Ukrainians are ready both to fight and to cease fire: what the KIIS survey actually showed

62% of Ukrainians are willing to endure the war for as long as it takes. 79% believe that Ukraine will eventually win. At the same time, 75% allow for negotiations with Russia, and 69% are ready to support an immediate ceasefire along the current front line. At first glance, the numbers seem to contradict each other. But if you read not only the percentages but also the questions from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the picture becomes much clearer: Ukrainians are increasingly separating the cessation of shooting from capitulation.

Author: Pavel Shveiko

Results of the latest KMIS study, published on October 6, 2026. The survey itself was conducted from September 12–21, 2026: 1002 adult citizens of Ukraine living in government-controlled territories were interviewed by phone. Residents of occupied territories and Ukrainians who went abroad after February 24, 2022, were not included in the sample.

KMIS — Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, one of the main Ukrainian centers for public opinion research. This clarification is especially important for the Israeli reader: it is not about internet voting or a survey of a specific media audience, but a nationwide sociological study with a random sampling of mobile numbers and subsequent statistical weighting. For indicators around 50%, the declared formal error is up to 4.1 percentage points.

Ready to endure the war for a long time. Even after September

To the direct question of how much longer people are willing to endure the war, 62% answered: as long as necessary. Another 4% named a period of about a year, 23% — several months or half a year. The remaining 11% were undecided.

Since late July — early August, these figures have hardly changed. And KMIS specifically notes the timing of the September survey: Russia had already intensified the use of reactive drones and strikes on entirely civilian infrastructure.

Kyiv is particularly noticeable. In the spring, 61% of the capital’s residents said they were ready to endure the war for as long as it takes. By late July — early August, it was 69%, and in September — 72%.

KMIS does not call the transition from 69% to 72% a statistically significant increase — the difference is too small for such a conclusion. What is significant is that the indicator did not decrease, even though the capital was living under new heavy attacks at that time.

What reactive drones, mentioned by KMIS, are, should be immediately explained to the Israeli audience. The usual Shahed with a piston engine is already familiar to Israelis from the Iranian drone program. Reactive devices are significantly faster: the time between detecting a target and its possible interception is shorter. Already on September 30, a few days after the survey ended, a Russian strike on Ukraine recorded 188 drones, of which 86 were reactive. NAnovosti thoroughly analyzed this attack and its consequences for Kyiv and the region.

There is a spread by region, but nowhere does the share of those willing to endure the war for as long as necessary drop below half: 61% in the West, 72% in Kyiv, 61% in the Center and North, 55% in the South, 66% in Lower Dnipro, and 56% in the East.

This already poorly aligns with the simplified formula that a prolonged war should automatically lead most of society to demand its end on any terms.

Victory remains the expectation of the majority, but confidence has weakened

79% of respondents believe that Ukraine will ultimately win. Only 7% expect a Russian victory.

But within these 79%, there is a change that cannot be overlooked.

Absolutely confident in Ukrainian victory are 47%, another 32% answer ‘rather yes’. In late July — early August, the overall belief in victory was higher — about 85%, and those absolutely confident were 60%.

So belief in victory remains widespread but has become more cautious.

This aligns well with responses to another question — not ‘who will win’, but what real outcome of the war people generally consider achievable.

41% consider maintaining an independent Ukraine realistic, but with the actual loss of part of the territory. In February 2025, it was 33%.

Here, the wording is crucial. The actual loss of control does not equal legal recognition of Russian annexation. This boundary then reappears in responses about a possible ceasefire.

At the same time, 53% still consider the return of at least part of the captured territories realistic. Of them, 14% hope for the restoration of the line that existed before the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022; 4% — for the complete liberation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; 23% — for Ukraine’s return to the internationally recognized borders of 1991, including Crimea; another 12% allow for the restoration of territorial integrity along with the transfer of hostilities to Russian territory.

This is no longer a society that uniformly envisions victory. But also not a society that has agreed to consider the current front line as the final state border.

