- September 12, 2026
- 9:17 pm
- Middle East
According to reports from Jordan, the US administration has recommended that several Middle Eastern states increase readiness in case of a new wave of war that could simultaneously affect several directions. There is no official confirmation of such a warning from Washington yet. But the events of the past day show why such a scenario is being discussed at all: a strike on the main bypass oil artery of Saudi Arabia, drone launchers found in Iraq, the advance of the Houthis near Bab-el-Mandeb, and the ongoing tension on Israel’s Lebanese border.
Author: Elena Gunko
On September 12, 2026, a worrying signal came from the region: according to reports from Jordan, the American administration asked several Middle Eastern states to prepare for a situation where the next escalation would no longer remain a war on one front. In Amman and Riyadh, according to these reports, the next round is considered potentially more extensive and tougher than previous ones.
A caveat is needed here. The White House, Pentagon, and State Department have not publicly confirmed such a warning yet, so turning it into a statement that ‘the US announced the approach of a big war’ would be incorrect. But almost simultaneously, several events occurred that make the scenario of multi-front escalation not just theoretical.
For NANews, Elena Gunko compared what is currently happening in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, around the Strait of Hormuz, and on Israel’s northern border. The picture is unpleasant: it’s not just about who and what will strike Iran or Israel. Oil routes, American bases, Gulf states, and two of the most important maritime passages are under pressure.
Saudi Arabia’s oil ‘bypass road around Iran’ was attacked from Iraqi territory
The most notable event is the drone strike on the Saudi oil pipeline East–West.
This line, about 1,200 kilometers long, crosses the Arabian Peninsula and allows oil to be transferred from eastern Saudi Arabia to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. In recent months, its significance has sharply increased: due to problems with tanker movement through Hormuz, Riyadh could transport part of the oil by land and then load it on the western coast.
After the attack, the pipeline was temporarily stopped. Saudi and Iraqi authorities stated that the drones came from Iraqi territory. It is estimated that recently about 4–5 million barrels per day passed through East–West, a volume comparable to 4–5% of the world’s oil supply.
This is what makes the strike special. If Hormuz becomes dangerous, Saudi Arabia uses the land route to the Red Sea. Now this route has also been attacked.
Riyadh has not yet responded with military force. The Saudi side stated that it decided to give Baghdad the opportunity to deal with the formations operating from Iraqi territory. At the same time, the kingdom separately reserved the right to take measures to protect infrastructure and its own territory.
On September 12, US President Donald Trump stated that he considers Iran likely involved in the attack. This is still a political assessment by the American president, not a published investigation with a proven chain of orders from Tehran to the executors.
Launchers found in Iraq near the Iranian border
The Iraqi part of the story became even more interesting within a few hours.
Two sources in Iraq’s security structures told AFP about the discovery of drone launch sites near the Iranian border — in the remote area of Al-Tayeb in Maysan province. According to preliminary data from Iraqi authorities, the devices used against Saudi Arabia could have been launched from Maysan.
It is important to formulate this carefully. The discovery of the launchers confirms that Iraqi territory could have been used to prepare such attacks, but it does not yet answer the question of who exactly controlled the drones and who gave the order.
Baghdad simultaneously began an internal investigation, changed part of the command on the ground, and strengthened control at the border with Iran. For the Iraqi government, the situation is extremely unpleasant: the country does not want to become a territory from which someone conducts a foreign war against neighbors, but the presence of numerous armed groups for many years makes such a scenario possible.
And here, multi-frontedness ceases to be a beautiful word for a headline. One drone launched from Iraq is capable of striking not only Saudi Arabia — it can draw Baghdad, Tehran, Washington, and Gulf states into a new round of mutual accusations and responses.
On the other end of the Arabian Peninsula, the Houthis reached Bab-el-Mandeb
Almost at the same moment, the situation in Yemen sharply deteriorated.
Iran-linked Houthis advanced along the western coast and reached the area of Dhubaab, directly adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Yemeni government sources also reported the Houthis’ advance on the strategically important island of Perim, or Mayyun, located right in the middle of the strait.
For the Israeli reader, geography here is more important than names.
Bab-el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and further with the Indian Ocean. Ships pass through it, which then go to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. If the security of this passage deteriorates, the consequences are felt by Israel, Egypt, European states, and all trade between Asia and Europe.
