- June 3, 2026
- 3:09 pm
- Israel
On June 2, 2026, the topic of emigration from Israel once again went beyond dry statistics. New data, published on June 3 by Vesti/Ynet, shows: it is not only “fresh” immigrants who arrived after the start of the big war in Ukraine leaving the country, but primarily Israelis themselves — young, educated, working, and already integrated into the life of the country.
This picture sharply contrasts with the explanation given by Benjamin Netanyahu in January at a Knesset session. At that time, the Prime Minister, speaking about yerida, claimed that it was supposedly mainly about citizens from Ukraine, who recently arrived in Israel due to the war. However, a study prepared by Dr. Ila Eliyahu for discussion in the Knesset Committee on Aliyah and Integration shows a more alarming reality: the negative migration balance affects not the periphery of society, but its central layers.
Not Ukrainians as a “convenient explanation,” but an Israeli crisis of trust
According to data provided by Ynet, since 2022, about half of those who left Israel are people aged 20 to 44. This is not pension migration, not a story about random tourists, and not only a problem of new immigrants who found it difficult to adapt.
This is the age of work, army, family, startups, medicine, science, universities, and the future tax core of the country.
That is why the attempt to reduce the departure to “Ukrainians who did not settle” seems too simplistic. In 2022, 20,124 new immigrants who had lived in the country for less than two years left Israel. But those who did not fall under this definition were almost twice as many — 39,241 people. In 2023, the picture repeated: 27,973 “fresh” immigrants versus 54,791 people from other categories.
Why this is important for the Israeli audience
For Israel, this is not just statistics from Ben Gurion Airport.
When a person who recently arrived through aliyah leaves, it may be a problem of absorption, language, housing, work, or expectations. But when native Israelis, graduates of local universities, specialists, and families who have already put down roots here leave en masse, the question becomes much deeper.
Here it is no longer about who “could not withstand Israel.”
It is about the fact that some Israelis have stopped seeing a reliable personal horizon in the country.
Young and educated: the most painful part of the statistics
One of the harshest conclusions of the report concerns education. Among those leaving Israel, the share of people with academic degrees is noticeably higher than their share in the country’s population. According to data for 2022, 33.2% of those who left had a first academic degree, while their share in the population was 21.5%. A second degree was held by 23.5% of those who left — almost twice as much as in the overall population structure.
Even more alarming are the figures for holders of a third academic degree. Among those leaving, they were 3.7%, while in the population — only 0.8%.
This is no longer everyday emigration, but a brain drain.
According to the publication, about 25% of people who defended a doctoral degree in mathematics in Israel today live abroad for at least three years. In computer sciences, this figure is 22%, in genetics — 19%, in physics — 17%.
For a country that builds its strength on the army, technology, universities, medicine, and innovation, this sounds like a warning.
NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this part of the story: the problem is not only in the number of those who left, but in who exactly is leaving. If the country is losing future scientists, engineers, doctors, entrepreneurs, and teachers, the consequences will not be immediate, but will hit Israel in years — in the economy, security, universities, high-tech, and the quality of state systems.
Gilad Kariv: the state cannot pretend that nothing is happening
Knesset member Gilad Kariv, who heads the Knesset Committee on Aliyah and Integration, stated that alarming data continues to arrive, but, according to him, there is no single body in the government that coordinates work on the emigration problem, nor a strategic plan to change the trend.
Kariv also directly challenged Netanyahu’s version that the main flow of those leaving are new immigrants from Ukraine. According to him, the statistics do not confirm such proportions.
In 2023, the number of those who left among native Israelis or immigrants who had lived in the country for at least five years reached 51,000 people. This is 53% more than in 2021. And in 2024, according to published data, 53% of those who left the country were sabras — native Israelis, while 48% were born abroad.
The numbers leave no convenient political exit.
One can argue about the reasons, one can assess the responsibility of the government, wars, cost of living, judicial reform, social division, and the sense of personal security differently. But it is already difficult to claim that this is a “foreign” problem brought to Israel by the last wave of aliyah.
Yerida after 2022: from personal decisions to a strategic threat
Until 2021, about 40,500 people left Israel on average per year. In 2022, 59,400 left. In 2023, there was a sharp jump — 82,800 people. In 2024, the figure decreased to 69,500, but still remained significantly above the pre-COVID level.
The number of returning Israelis also decreased. If the average annual figure for the period from 2009 to 2024 was 24,450 people, then in 2024 it fell to 18,800. According to the CBS, the migration balance of Israelis in 2022–2024 was negative: the gap was about 140,000 people in favor of those who left.
A personal story from Tel Aviv and Prague
The Ynet publication includes the story of 45-year-old Dudu Zakai, who moved to Prague. He said he had been working there for many years and had long thought about moving, but the final decision in the family matured after a rocket strike on their neighborhood in Tel Aviv in June last year.
This is an important detail.
For Israelis, war has long ceased to be something abstract. Rockets, alarms, mobilization, hostages, north, south, economic uncertainty, political fatigue — all this adds up to a personal sense of the future. For some, it holds. For others, it breaks.
That is why the conversation about emigration cannot be reduced to accusations of weakness or disloyalty.
People leave not only because it is easier abroad. Often they leave because it has become too difficult at home to plan life five, ten, or twenty years ahead.
Israel, Ukraine, and new aliyah: where the honest line lies
For immigrants from Ukraine, this topic is especially sensitive. After Russia’s invasion in 2022, many came to Israel not out of tourist interest and not for comfort, but because the war destroyed their previous lives. Some managed to integrate, some faced language, bureaucracy, expensive rent, difficulties in diploma recognition, and heavy psychological burdens.
But the new data is important precisely because it removes the role of a convenient explanation from Ukrainian immigrants.
The problem is broader.
NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency views this story as a signal for the entire Israeli society: if the country wants to retain people, it is not enough to talk about Zionism, aliyah, and historical ties with the Jewish people. It is necessary for the citizen to see security, respect for institutions, a clear economy, honest absorption, functioning state services, and a future for children.
What lies behind the numbers
Yerida has always been a painful word in the Israeli language. It carries not only geography but also a moral burden: as if a person not only left but “descended.” However, modern emigration is more complex.
One person leaves for a postdoc.
Another — for work in high-tech.
A third — because of housing prices.
A fourth — because they no longer believe that the state can maintain a balance between security, democracy, economy, and normal life.
A fifth simply wants their children to sleep without sirens.
When such decisions number in the tens of thousands per year, it is no longer a sum of private stories. It is a national symptom.
The main question now is not who is to blame for the specific figure for 2024. The main question is whether the state is ready to recognize that it is not only the “unsettled” who are leaving, but people without whom it will be harder for Israel to remain a strong, smart, and resilient country.
The ending here is still open.
If the Knesset limits itself to another discussion without a plan, the statistics will remain statistics — until the next jump. But if Israel sees in these data not a political threat, but a warning about the future, the conversation about yerida may become the beginning of serious work: with security, absorption, economy, education, science, and trust between citizens and the state.