Not the Baltics, but Germany? Why the new threat scenario to Russia makes Europe nervous

In Europe, for years, they have been accustomed to discussing the same scenario: if Russia decides on a new direct confrontation with NATO, the first strike would supposedly be on the Baltic countries. But in early April 2026, a different, much less familiar and therefore more alarming version emerged in the public sphere. Erkki Koort, Director of the Institute of Internal Security of the Estonian Academy of Security, stated that it would be more logical to look not only at Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but at Germany as a strategic rear and the main logistical hub of the alliance in Europe.

This is an important clarification because it is not about a “war forecast for tomorrow,” but an attempt to understand how Moscow might think in the event of a major escalation. Koort himself directly contrasts his logic with the popular but, in his opinion, overly simplistic view of the future conflict: if NATO relies not only on the border but also on the ability to quickly deploy forces, equipment, fuel, and reinforcements, then a strike on the rear might be more advantageous for the aggressor than an attack on the periphery.

For the Israeli audience, this topic also does not seem like a distant European theory. Germany today is not just a major EU economy, but one of the pillars of the entire Western deterrence architecture. And if the discussion in Europe shifts from the question of “will they strike the Baltics” to “will they try to destabilize the very center of NATO,” it already affects the overall security balance — including the West’s ability to simultaneously deter Russia, support Ukraine, and respond to crises in the Middle East. This context is especially important for readers of NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, because it is not just about the geography of a possible strike, but about the strength of the entire system on which the decisions of Israel’s allies depend.

Why Koort points specifically to Germany

The logic of striking the rear, not the edge of the map

The main idea of the Estonian expert is based on simple military logic: there is no great sense in hitting the border zone between Russia and NATO if the strategic rear, through which the alliance can pull forces and stabilize the front, remains untouched. In the retelling of ERR, Koort directly says that Russian planners understand: neutralizing a key European country and military rear can have a greater effect than problems “on the periphery” if the logistical center continues to operate.

Hence his harsh formulation that talks exclusively about the Baltic scenario are too primitive a view of the threat. In his assessment, Germany is vulnerable not because it is geographically closest to Russia, but because it is too important for the entire chain of decision-making, supply, and internal stability of Europe. In this context, he mentioned that even a limited strike on German territory could give Moscow a stronger political and propaganda effect than a local capture of a small area on the eastern flank.

Germany is already officially considered a NATO hub

This part of the reasoning does not hang in the air. The German Bundeswehr itself describes Germany as a “hub in the center of Europe” and a host country through which allied troop movements to the eastern areas of the alliance must pass. Official Bundeswehr materials explicitly state that Germany provides transit for allies, including escort, fuel, food, rest areas, and coordination of military and civilian resources to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.

Reuters previously also reported that the German army approached major companies, including Rheinmetall, Lufthansa, and Deutsche Bahn, to understand what logistical support they could provide in the event of a crisis and deployment of forces to NATO’s eastern border. In the same Reuters material, it was emphasized that Germany, due to its central position, is already considered a logistical hub that should quickly deploy soldiers, ammunition, and equipment to the crisis direction.

What this changes for Europe and NATO

A strike on Germany is a strike not on one country

From this grows the alarming logic of the current discussion. If Germany is indeed the main corridor for the movement of NATO forces, then any serious strike on its ports, railway hubs, transport interchanges, communication centers, or supply facilities can hit not only Germany itself but also the ability to quickly reinforce Poland, the Baltics, and other parts of the eastern flank. This is no longer just a national vulnerability, but a vulnerability of the entire collective defense system. Such a conclusion is an analytical interpretation, but it directly relies on the official description of Germany’s role as a hub for allied forces.

Against this background, Koort’s words cease to sound like an exotic provocation. They fit into a broader European conversation about how Moscow may seek not necessarily the most direct, but the most sensitive way of pressure. Reuters in November 2025 conveyed a warning from German General Alexander Zollfrank that Russia, in principle, retains the ability for a limited attack on NATO territory at any moment, even if it is not about a big war “tomorrow morning.” He did not name Germany as the most likely target, but the very fact of such a warning shows that the conversation about a direct threat to the alliance has long gone beyond pure theory.

Why a similar idea is picked up in Germany

This logic is not only heard from Estonia. In publications recounting the discussion around Koort’s thesis, it was noted that German politician Markus Faber supported this view and linked it specifically to Germany’s role as a support center for allies in the event of an invasion. In other words, even within Germany, they increasingly look at the country not just as a “deep rear,” but as an object through which the nerve of all European defense passes.

Here, however, it is important not to overdo it with conclusions. At the moment, this is not an official NATO doctrine and not a confirmed intelligence scenario of an imminent strike specifically on Germany. It is more correct to say this: Koort proposed an uncomfortable but strategically understandable hypothesis, and Germany’s role in European defense makes such a hypothesis serious enough that it can no longer be dismissed as journalism.

What Israel should see in this story

Europe is arguing not about the map, but about the strength of the entire western rear

For Israel, the meaning of this story is not in which point on the map of Europe is more often mentioned in headlines — Riga, Tallinn, or Berlin. Much more important is something else: Europe itself is beginning to discuss a scenario in which the main target of pressure becomes not the edge of the alliance, but its central nervous system. If such an approach takes root, it means that Western capitals are increasingly thinking not only about the front line but also about the protection of the rear, infrastructure, transport, communication, and internal stability.

And this is directly related to Israel’s interests. The more resources Europe and the US spend on strengthening their own rear and preparing for potential confrontation with Russia, the more European and Middle Eastern security intertwine. In this sense, the dispute about Germany and the Baltics is not about a distant northern map, but about how stable the entire western camp will remain at a time when challenges simultaneously come from both the east of Europe and the Iranian arc of threat. This conclusion is analytical, but it follows from the role that Germany already officially plays in NATO logistics, and from the fact that European military officials already publicly allow limited scenarios of attack from Russia.

Therefore, the main question here is not whether Koort is one hundred percent right, but whether Europe is ready for a scenario in which the strike is delivered not to the most expected place, but to the most important one. And the longer Germany becomes a key hub for NATO forces, the more often this question will sound not as an intellectual exercise, but as a practical test of European readiness for a new reality.