According to the US Energy Information Administration, in the second quarter of 2026, an average of about 8.1 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day passed through Bab-el-Mandeb. For comparison: before the current war, Hormuz was a route for about one-fifth of the world’s liquid petroleum product consumption.
The geography is quite unpleasant. To the east of the peninsula is Hormuz. In the middle is the Saudi pipeline, which allows bypassing Hormuz. To the west is Bab-el-Mandeb, where the Houthis have just arrived.
A strike on one point can still be compensated by another. Problems in three places at once are a completely different arithmetic.
NANews previously detailed why US pressure on Iran directly increases risks for Israel through Hormuz and oil routes. Now another section has been added to this scheme — the exit from the Red Sea.
Lebanon has not disappeared from this map
There is also no stable calm on Israel’s northern border.
On September 12, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited the south of the country amid fears of a new expansion of Israeli operations. The truce reduced the intensity of the fighting but did not solve the main issue — the arming of Hezbollah and control over its military infrastructure. Israel continues strikes on targets linked to the group; negotiations on further settlement continue, although the next round has been postponed to October.
For Israel, this means a simple thing: if the confrontation with Iran sharply escalates again, one cannot count on the north automatically staying aside.
In March of this year, the Iranian-Israeli escalation already led to the resumption of fighting with Hezbollah. We also wrote about Hezbollah’s acquisition of FPV drone methods, well known from the war in Ukraine. In the current situation, any new expansion of the Iranian conflict again raises the question: how quickly can the northern front come to life.
NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency considers this story as one system, not as a set of disparate alarming news. The Saudi oil pipeline, Iraqi launch site, Houthis on Perim Island, and tension in Lebanon are far apart on the map, but politically they are linked by one conflict.
Why Gulf states are simultaneously preparing and trying to negotiate
Despite all the military activity, the diplomatic channel is still working.
A meeting between Iran and Gulf states on the situation around the Strait of Hormuz is scheduled for Monday in Oman. However, a senior Iranian official has already warned Reuters that a full-fledged agreement is not expected to be signed at this meeting. The disagreements remain serious, including the issue of who and under what conditions will control the passage of ships through the strait.
It turns out to be a strange, but quite familiar construction for the region. The same states are simultaneously strengthening air defenses, looking for those responsible for attacks, redeploying troops, and conducting phone negotiations, trying to prevent the next strike.
Oman remains one of the main mediators in this scheme. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are also interested in bringing the US and Iran back to at least a limited format of agreements. The problem is that each new hit on a pipeline or tanker reduces the space for such diplomacy.
Where is Ukraine in this
At first glance — far away. In practice, not anymore.
The expansion of the war in the Middle East means additional consumption of American interceptors, aviation resources, intelligence, and air defense systems. For Ukraine, this is not an abstract problem: Kyiv depends on the same production chains of the Western defense complex, which must simultaneously replenish American stocks and ensure the protection of US bases in the Middle East.
NANews recently showed this in detail using the example of Patriot: a single large wave of attacks can consume modern interceptors comparable to months of their production. Therefore, another regional war almost inevitably affects the discussion of aid to Ukraine, even if Ukrainian military personnel are not directly involved in this story.
There is also a second bridge — Russia and Iran. Moscow continues military-technical cooperation with Tehran, and the experience of the war in Ukraine has long been a source of technologies and tactics that then appear on other fronts. NANews separately analyzed the Russian-Iranian military link and how the war in Ukraine has effectively become one of the testing grounds for technologies already important for Israel.
What will happen next
The calmest option is that Baghdad will indeed block the possibility of launches from Iraqi territory, Saudi Arabia will restore East–West, and negotiations in Oman will at least fix the rules of movement through Hormuz. This is not peace, but a safeguard appears.
Much worse if the strike on Saudi Arabia turns out not to be a single operation but the beginning of a series. Then Riyadh will have to decide how many more attacks can be endured without a response, and Baghdad — whether it can control armed formations on its own territory at all.
The most dangerous scenario begins when these lines coincide in time: a new major attack by Iran or the US, a response through Iraqi groups, pressure from the Houthis on Bab-el-Mandeb, and the resumption of a full-fledged front in Lebanon. It is in such a situation that the expression ‘several fronts simultaneously’ ceases to be a forecast.
For Israel, the main question now is not even whether another round will begin. Separate rounds are already underway.
The other question is: will Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Hormuz, and the Red Sea remain separate episodes — or at some point will they converge into one war.
And it seems that this is the option that the governments of the region are preparing for today.