Washington tightens the ring: Israel between Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the deal with Iran

Against the backdrop of the American-Iranian memorandum, Israel found itself under pressure on several fronts at once — in Southern Lebanon, on Syrian Hermon, around direct dialogue with Damascus, and regarding the future of the Gaza Strip.

The key problem for Jerusalem is not only the agreement between the US and Iran itself. Far more dangerous is something else: Washington may try to turn Israel’s military achievements of recent months into a diplomatic payment for a regional deal that Donald Trump wants to present as a major peace breakthrough in the Middle East.

According to Israeli logic, the withdrawal of troops from the north, the limitation of freedom of action against Hezbollah, and the initiation of Gaza’s reconstruction before the disarmament of Hamas create a single common threat. Israel risks losing control precisely where the cost of a mistake is measured not by political statements but by the safety of the residents of Galilee, the Golan, the south of the country, and the center of Israel.

Lebanon and Syrian Hermon: pressure around northern security

At the center of Israeli concern is Southern Lebanon and areas that Israel considers a security buffer after the war with Hezbollah. According to Israeli sources, the Trump administration may increase pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, demanding troop withdrawal or at least a formula that Washington can present to the Arab world as a diplomatic achievement.

Journalist Anna Raiva-Barski wrote in Maariv that in Israel, there is concern about the transition of American pressure into a practical phase. This may involve not only political demands but also delays in arms supplies, security restrictions, and steps that will effectively resemble an arms embargo.

What exactly does Washington want

Israeli officials believe that Trump is trying to get Israel to “pay” for security in the north in exchange for the agreement that the US is promoting with Iran. In this logic, Lebanon, Syria, and Syrian Hermon become not separate issues but part of a single regional construct.

Publicly, Netanyahu has already made it clear that Israel does not intend to abandon buffer zones. His position is simple: if Israel withdraws too early, Hezbollah and Iran will gain time, space, and a route to restore the threat on the northern border.

In this sense, the dispute between Jerusalem and Washington is not only diplomatic. It is a dispute over who will determine the boundaries of Israeli security after the war: the government of Israel, based on threats on the ground, or the US administration, based on a grand deal with Tehran.

Syria: Damascus returns to the negotiating game

The Syrian direction has become the second element of American pressure. According to Kan 11, correspondents Gili Cohen and Roy Case reported that direct dialogue between Jerusalem and Damascus may resume under US pressure after several months of freeze and for the first time after the war with Iran.

Here it is important to clarify the facts: it is not about Bashar Assad, but about Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Western publications now call the president of Syria. It is around him that Washington is trying to build a new regional formula, in which Damascus should play a role in weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon.

During the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, Trump stated that he spoke with the Syrian leader about Hezbollah. The American president effectively suggested that Syria deal with the Lebanese Shiite group instead of Israel. In one of his phrases, he said that Israel does not need to “demolish a residential building every time” when they are looking for a Hezbollah militant there.

Why Israel is cautious about this

For Israel, such an idea seems problematic for several reasons. First, Syria itself remains unstable. Second, Damascus’s intervention in Lebanon could trigger a new wave of sectarian conflict. Third, Israel does not want to trade its freedom of action for promises from a third party, especially when it comes to Hezbollah and Iranian infrastructure.

According to Reuters, al-Sharaa himself denied rumors of Syria’s intention to enter Lebanon. Thus, the American idea currently looks more like a tool of pressure on Israel and Lebanon than a real military mechanism.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially important: when Washington talks about “regional architecture,” the residents of Kiryat Shmona, Metula, Nahariya, Haifa, and the Golan hear a different question — who will be responsible if Hezbollah starts shooting again. This is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views US pressure not as abstract diplomacy but as a direct dispute over Israel’s right to maintain its own security lines.

Gaza: reconstruction before Hamas disarmament

The third front of pressure is the Gaza Strip. This week, Israeli media published reports that the US insists on advancing Gaza’s reconstruction even before the complete disarmament of Hamas. This primarily concerns areas under IDF control, including the so-called “yellow zone.”

The American idea is as follows: start reconstruction in areas where there is no direct Hamas presence, introduce an international contingent, and simultaneously create conditions for the evacuation of approximately 100,000 Gaza residents from the sector. Officially, this is presented as a way to separate the population from Hamas’s power and launch civilian governance without a terrorist structure.

But in Israel, such a scheme is considered dangerous. The cabinet demands to maintain control over the territory until the main condition is met — the disarmament of Hamas. Without this, reconstruction may turn into not stabilization of the sector but the restoration of infrastructure that the terrorist organization will then use again.

The main dispute: security first or reconstruction first

Israel’s position remains firm: international forces should not enter the sector, and reconstruction should not begin while Hamas retains weapons, management structures, and the ability to restore military potential.

In unofficial Israeli conversations, it is acknowledged that American pressure on Gaza is increasing and may become even stronger after the de-escalation around Iran and Lebanon. Washington wants to move towards a political picture of “post-war settlement,” but Jerusalem sees a different reality on the ground: Hamas is using the time for regrouping.

This is where all three directions converge — Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. The US is trying to assemble a broad regional package: Iran gets a negotiation track, Lebanon — an end to the war, Syria — a new role, Gaza — reconstruction, and Israel — demands for restraint.

For Jerusalem, this is a dangerous formula. It may look good at summits, but in practice, it leaves Israel with a familiar choice: either agree to an ally’s diplomatic construct or maintain freedom of action where the threat has not disappeared.

The main conclusion for Israel is simple. If the US links Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Iran into one deal, Israel needs not only to respond to each pressure separately but also to see the whole map at once. Because a concession on one front can quickly become a precedent for pressure on another.