- June 6, 2026
- 4:47 pm
- Israel
“The Secret Visit” of Israel’s Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu to Moscow raised questions not because of the idea of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center itself, but because of the political context of the trip. The project has long been promoted in Israel, so the Russian scene in this story seems unnecessary, dangerous, and requiring public explanations.
Secret trip to Moscow: what is known as of June 4–7, 2026
Amichai Eliyahu’s visit to Russia is called “secret” primarily because that is the wording used by Channel 7 / Arutz 7, which first reported on the minister’s trip on June 4, 2026. It is not about a proven secret deal or a confirmed closed mission, but about the fact that the trip was not previously presented to the public as a regular official visit with an open agenda, a list of meetings, and a clear diplomatic framework.
For a democratic state, this is an important difference. If a minister goes to a country that is waging an aggressive war against a neighboring democratic state and maintaining close ties with Iran, such a trip requires maximum transparency. When society learns about it from a media report where the visit itself is called “secret,” the question becomes not technical but political: why was the discussion of the Israeli USSR Jewish Heritage Center conducted in this manner?
The subheading of the publication directly states: “Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu secretly flew to Russia today amid the war in the country and diplomatic sensitivity in relations with Israel — to promote the creation of the Heritage Center for immigrants from the Soviet Union in Rishon LeZion“.
According to an Israeli source, the trip was supposed to last the weekend. The minister’s return was expected on Sunday, June 7, 2026.
At first glance, the official goal seems almost harmless: discussing the Heritage Center for Jews of the former USSR. For Israel, this topic is indeed important. It is not about a decorative museum, but about the memory of a massive aliyah, about people who lived for decades under Soviet anti-Semitism, fought for the right to leave, preserved Jewish identity, learned Hebrew underground, went through refusals, interrogations, dismissals, and systemic pressure.
But that is precisely why the trip to Moscow raises not fewer, but more questions.
USSR Jewish Heritage Center is an Israeli story. It is the story of Rishon LeZion, Haifa, Ashdod, Bat Yam, Netanya, Be’er Sheva, Jerusalem, Karmiel, Ariel, and dozens of other cities where immigrants from the former USSR, their children, and grandchildren live. It is the story of people who became doctors, engineers, scientists, musicians, military personnel, entrepreneurs, teachers, politicians, journalists, and part of Israeli society.
And if all this has long been in Israel, a simple question arises: why did the Israeli minister need Moscow specifically?
Who is the Heritage Minister and why is this position important
Amichai Eliyahu holds the position of Israel’s Heritage Minister. In Hebrew, it is שר המורשת. Formally, the ministry is associated with state projects of historical memory, archaeology, monuments, museums, Jewish heritage, and community heritage.
So on paper, Eliyahu’s participation in the USSR Jewish Heritage Center project is understandable. His department can allocate budgets, promote museum, educational, and memorial initiatives, and support memory projects of various Jewish communities.
But this is where the political sensitivity of the situation lies.
Historical memory is not a neutral zone. Especially when it comes to Russia. Moscow has been using the memory of World War II, the Soviet past, “compatriots,” diasporas, and “historical truth” as a tool of influence abroad for decades. Through cultural centers, archival projects, veteran organizations, community ties, and commemorative events, Russia knows how to enter where a direct political channel would look too toxic.
Therefore, the visit of Israel’s Heritage Minister to Russia cannot be considered a regular cultural trip.
Especially if the visit itself is called “secret.”
The USSR Jewish Heritage Center did not appear in Moscow
The main thing to note immediately: the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is not a new idea by Amichai Eliyahu and is not a project that was born from his trip to Moscow.
This initiative appeared and developed in Israel.
As early as March 8, 2021, Vesty wrote about the creation of the “Maalot” association — here is its website – https://maalot.org/, which aimed to open the USSR Jewish Heritage Center in Israel. The board included well-known representatives of Russian-speaking Israel: writer David Markish, musician Vyacheslav Ganelin, actress Natasha Manor, journalist Victoria Dolinskaya, professor of Slavic studies at the Hebrew University Wolf Moskovich. The board was headed by former refusenik, writer, and journalist David Shechter, formerly the press secretary of the Russian-speaking immigrants’ party “Israel BaAliyah.”
