Not a truce, but a long war: what scenario for 2026 do Ukrainian futurists foresee

When might Russia’s war against Ukraine end: forecast for 2026.

Ukrainian experts Andriy Dligach and Valeriy Pekar believe that Russia is not ready to stop the war anytime soon. What scenarios for 2026 do they consider most realistic and why is this important for Israel.

Talks about the imminent end of the war are returning to the public sphere. But if you remove political declarations, media noise, and endless speculations around negotiations, the picture looks noticeably harsher. Ukrainian experts who commented on possible scenarios for 2026 start from an unpleasant but sober starting point: Russia currently has no systemic reasons to stop the war.

This is where the main conflict between the desired and the real begins. Many want to see a harbinger of peace in every diplomatic contact. But in Moscow’s logic, negotiations may not be a step towards ending the war, but a way to buy time, regroup, and prepare for the next phase of pressure on Ukraine.

For the Israeli audience, this dispute is especially understandable. When a country lives next to an adversary that sees a pause not as a compromise but as a window for a new strike, any talk of a ceasefire must be read very carefully — without illusions, but also without complacency.

Why Moscow, according to experts, is not ready to stop

Futurologist and Doctor of Economics Andriy Dligach formulates the basic thesis very directly: Russia does not see reasons to curtail the war now. In his assessment, the Russian system is still capable of financing military expenses, and Ukraine’s international partners have fewer levers to quickly change the situation. Against this backdrop, the world’s attention to Ukraine is blurring, and the war itself risks dragging into a long exhausting scenario.

This is an important thought because it breaks the usual hope for the automatic exhaustion of Russia. In Ukrainian expert logic, the problem is not that Moscow is stronger than everyone and controls the situation perfectly. The problem is different: the war for Russia still remains politically and economically acceptable, which means the decision to continue it still looks rational from the Kremlin’s point of view.

Dligach goes further and suggests that Moscow may count on at least another two to two and a half years of pressure, observing the internal problems of the West, the fluctuations of the USA, and how Europe is getting tired. In this time model, Russia is in no hurry. It plays a long game.

Negotiations in this logic — not necessarily a path to peace

One of the most unpleasant parts of the forecast concerns the negotiations themselves. According to Dligach, there are forces that would benefit if Ukraine agreed to Russian terms, and Moscow got a pause to prepare for new waves of war. This is not a description of peace. This is a description of a respite before the next round.

At the same time, the expert emphasizes the paradox: negotiations are needed by all parties, but for different reasons. Russia — to buy time. The USA — to maintain the role of mediator and peacemaker. Ukraine — because it is not in a position of full victory on the battlefield. In this, he sees a kind of “equilibrium” situation, where no one gets a good result, but it is also difficult to exit without worsening one’s own conditions.

That is why the topic of negotiations now requires not romanticization, but cold reading. The war can simultaneously remain deadlocked and continue further. This is an unpleasant but quite real combination.

What Ukraine should do if the war drags on

From Dligach’s forecast follows a rather harsh conclusion: if Russia is not going to stop itself, the war needs to be made much more expensive for it. He talks about transitioning to strategic defense, strengthening long-range strikes, and increasing the production of components and final military products. His formula — “bee against bear” — sounds simple, but its meaning is extremely practical: to make the enemy pay such a price that continuing the war no longer seems profitable.

This is no longer a conversation about beautiful formulations. This is a conversation about the endurance of the state. About human capital. About how capable Ukraine is of maintaining internal stability in a situation where the society’s resilience reserve is gradually depleting, and some citizens begin to lean towards peace at almost any cost.

Here is the point where the material goes beyond the Ukrainian internal discussion. NAnews — Israel News https://nikk.agency/ | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly noted that modern wars are won not only on the front line but also in the matter of public endurance. You can have a strong army and at the same time lose internal resources. You can hold the defense and at the same time slowly lose the fight for long-term resilience.

Why Valeriy Pekar also does not see a quick exit

Lecturer at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School Valeriy Pekar sounds no softer on this issue. His assessment is even more straightforward: Russia does not want and cannot stop the war due to a complex of economic, political, and military reasons. In his opinion, there will be no effective peace negotiations or real ceasefire in the near future. Instead, attempts to pressure the front and shell infrastructure will continue.

Pekar separately notes that Russia will continue to try to make life as difficult as possible for Ukrainians. In spring, in his opinion, water supply systems and transport may be under threat, and in summer there may be a new return to strikes on energy. This approach is read not as purely military tactics, but as a strategy of exhausting society.

His explanation of why Moscow cannot simply “stop” is also indicative. It is difficult to return the economy to peaceful rails without huge investments. The higher elites are direct beneficiaries of the war. The population needs to be shown at least the appearance of victory. And finally, within the system, a mass of people who have gone through war and violence has already accumulated, whom the Kremlin finds difficult to safely return to normal life.

What this forecast means for Israel

For the Israeli reader, there is nothing abstract in this analysis. Ukraine today discusses the same problem that is well known to Israel in another military-political reality: how to live next to an adversary for whom conflict is not a system failure, but part of the system itself.

From this follows an unpleasant but clear conclusion. In 2026, the main question seems not to be when Russia itself will want to end the war. The main question is whether Ukraine, together with its partners, can make the continuation of the war truly unbearable for Moscow in terms of cost — military, economic, and political.

Therefore, the scenario described by Ukrainian experts looks not like a path to a quick peace, but as a warning. A truce is possible. Negotiations are possible. Diplomatic activity is also possible. But without a real change in the balance of pressure, all this may turn out to be not the end of the war, but just a long pause within an even longer war.

And this is perhaps the most sober thought in this whole story.