices, if it cooperates with Iran, if it uses the war against Ukraine as a tool to pressure the West, then its interest in a stable Middle East looks at least questionable. It can talk about diplomacy but simultaneously benefit from diplomacy not working too quickly.

It is important for Israel to understand: Iran is not only an Iranian problem but part of a broader system of alliances and conflicts. Ukraine also faces not only Russia but a network of regimes that help Moscow bypass pressure, obtain technologies, produce weapons, and prolong the war.

It is here that the interests of Israel and Ukraine intersect not at the level of beautiful words but at the level of security.

Main conclusion

Peace in the Middle East is again postponed not only because the parties are not ready for compromise or because Iran continues to play on raising the stakes. It is also postponed because there are external players who benefit from the region remaining in a state of controlled anxiety.

For Iran, it is a matter of influence.

For Russia, it is a matter of money, sanctions survival, and continuation of the war against Ukraine.

For Israel, it is a matter of security.

For Ukraine, it is a matter of life and death.

When the Middle East is on fire, Russia can earn not only politically but also economically. When the region calms down, the Kremlin loses part of the pressure on the world and part of the financial space for war. Therefore, the conversation about peace between Israel, Iran, the US, and the Gulf countries today cannot be separated from the conversation about Russian oil, Iranian drones, the war in Ukraine, and the system of instability that Moscow uses as a weapon.

NAnews — Israel News will continue to monitor how the Middle Eastern crisis affects not only Israel’s security but also Russia’s war against Ukraine, energy markets, and relations between countries that understand: peace in one region increasingly depends on who profits from war in another.