Three-quarters allow for negotiations — but this is not three-quarters of supporters of concessions

The next figure easily turns into manipulation if detached from the wording of the question.

75% of Ukrainians allow for negotiations with Russia to end the war. 21% oppose the very possibility of negotiations, another 4% are undecided.

KMIS received almost the same responses back in February 2025.

But people were not asked if they were ready to give territories to Russia for the sake of negotiations. Nor were they asked about recognizing annexation, reducing the army, or abandoning NATO.

Therefore, 75% is support for the possibility of talking to the adversary about ending the war, not a willingness to accept its terms.

This is where the results become most interesting.

69% are ready to stop the fire on the current line — under three conditions

KMIS offered respondents not abstract ‘negotiations’, but a specific scenario: immediate full ceasefire along the current line of hostilities.

It is ready to be supported by 69%.

But the wording immediately included three conditions: Ukraine does not legally recognize the occupied territories as part of Russia, continues to strengthen its army, and maintains its movement towards the European Union and NATO. 22% opposed this option, another 9% could not decide.

Here, the apparent contradiction between the 62% who are ready to endure the war for as long as necessary and the 69% who are ready to stop the shooting disappears.

The majority agrees to consider the cessation of hostilities not as a final political settlement, but as a halt to the war on the line that exists at the moment — without legalizing the Russian capture of territories and without disarming Ukraine.

For the Israeli reader, this distinction is familiar from their own political lexicon: ceasefire and peace treaty are not the same. Israel has repeatedly ended specific rounds of hostilities with a ceasefire without resolving the conflict itself and without recognizing the opponent’s demands. In the Ukrainian issue, the scale, opponent, and international legal situation are completely different, so a direct comparison would be incorrect. But the terminological distinction is the same: stopping shooting today does not yet mean agreeing on who owns the territory and what the security arrangement will be tomorrow.

This is why NAnovosti — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency previously analyzed the option of freezing along the front line as a separate scenario: the line where hostilities ceased can exist de facto, without becoming a recognized new state border of Ukraine.

Remove the guarantees — and support drops sharply

Previous KMIS surveys allow checking how important these conditions really are.

In late July — early August, Ukrainians were offered a scenario where the Armed Forces of Ukraine had to leave Donbas in exchange for rather abstract security guarantees from the US and Europe. Only 32% were ready to agree with it, and 60% rejected it.

In another variant, it was about freezing hostilities along the current front line, but with enhanced arms supplies and financial support for Ukraine. Here, 59% agreed, against 31%.

Even earlier, in May 2026, 61% rejected a ceasefire on the current line if it was not accompanied by security guarantees, increased armament, and financial assistance.

The difference between 32%, 59%, and the current 69% shows more than one isolated question.

For the majority, it matters not only where the armies stop, but also what state Ukraine will be in after that.

If the price of stopping is the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops, vague security promises, and the risk of weakening the country, there is no support even from half of society. If Ukraine retains its army, western course, the right to arm itself, and does not recognize annexation — the majority is already ready to accept a ceasefire.

Not ‘fight or reconcile’, but on what terms to stop

This is how these data come together into one picture.

62% are ready to endure the war for as long as necessary. 79% consider Ukraine’s ultimate victory more likely than Russia’s. But absolute confidence in victory is decreasing, and 41% already consider maintaining an independent state with the actual loss of part of the territory realistic.

At the same time, 75% do not reject negotiations and 69% are ready to support stopping the fire where the front currently runs — if this line does not become a legally recognized Russian border, the Ukrainian army remains strong, and the movement towards the EU and NATO continues.

Therefore, the latest KMIS survey shows not so much ‘war fatigue’ and not a sudden turn of Ukrainians towards territorial concessions.

It shows a more pragmatic society than a few years ago: people are still ready to resist, but increasingly allow for the cessation of hostilities, if the pause does not deprive Ukraine of the ability to defend itself and does not turn the Russian occupation into a recognized outcome of the war.