Ukraine enters the Middle East with war experience: why it’s important for Israel not to miss this signal

Ukraine is becoming more noticeable on the Middle Eastern map

Ukraine no longer appears to the Middle East as a distant European country whose war with Russia remains outside the regional agenda. After four years of major war, Kyiv is gradually turning its combat experience into a diplomatic and technological resource that is beginning to be noticed in Israel, the Gulf countries, and other parts of the region.

This is exactly what the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel INSS writes about in an article by Georgy Poroskoun, published on June 3, 2026, titled “התגברות המעורבות האוקראינית במזרח התיכון“.

The main idea of the publication is simple but important: Ukraine has not become a force capable of independently changing the entire order in the Middle East. However, it is no longer a bystander. Kyiv acts more confidently, offers practical experience, seeks partners, and tries to integrate into regional processes where its role was previously much more modest.

For Israel, this is not a secondary topic.

Ukraine is fighting against Russia, which is increasingly linked with Iran. Israel, in turn, faces the Iranian axis — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other structures that use drones, missiles, information operations, and hybrid pressure. Therefore, the Ukrainian experience is not only a story about the front in Europe but also a practical lesson for the Middle East.

Why Kyiv turned out to be needed in the region

According to INSS, Ukraine is not a completely new player in the region. During the war with Russia, it was already present in the Middle Eastern context at least as a party to negotiation processes hosted by various countries in the region. But now there is a shift: Kyiv is becoming a more noticeable, persistent, and practical participant in regional politics.

The reason is not only diplomacy.

Ukraine has accumulated experience in modern warfare, where not only tanks, planes, and classical artillery matter. On the Ukrainian front, air defense systems, interceptor drones, electronic warfare, cheap means of countering mass attacks, intelligence, communication, logistics, and the ability to quickly adapt to new types of threats are tested daily.

For Middle Eastern countries, this sounds very specific.

The region faces the same technologies, only in a different geography. Iranian drones, missiles, proxy groups, infrastructure strikes, attempts to overload defense systems — all this is well known to both Ukraine and Israel. The difference is that Ukraine gained this experience through daily war of attrition, while Israel through constant confrontation with terrorist structures and Iranian pressure.

What Israel sees in this

For the Israeli audience, the INSS article is important because it shifts the Ukrainian topic from the moral-political plane to the national security plane. It’s no longer just about whether Israel publicly supports Ukraine and how cautiously Jerusalem acts in relations with Moscow. It’s about what knowledge Ukraine can provide to Israel and its partners.

This especially concerns drones.

Russia uses Iranian technologies against Ukrainian cities. Israel faces the same source of threat through other channels: Iran arms and inspires forces that attack Israel and its allies. This means there is not a beautiful political analogy between the Ukrainian and Israeli experiences, but a real military connection.

Russia, Iran, and the common threat contour

Georgy Poroskoun is not a random author for this topic. At INSS, he deals with Russia, its internal and external politics, as well as information and cyber warfare; previously, he served in the field of national security and military intelligence.

Therefore, the emphasis on strengthening Ukrainian participation in the region should be read more broadly.

After 2022, Russia became Ukraine’s main military enemy, and for Israel, an increasingly problematic partner of Iran and an ally of forces hostile to the West. Moscow does not always act directly against Israel, but its rapprochement with Tehran changes the strategic picture. The more Russia depends on Iranian technologies and political support, the less reason there is to consider the Russian factor neutral for Israeli security.

This is where the Ukrainian interest appears.

Kyiv can offer the region what many armies and security services lack: not theory, but experience of survival under massive attacks. This is the experience of fighting the Russian army, Iranian drones, strikes on energy, information operations, cyber pressure, and attempts to break civil society through fear.

For NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency, this topic is important as part of a broader picture: Ukraine and Israel face different fronts of one big problem — aggressive regimes and terrorist networks that learn from each other faster than democratic states sometimes react.

Why it is important for Ukraine to be in the Middle East

Ukraine acts in the region not out of curiosity. For Kyiv, the Middle East is not only about diplomatic meetings but also a field where issues of weapons, sanctions, logistics, energy, food, voting in international organizations, and attitudes towards Russian aggression are decided.

The more actively Ukraine works with Israel, the Gulf states, Turkey, and other regional players, the less space remains for the Russian version of events.

This is especially important where Moscow has built connections for years through weapons, energy, propaganda, the Syrian track, and contacts with authoritarian regimes. If Kyiv wants not only to defend itself but also to change attitudes towards the war in Ukraine, it needs to speak to the Middle East in the language of interests, security, and practical benefits.

What Israel can gain

Israel can learn several lessons from the Ukrainian experience. First, cheap interception means become as important as expensive missiles. Second, mass drone attacks require a flexible system where air defense, intelligence, electronic warfare, mobile groups, and civilian infrastructure work together. Third, the war of the future is already underway, and it cannot be studied only through staff reports.

Ukraine knows the cost of mistakes.

Israel too.

Therefore, the question is not whether Ukraine should replace Israel’s traditional allies. Of course not. The question is whether Israel is ready to systematically study the Ukrainian experience and use it where it helps protect the north, south, energy facilities, airports, ports, bases, cities, and civilian population.

Political conclusion for Jerusalem

The INSS publication essentially leads to an uncomfortable but necessary conclusion: Israel should look more closely at Ukraine not only as a country that needs help but also as a partner with unique knowledge of modern warfare.

This changes the tone of the conversation.

Ukraine does not ask to be perceived only through a humanitarian agenda. It shows that it can be useful to the region because it goes through a war every day where the enemy combines missiles, drones, cyberattacks, propaganda, and terror against civilian infrastructure.

For Israelis, there is a clear logic here. If Iran and Russia exchange experiences, technologies, and political support, then Israel and Ukraine should not remain in the old framework of cautious distancing.

The connection between Kyiv and Jerusalem becomes not an emotional addition to foreign policy but a part of real security. And the faster this is understood in both capitals, the fewer chances enemies have to exploit the gap between the front in Ukraine and the fronts in the Middle East.