- July 5, 2026
- 1:55 pm
- Israel, Video
On July 5, 2026, a post was published in the Telegram channel “Shomer Saf” about Sergey Pashkov, a Russian TV journalist who has been working on Middle Eastern topics for many years and lives in Israel.
Quote:
“This man lives in Israel, raises his children here, and his wife works for the Russian-speaking 9th channel of Israeli television. At the same time, he speaks to a foreign audience with harsh criticism of Israel, spreads false information, criticizes the government and the prime minister.
The question arises: why does the state allow such activities from its territory? And is it related to the fact that he has influential patrons, thanks to whom he feels so confident?”
On the same day, a video with a fragment of his report was released on the YouTube channel “Anetta Shapiro: Israel Without Borders”.
What exactly did Pashkov say in this fragment
In the Russian broadcast, Pashkov said several things that could irritate the right-wing Israeli camp.
He started with the thesis that Israel and Washington “have quarreled again,” and linked Netanyahu’s statements about a possible refusal of US financial aid to the pre-election atmosphere in Israel.
He then called Channel 14 a “pro-government channel” that “absolutely supports the ruling coalition” and “is entirely supportive of Netanyahu.”
Pashkov called Netanyahu’s statement that Israel could refuse American aid “populist,” reminding that it involves about $12 billion over three years, arms supplies, technologies, and work with American military specialists.
He also said that the degree of Israel’s dependence on the American defense center is “colossal.”
Separately, Pashkov highlighted Netanyahu’s response to the question of how he changed after October 7. According to him, the prime minister replied: “I lost some weight,” and this, as Pashkov said, caused “shock” among a large number of viewers, especially the opposition.
Another thesis: Pashkov stated that there is a “saber battle” in Israel between the opposition and Netanyahu around the prime minister’s words that he allegedly saved the world twice from an Iranian nuclear bomb.
He then said that Washington demanded Israel stop strikes in Lebanon and had previously demanded a reduction in the intensity of the military campaign in Gaza.
And in the end, Pashkov concluded that Netanyahu would not go for a complete break with the US because “the future of Israel depends on it,” and sharp statements before the elections could further cool US-Israeli relations.
In the description of the video in Hebrew, Pashkov is presented as:
Sergey Pashkov, head of the Middle East bureau of Russian television
That is: Sergey Pashkov, head of the Middle East bureau of Russian television.
The publication is important not only because of Pashkov himself.
It is important because the question of Russian media influence in Israel was raised specifically from the right-wing Israeli media field.
Not from a “Ukrainian” organization.
Not from the “left” camp.
Not from the opposition “anti-Netanyahu” environment.
But specifically from the right — from an environment that usually speaks the language of “security, sovereignty, national interest, and support for a strong state”.
And the main phrase of the post sounds like this:
“The question arises: why does the state allow such activities from its territory?”
This is the political moment.
Because now the topic of Russian influence in Israel is no longer just a “Ukrainian pain” or a dispute among activists. If this question is being asked by right-wing Israeli media, then the ice has indeed moved.
Why Pashkov specifically
Sergey Pashkov is not a random person in this story and not just a commentator who accidentally got into the Israeli agenda.
Open sources describe him as a journalist for VGTRK and the “Russia” channel, working on Israel and the Middle East. In 2025, Vesti called him the head of the Middle East bureau of VGTRK and noted that he reported on “Russia 24” about the situation in Israel after strikes on Iran.
There is also a family detail that coincides with the wording of the post. Newsru.co.il wrote that Aliya Sudakova is a news and current affairs presenter on Channel 9 ITV, and Sergey Pashkov is the director of the Middle East bureau of the “Russia” channel. It was also mentioned that they have lived and worked in Israel for many years, and their younger daughters grew up here.
So it’s not about a person who came to Israel for a few days to shoot a story.
It’s about a Russian TV journalist who has long been inside Israeli reality, lives here, enjoys the security of this country, works from the region, and at the same time is part of the Russian state media system.
In 2023, a public story already arose around Pashkov. Israeli media wrote that he was wanted to be stripped of accreditation in Israel due to materials about the war against Hamas.
