Oil, drones, and money for war: how Ukraine hinders the Kremlin from profiting from the war against Iran

The war around Iran gave Moscow what it had long hoped for: a surge in oil prices, a rise in gas quotes, and a chance to gain additional billions to continue the war against Ukraine. But an important glitch appeared in this scheme. While the Kremlin tried to profit from the Middle Eastern escalation, Ukrainian drones began systematically hitting Russian oil infrastructure — ports, refineries, logistics, and export chains. As a result, some of the money Moscow wanted to turn into missiles, shells, and drones simply doesn’t reach the cash register.

For the Israeli audience, this is not a peripheral Ukrainian news. It is an important element of the overall picture.

Every time a major war breaks out in the Middle East, the oil market starts working in favor of resource dictatorships. Russia is one of the first to benefit from this. And if Israel is fighting the Iranian threat, while Ukraine at the same time cuts the Kremlin’s oil revenues, then a direct strategic link arises between the two fronts.

Ukraine is hitting not just objects, but Moscow’s military wallet.

Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has intensified strikes on Russian oil and gas infrastructure. Ust-Luga and Primorsk, as well as major refining capacities in Kirishi, Yaroslavl, Moscow, and Ryazan, have come under attack. These are no longer one-time raids for effect and not symbolic ‘responses.’ This is a consistent campaign across the entire oil chain — from processing to export and export.

This is where the story becomes particularly sensitive for the Kremlin. Before the escalation around Iran, the Russian budget was already entering 2026 not in the best shape: oil and gas revenues were sagging, raw materials were leaving at discounts, and the deficit was growing. Then the Middle East threw Moscow a gift — oil sharply went up. For the Putin system, this meant a chance to once again flood the war with money without the immediate collapse of the internal structure.

But Ukrainian strikes began to break precisely this scenario.

According to the estimate provided in the text, about 40% of Russia’s oil export capacities were stopped due to attacks on infrastructure, pipeline damage, and problems with the shadow fleet. Even if this figure is taken as an estimate, the logic itself is clear: high world prices do not give a full effect if processing, loading, and export are physically disrupted. For Moscow, this is no longer just military damage. This is a direct blow to the ability to monetize the war in the Middle East.

Why this is important specifically to Israel

The Israeli reader here should see an unpleasant but important fork. The war against Iran may strategically weaken Tehran, but rising oil prices simultaneously feed Moscow. And Moscow is not an outside observer. It is a state that benefits from the Middle Eastern crisis and then turns this benefit into the continuation of the war against Ukraine, into supplies, into production, and into support for the anti-Western axis.

Therefore, Ukrainian strikes on oil are in some sense also working for a broader regional balance. Kyiv does not allow the Kremlin to fully turn the Middle Eastern escalation into an oil ATM.

Drones have become a tool not only of tactics but also of a large economic war.

The text separately emphasizes the role of Ukrainian long-range drones — FP-1, ‘Lyutyi,’ ‘Palyanytsia,’ and other systems.

They allowed Ukraine not only to reach targets at a depth of up to a thousand kilometers but also to change the very structure of pressure on Russia. It is no longer enough to guard only the front. It is not enough to protect only military bases. Now everything that helps the Kremlin earn and transport oil is under attack.

This is the main shift. Drones have turned into a tool of strategic exhaustion. Ukraine shows that in modern warfare, you can hit not only military objects but also the financial mechanism of the enemy. Not in the sense of ‘breaking everything overnight’ — this almost never happens in reality. But in the sense of constantly reducing flexibility, hindering the quick restoration of supplies, forcing more spending on protection, and getting less from each window of opportunity.

That’s why strikes on Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Kirishi, or tanker logistics are so important. It’s not just geography. These are points through which oil turns into money, and money into the continuation of the war.

The Kremlin wins on rising prices but loses on disrupted logistics.

The text provides an estimate that Russia’s budget revenues from oil and gas in April may grow by 70% compared to March and reach 0.9 trillion rubles. For Moscow, this would indeed be a significant relief. But at the same time, strikes on ports and refineries create another reality: you can sell at a higher price, but not the entire volume, not as quickly, and not through all the previous infrastructure.

This is where the Ukrainian strategy looks particularly mature. It is not built on the naive idea that one raid will collapse the Russian oil industry. It is built on a more sober calculation: each strike reduces the financial flexibility of the Kremlin, and in a long war, this is already a weapon in itself.

For Israel, this logic is very understandable. The region has long known that the enemy does not necessarily fall from one crushing blow. Sometimes it needs to be consistently deprived of resources, routes, reserves of strength, and a sense of impunity. Ukraine is doing roughly the same with Russian oil — not an instant knockout, but a systematic strangulation of revenues.

The war of Israel and the war of Ukraine increasingly intersect through money and energy.

This story has another layer that is especially important for the Israeli audience. When tensions rise in the Middle East, not only speculators and oil traders win. Regimes that sit on raw material exports and know how to turn an energy crisis into a military budget win. Russia is one of them. Therefore, the question here is not only about Ukraine. The question is how not to allow the anti-Western link to simultaneously earn from the war in one region and invest this money in the war in another.

That’s why NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency is needed in such topics not for a dry retelling of oil figures, but for explaining a broader picture. Israel is fighting against the Iranian threat. Ukraine is fighting against Russian aggression, in which Iran has long been a technological and military partner of Moscow. And the oil market unexpectedly ties these wars even closer: one crisis can feed another if no one cuts logistics and revenues.

Ukraine, judging by the text provided, is trying to do just that. It shows that even in conditions of resource scarcity, it is possible to force Russia to pay more for the protection of its infrastructure and receive less from the global conjuncture. This is the long game.

Not a knockout, but a painful weakening.

An important detail in the original material sounds honest: Ukrainian strikes are not a ‘knockout blow.’ Russia still has alternative export routes, Asian directions, and a huge raw material sector. But this does not cancel the main thing. Even without a complete collapse of the oil system, the strikes make the war for the Kremlin more expensive, more nervous, and less predictable.

And in 2026, that’s already a lot.

Because modern war is increasingly won not only on the front line. It is won in ports, at refineries, on logistics routes, in insurance rates, in the cost of repairing infrastructure, and in how quickly a state can convert a global crisis into live money. Ukraine is trying to destroy precisely this conversion.

For Israel, the conclusion is direct. The war with Iran does not exist separately from Russia’s war against Ukraine. They are increasingly connected through oil, drones, logistics, markets, and a common anti-Western interest. And if Ukrainian drones prevent the Kremlin from earning on the Middle Eastern fire, then this is no longer just a Ukrainian story. It is part of a broader struggle to ensure that the enemies of Israel and Ukraine do not strengthen each other at the expense of the same war.