This is a crucial starting point.
The project was initially not connected with the Kremlin’s agenda, but with the experience of Russian-speaking Jews in Israel, with the history of refuseniks, with the memory of aliyah, with academic and public circles within the country.
In the same Vesty publication, it was explained why such a center is needed. Despite their enormous contribution to the creation and development of Israel, immigrants from the USSR did not have a full-fledged center, museum, or even a small permanent platform where the history of this community would be presented.
This is a strong and fair argument.
In Israel, there are heritage centers for Jews from Babylon, Yemen, Ethiopia, North Africa, and other communities. But the million-strong aliyah from the former Soviet Union long remained without its own state memory platform. For a country where Russian-speaking immigrants have changed medicine, science, technology, culture, the army, the economy, and politics, this indeed seemed strange.
Such a center is needed.
The question is not about that.
The question is why a project that has been created in Israel for years suddenly received a Moscow shadow in June 2026.
What the Center was supposed to include
According to the original plan of “Maalot,” the USSR Jewish Heritage Center was not just supposed to be a museum with stands and photographs. It was supposed to tell about the achievements of Soviet Jews in science, art, and sports, about survival under harsh state anti-Semitism, about the Zionist movement, Yiddish culture, Chabad, and other Jewish religious movements that operated underground in the USSR despite NKVD-KGB persecutions.
A separate section was to be dedicated to the contribution of immigrants from the USSR to the creation and development of Israel. It was also planned to present Jewish communities in the post-Soviet space.
This is not a Moscow story.
This is the story of people who often broke free from the Soviet system. The story of those who wanted to live as Jews, speak Hebrew, move to Israel, and build their lives outside Soviet control.
Therefore, it is symbolically very important who exactly becomes the custodian of this memory.
If the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is built in Israel, its logic is clear: the state of Israel finally recognizes that the large aliyah and Jews of the former USSR are one of the key parts of national history.
However, if a secret trip by a minister to Moscow appears around this project, another nuance arises: as if the country from which many left due to anti-Semitism, repression, and lack of freedom is once again gaining the right to be present in the packaging of this memory.
And that is already dangerous.
“Maalot” worked for years, not waiting for a signal from Russia
On June 7, 2024, Madan published material stating that the NGO “Maalot” had been working on creating the USSR Jewish Heritage Center for eight years. Over these years, as stated in the publication, documents, testimonies, and artifacts were collected, exhibitions, lectures, meetings, and seminars were held.
The same material indicated that in 2016 an initiative group was formed, which included figures from science, culture, and public activists. They created the “Maalot” board of trustees. The initiative was supported by Natan Sharansky, Yuli Edelstein, and other politicians.
This destroys the possible explanation that Eliyahu’s trip to Moscow was needed to “launch” the project.
The project did not need a launch from Moscow.
It already existed.
It had people.
It had an idea.
It had documents, testimonies, artifacts, exhibitions, lectures, public support, political allies, and an Israeli base.
Moreover, Vesty wrote back in 2021 that the association received support from Yuli Edelstein, Natan Sharansky, the leadership of the Tel Aviv Museum of the Diaspora, and also concluded an agreement with the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which created a group of professors responsible for the museum’s content.
So even the expert base was Israeli.
That is why the question about the visit on June 4, 2026, becomes tougher: what exactly needed to be sought in Moscow if historians, public figures, scientists, former refuseniks, documents, family archives, and the target audience are already in Israel?
Funds were already allocated: why then the trip now?
Another important fact: in June 2024, the Israeli government already allocated 25 million shekels for the creation of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center.
From this amount:
- 12 million shekels were to come from the Ministry of Heritage, headed by Amichai Eliyahu;
- 4.5 million from the Ministry of Culture and Sports;
- 3 million from the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration;
- 3 million from the Ministry of Construction;
- another 3 million from the Ministry of Development of the Negev and Galilee.
This is a key point.
If the budget was allocated as early as June 7, 2024, then Eliyahu’s trip to Moscow on June 4, 2026, cannot look like a regular initial stage of the project. Almost exactly two years have passed.
During this time, it would be logical to expect an Israeli state procedure: a commission, a concept, site selection, work with archives, involvement of researchers, an architectural program, an educational strategy, participation of “Maalot,” the Hebrew University, museums, municipalities, and immigrant organizations.