Therefore, the current publication did not appear out of nowhere.
It hit an already existing nerve.
Why the main thing is that the question was raised from the right
The main news here is not that someone was once again outraged by a Russian journalist.
The main news is who exactly asked the question.
“Shomer Saf” is not a left-wing platform, not a “Ukrainian” organization, and not an opposition party headquarters. It is a right-wing Zionist Israeli media project founded by Dr. Gadi Taub in 2020.
Gadi Taub is an Israeli historian, writer, publicist, and political commentator, one of the prominent public intellectuals of the right-wing camp. “Shomer Saf” itself is not formally a party and is not an official body of Likud, “Zionut HaDatit,” “Otzma Yehudit,” or any other political force.
But in terms of political orientation, it is a right-wing Israeli media.
It is an environment close to the national-Zionist and pro-coalition discourse, to criticism of left-wing media, the judicial system in its current form, and the Israeli mainstream.
And that is why the publication is important.
When “Ukrainians” talk about Russian influence, it is often dismissed as Ukrainian pain.
When “leftists” talk about it, it is dismissed as an attack against Netanyahu.
When activists talk about it, it is called a private campaign.
But when the question comes from the “right” Israeli field, the usual excuses begin to break down.
It is already difficult to say: “this is just a Ukrainian agenda.”
It is difficult to say: “these are leftists attacking the government.”
It is difficult to say: “this is an internal dispute among Russian speakers.”
No.
Now the question of Russian influence has been raised from the right.
And this makes it part of the Israeli political agenda before the elections.
Freedom of speech or the work of a foreign state media machine?
In a democratic country, you can criticize the government.
You can criticize the prime minister.
You can debate Israel’s policy in Gaza, dependence on the US, Channel 14, future elections, the actions of the opposition, Netanyahu’s style, and what the country’s strategy should be after October 7.
This is a normal part of political life.
But the question becomes different when criticism comes not just from an independent journalist or civil commentator, but from a representative of the Russian state media system, which after 2022 has become one of the key tools of Putin’s regime.
Russian television has long ceased to be ordinary media in the Western sense.
It works as part of the state machine that justifies the war against Ukraine, attacks the West, blurs the responsibility of Moscow’s allies, and creates a picture of the world favorable to the Kremlin.
Therefore, the question from the post does not sound like a demand to ban any inconvenient opinion.
It sounds like a question of sovereignty.
Why does the state allow such activities from its territory?
Israel is not obliged to persecute a person for criticizing the authorities. But Israel must understand when its territory, its security, its accreditations, its infrastructure, and its open democratic environment are used by representatives of a foreign state media system.
Especially if this media system belongs to a country that after 2022 is waging war against Ukraine and at the same time building political ties with Iran, anti-Western regimes, and forces that do not always act in Israel’s interests.
Right-wing media raised a question that major parties avoid
So far, major Israeli parties speak about Russian influence very cautiously or remain silent.
The reasons are clear.
The topic of Russia is inconvenient.
It involves diplomacy, old ties, business, cultural inertia, fear of offending part of the electorate, and reluctance to open an additional conflict before the elections.
But that is why it is important that the question was raised by right-wing Israeli media.
The right-wing camp usually speaks about security more harshly than the left. It demands strength from the state, control over borders, toughness towards Israel’s enemies, responsibility for the national interest, and a clear understanding of who acts against the country.
And now this same language is beginning to be applied to Russian informational influence.
If Israel must be strong against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, then why should it be weak against the Russian state media machine?
If Israel demands vigilance from its citizens, then why should the state itself not be vigilant towards those who broadcast from its territory to a foreign audience?
If security is not a slogan but real policy, then why does informational security remain a gray area?
That is why the right-wing source of the question is so important.
It translates the topic from an emotional discussion into a political plane.
Not against citizens, but against foreign influence
It is important not to confuse the addressee here.
The problem is not the Russian language.
The problem is not with Israeli citizens who came from the former USSR.
The problem is not that a person has the right to a political opinion.