This is exactly how it was described in the Madan publication: after the government’s decision, a regular state procedure was supposed to begin, within which a commission would develop a program — what the Center would be like, where it would be created, and what would be included in it.
But two years later, there is no public report on the project’s progress, no presentation of the concept in Rishon LeZion, no discussion with the Russian-speaking community of Israel, but a secret visit by the minister to Russia.
This is the political problem.
Not the Center itself.
Not the memory.
Not “Maalot.”
Not the large aliyah.
But specifically the Moscow scene.
The Center is needed by Israel — but without the Kremlin’s tint
It is important to say directly: criticism of Eliyahu’s trip should not turn into criticism of the very idea of the USSR Jewish Heritage Center.
On the contrary.
Such a center has long been needed. It should tell about Soviet state anti-Semitism, the ban on Jewish religious life, the underground study of Hebrew, the struggle of refuseniks, families who waited for years for permission to leave, those who went through prisons, dismissals, surveillance, KGB pressure, and social isolation.
It should also tell about something else: how people who came from the former USSR changed Israel.
These are doctors who strengthened Israeli medicine.
Engineers who entered the technology sector.
Scientists, musicians, teachers, entrepreneurs, athletes, journalists, officers, soldiers, social workers, municipal activists.
These are the children of immigrants who already speak Hebrew as their native language, serve in the army, work in startups, teach, heal, build businesses, create Israeli culture, and often know too little about their family’s Soviet past.
That is why the USSR Jewish Heritage Center should be in Israel not only physically but also in meaning.
It should be Israeli memory, not a platform for Russian soft power.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this story not as a dispute over the right of Soviet Jews to memory. This right is obvious. The question is different: why a project that grew out of the Israeli Russian-speaking community, from the experience of refuseniks, large aliyah, and years of work by the NGO “Maalot,” suddenly receives a Moscow shadow right now — June 4, 2026, at the moment of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Moscow’s close ties with Iran, and growing political tension within Israel.
Russian context: why Moscow is not neutral for Israel
Russia today is not just a “country of the former USSR,” not an archival territory, and not a neutral cultural partner.
Since February 24, 2022, Russia has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine. For many Israelis of Ukrainian origin, for immigrants from Ukraine, for families whose relatives live in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, or Lviv, this is not abstract geopolitics.
This is a war in which Russian missiles hit cities where their parents, grandparents, friends, classmates, neighbors lived.
At the same time, Russia is increasingly connected with Iran — a state that has become a direct threat to Israel. According to published UNITED24 Media materials, based on leaks of Russian documents, Moscow supplies Iran with aviation missiles and weapons related to the Su-35, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.
Another UNITED24 Media publication claimed that Russian documents show the continuation of contracts related to Yak-130 and Su-35 for Iran.
For Israel, this is not a secondary detail.
Iran has attacked Israel with missiles and drones. Tehran arms and supports forces hostile to Israel. And Russia, which simultaneously wages war against Ukraine, remains an important military partner of Iran.
Therefore, the Israeli minister’s trip to Moscow cannot be detached from this background.
A country that helps Iran strengthen its military potential suddenly becomes the place of the first visit in years by an Israeli minister on the topic of the historical heritage of Soviet Jews.
This looks at least politically irresponsible.
Memory as a tool of influence
Russia knows how to work through topics that seem soft.
It is not always a direct slogan “support Russia.” More often, it is subtler: memory of the war, respect for veterans, culture, language, “historical truth,” fighting “rewriting history,” protecting “compatriots,” ties with communities, conferences, funds, trips, monuments, archives.
In this sense, the USSR Jewish Heritage Center is a very sensitive topic.
Because here several layers intersect at once: the Soviet past, Russian-speaking aliyah, Jewish identity, family memory, the trauma of anti-Semitism, gratitude to Israel, nostalgia for language and culture, the politics of the Russian-speaking electorate.
For Israeli society, this is important.
For the Russian propaganda machine — this can also be interesting.
That is why any connection of such a project with Moscow must be extremely transparent. Who invited? Who coordinated? Who were the meetings with? Were only cultural issues discussed? Were there any Russian state structures? Were there any funds associated with the Kremlin? Were money, archives, organizational support, political contacts offered?