People who came to Israel from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, or Central Asia are Israeli citizens. Many serve in the army, pay taxes, raise children, survived October 7, and understand well what security is.
Many of them know better than others how Russian propaganda works because they have seen it from the inside. Many after 2022 observed how Russian channels justified aggression against Ukraine, erased crimes, replaced facts with emotions, and turned the war into a television product.
That is why an honest conversation should not be against Russian-speaking Israeli citizens, but against Russian state influence.
The Russian language does not belong to the Kremlin.
People who speak Russian are not obliged to answer for Russian television.
But Israel has the right to ask why representatives of the Russian state media system feel so confident here.
Who gives them access?
Who gives accreditations?
Who checks how their materials are then used abroad?
Who determines where the line is between journalism and activities in the interests of a foreign state machine?
NANews —Israel News | Nikk.Agency has already written: a party or bloc that first clearly states this difference may gain additional votes. Not through hysteria and not through a witch hunt, but through an honest formulation: Israeli citizens are Israeli citizens, and Russian state propaganda is Russian state propaganda.
Why this could become an election topic
The closer the elections, the harder it will be for major parties to hide behind cautious phrases.
Israel after October 7 lives in a new reality. The country has already realized that war is not only about rockets, tunnels, borders, drones, and airstrikes. The war is also in the information field, where every picture, every word, and every external comment affect how the world perceives Israel.
Hamas fights with images.
Iran fights with networks of influence.
Russia fights with television, diplomatic formulas, agents of influence, pseudo-neutral comments, and a constant attempt to portray democratic countries as weak, hypocritical, and dependent.
In such a reality, Israel cannot afford naivety.
That is why the right-wing Israeli media, which raised the issue of Russian influence, effectively opened a topic that parties are not yet willing to touch.
Before the elections, this could become an important line.
A party or bloc that first says: Israel must defend itself not only from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran but also from foreign informational influence, may gain additional votes.
Not because it’s a loud slogan.
But because it’s a long-overdue problem.
“Right-wing” camp may demand the state to be a state
The peculiarity of this story is that it is the right-wing field that can ask the question more harshly than others.
The left-wing camp often talks about rights, press freedom, and democratic procedures.
“Ukrainian” activists talk about Kremlin propaganda and Russia’s war against Ukraine.
But the right-wing Israeli field speaks a different language — the language of security, sovereignty, national interest, and state strength.
When the question arises there, “why does the state allow such activities from its territory?”, it no longer sounds like a request from activists.
It sounds like a demand for the state to be a state.
Not a thoroughfare.
Not a weak platform.
Not a territory where foreign state media structures can live, work, reach an overseas audience, and shape the image of Israel in the interests of a foreign political system.
For the right-wing voter, this topic is especially understandable.
If Israel demands strength at the borders, strength against Hamas, strength against Iran, and strength in international diplomacy, then why should it be weak against Russian informational influence?
Why should security end where television begins?
The ice has moved precisely from the right
The post on July 5 is important not because it contained harsh words about Sergey Pashkov.
It is important because in the right-wing Israeli media field, a question was raised that major parties still prefer to sidestep.
“The question arises: why does the state allow such activities from its territory?”
This question is addressed not only to one journalist.
It is addressed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security services, regulators, press services, parties, and future Knesset candidates.
It is addressed to the entire Israeli system, which after October 7 must look at security more broadly than before.
The ice has moved precisely because the question was raised from the right.
And now it will be increasingly difficult to hide it aside, call it secondary, or write it off as a Ukrainian agenda.
Russian-speaking Israelis do not belong to Moscow.
Right-wing Israelis are not obliged to turn a blind eye to the Kremlin’s media machine.
And the state of Israel is not obliged to be a convenient platform for those who live here, enjoy the protection of this country, but work in the logic of a foreign state system.
Before the elections, this could become an important topic.
And perhaps additional votes will be gained not by those who remain silent again, but by those who first say out loud what many have long understood: Russian influence in Israel is not a cultural issue and not a language problem.
It is a matter of security, sovereignty, and political maturity of the state.