There are no public answers yet.
There is only the fact of a secret trip.
And that is not enough.
Pre-election context and Russian-speaking audience
The visit takes place in June 2026, when Israel is already living in a tense political atmosphere. The Russian-speaking audience remains a significant electoral group, and the theme of respect for the great aliyah, Soviet Jewry, and the memory of immigrants from the former USSR can be used in political mobilization.
There is no need to invent a conspiracy here.
It is enough to see the coincidence of factors.
Minister from the ‘Jewish Power’ party.
Secret visit to Moscow.
The theme of the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews.
A project that has been developing in Israel for many years.
The budget allocated back in June 2024.
Russia, which is waging war against Ukraine.
Russia associated with Iran.
Russian-speaking audience of Israel.
Pre-election period.
Each point individually can be attempted to be explained. Together they create a picture that cannot be dismissed as a regular working trip.
What questions should be asked publicly
The main question now is not whether the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews is needed. It is needed.
The main question is who and why is drawing this project into the Moscow context.
The Israeli public has the right to get answers.
Who initiated Amichai Eliyahu’s trip to Russia on June 4, 2026?
Why was the visit secret?
Why did the trip fall on the weekend and Shabbat period?
Why was Moscow specifically needed to discuss the Israeli memory center?
Who exactly did the minister meet with?
Were there representatives of Russian state structures among the meeting participants?
Were only issues of the Heritage Center discussed or also political topics?
Was Russian financial, archival, organizational, or media support offered?
Why did a project promoted in Israel by ‘Maalot’, David Shechter, Marina Ben-Arie, Natan Sharansky, Yuli Edelstein, scholars, museums, and public activists suddenly require a minister’s trip to a country waging war against Ukraine?
What changed between June 7, 2024, when the Israeli government allocated 25 million shekels, and June 4, 2026, when the heritage minister flew to Russia?
This is not rhetoric for the sake of scandal.
These are normal questions for a democratic state.
Where the memory of Soviet Jews should be
The memory of Soviet Jews should be in Israel.
Not only in terms of geography. In terms of control, meaning, language, values, and political independence.
The Heritage Center should tell about the Jews of Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Chisinau, Tbilisi, Baku, Riga, Vilnius, Tashkent, Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Lviv, Bukhara, Samarkand, Kutaisi, and dozens of other cities of the former USSR.
But this story needs to be told from an Israeli perspective.
This is the story of people who were not part of the ‘Russian world’. They were Jews, often deprived of the right to be openly Jewish.
Many of them fought not to preserve Soviet identity, but to return to Jewish identity and move to Israel.
That is why it is dangerous when Moscow tries to appear next to such memory as a natural partner.
Moscow does not have a moral monopoly on the memory of Soviet Jews.
Moreover, the Soviet system was one of the sources of the trauma that this Center should explain to future generations.
Conclusion: center — yes, Moscow shadow — no
The Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews is needed in Israel.
The work of the NGO ‘Maalot’ is important.
The history of refuseniks, underground Hebrew, Soviet anti-Semitism, the great aliyah, and the contribution of immigrants from the former USSR to Israel should have a worthy place in national memory.
But the secret visit of Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu to Moscow on June 4, 2026, does not look like a necessary stage in the creation of the Center, but as a politically dangerous gesture.
Especially because the project has been developing in Israel for many years, had a public base, support from well-known figures, contacts with academic and museum structures, and state funding was allocated back on June 7, 2024.
If the goal was only heritage, it could have been discussed in Rishon LeZion, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ashdod, or any other Israeli city.
If archives are needed — there are researchers, international digital databases, universities, family collections, funds, communities, and professional channels.
If testimonies are needed — they live here, in Israel.
If schoolchildren, soldiers, participants of ‘Masa’, ‘Taglit’, NA’LE, and new immigrants are needed — they are here too.
Then what was needed in Moscow?
This is the question that should remain at the center of the article.
Because the Center for the Heritage of Soviet Jews should tell an Israeli story — the story of people who broke free from the Soviet system and built a new life in Israel. This memory should not become an entry point for a state that today uses history as a weapon, wages war against Ukraine, and strengthens ties with Israel’s enemies.
