- June 24, 2026
- 2:21 pm
- Ukraine
The Russian war against Ukraine has brought back to the center of the military agenda what for many years was perceived as a weapon of the Cold War and closed strategic doctrines. Ballistic missiles have once again become not only a symbol of power but also a practical tool for exerting pressure on the front, rear, infrastructure, and political decisions.
For Ukraine, this issue no longer seems theoretical. Russian ballistic strikes remain one of the most complex threats to air defense: such missiles fly fast, carry a powerful warhead, and require expensive and scarce systems for interception, primarily at the Patriot level. One drone can be dangerous, but one ballistic missile carries a completely different scale of destruction.
That is why the statement by Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov that Ukrainian ballistics “will change everything in this war” sounds not like a slogan but as a formula for a new stage. It’s not just about the range of the strike. It’s about the status of a state capable of independently creating deterrent weapons, rather than waiting for partners to allow or not allow the use of their missiles.
Why creating a missile is not enough
One prototype of a ballistic missile is not yet a missile program.
The real problem begins where serial production, accuracy, guidance, navigation, engines, software, reliable warheads, component production, and dozens of enterprises working as a single system are needed.
This is the main lesson of global experience. Ballistics is not just a missile on a launcher. It is an industrial school, engineering personnel, money, testing, government orders, and long-term political will.
The USA, Russia, China, France, North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan have come to their arsenals in different ways, but all these countries have one common feature: missile programs were built over years, sometimes decades. Somewhere they were part of nuclear deterrence, somewhere a response to regional threats, and somewhere a way not to depend on allies in a time of great war.
Who is already in the closed missile club
The highest level of ballistics is intercontinental missiles. They remain the privilege of a few states, mainly nuclear ones. The USA maintains hundreds of silo-based Minuteman III and sea-based Trident II on submarines. Russia keeps mobile and silo-based complexes, including “Yars,” as well as sea-based ballistics.
China is rapidly increasing its potential and is betting on the Dongfeng family. France, striving for strategic autonomy from the American defense “umbrella” system, relies on M51 sea-based missiles. North Korea is developing the Hwasong line, demonstrating the ability to threaten not only neighbors but also the American continent.
Israel officially does not disclose the parameters of its potential, but open assessments regularly mention Jericho missiles. For the Israeli audience, this is a particularly understandable example: a state living surrounded by threats cannot build security only on the promises of partners.
India and Pakistan have created their own missile programs as part of a long-standing regional confrontation. For New Delhi and Islamabad, ballistics has become not just a weapon but an element of political balance.
From strategic deterrence to real war
For decades, intercontinental missiles mainly remained a tool of pressure and deterrence. But the technologies of large ballistics have gradually descended to a lower level – to operational-tactical complexes and medium-range missiles.
It is they that have direct significance for Ukraine today.
The Russian army massively uses “Iskander-M,” the aviation “Kinzhal,” as well as other high-speed means of destruction, which create similar problems for air defense. The war against Ukraine has become the first modern conflict where operational-tactical ballistics is used so intensively and regularly.
Russia, meanwhile, relies not only on its Soviet and post-Soviet developments. Moscow is increasingly involving allies in the missile war – primarily North Korea and Iran.
The DPRK has already supplied Russia with KN-23 missiles. Pyongyang’s potential is broader: it has shorter and medium-range complexes, including KN-24, Hwasong-9, and solid-fuel systems of the Pukguksong family. This shows that for the Kremlin, the missile war has become not only Russian but also coalition-based.
Iran, in turn, possesses one of the largest and most diverse missile arsenals in the Middle East. For Israel, this topic is not abstract: Iranian missiles have already become part of a real threat, not analytical forecasts. After strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, Tehran’s capabilities, according to experts, were weakened, but this does not mean the threat has disappeared. The respite can be used to restore production.
Against this backdrop, NAnews – Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the Ukrainian missile issue not only as a matter of Ukrainian defense but also as part of a broader security picture important for Israel. When Russia, Iran, and North Korea effectively combine their military technologies, the consequences are felt not only in Kyiv or Kharkiv but also in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and throughout the Middle East.
What the experience of the USA, France, China, Turkey, Korea, and Israel shows Ukraine
The American approach to ballistics is very different from the Russian one. The USA has long developed this segment as part of high-precision mobile artillery. ATACMS missiles, launched from HIMARS and M270, have become one of the most important tools for Ukraine to strike Russian rear areas, airfields, helicopter pads, and air defense systems.
But ATACMS is no longer the future but a transitional stage. Washington is betting on PrSM – more compact and long-range missiles designed for modern high-intensity conventional warfare. Their range is estimated at about 500-700 kilometers, and serial production should give the US army a new level of strike capabilities.
Europe has long underestimated conventional ballistics, preferring air-launched cruise missiles. The war in Ukraine has changed this logic. France is already developing new programs, including Thundart and the long-term MBT project – a mobile medium-range ballistic system. Paris concludes: Europe cannot live forever only on American stockpiles.
The Asian path: catch up, copy, rework, and become independent
China has built its missile doctrine around an access denial strategy. Its anti-ship ballistic missiles DF-21D and DF-26 are designed to threaten American aircraft carriers at great distances. For land tasks, Beijing uses mobile complexes DF-11 and DF-15, capable of quickly striking airfields, headquarters, and air defense systems.
Turkey took a different path. In the 1990s, faced with the West’s reluctance to transfer technology, Ankara turned to China. The first Turkish Yıldırım missiles grew out of Chinese solutions, then Bora appeared, and in 2026 the Turkish army received Tayfun Block-2 with a range of over 500 kilometers.
The main conclusion from the Turkish experience is simple: a country can start with importing technologies but become independent only when it connects its own industry, engineering schools, and private sector.
South Korea created ballistics under the direct threat from the DPRK. Its Hyunmoo complexes became an example of how a regional danger turns into a state program. Especially notable is Hyunmoo-5 with a heavy warhead designed to destroy deeply protected bunkers.
The Israeli lesson for Ukraine
For Ukraine, the Israeli experience is especially important. Israel has been building defense for decades with the understanding that in a critical moment, external assistance may be delayed, limited, or politically blocked. Therefore, its own developments – from air defense systems to strike means – have become not a luxury but a condition for survival.
Ukraine today is in a similar logic, although the geography and scale of the war are different. Partner support is critically important, but it does not replace national production. If Kyiv wants to have a sustainable missile shield, it needs not a one-time program for the current war but a strategy for 10-20 years.
This strategy should have three foundations: money, people, and production. Without funding, it is impossible to purchase equipment, conduct tests, and pay engineers. Without people, it is impossible to create a school. Without an industrial base, it is impossible to move from a prototype to a series.
But money alone does not solve the problem. Ukraine needs a state order architecture: who determines priorities, who finances promising developments, who guarantees the purchase of successful solutions, who connects the military, private companies, and state enterprises.
Models like the American DARPA or the European EDA are useful here. Such structures do not necessarily produce weapons themselves, but they look for promising ideas, finance developers, create conditions for testing, and help bring the product to the army.
Ukraine has already proven capable of quickly creating innovative solutions in drones, naval drones, and long-range systems. But ballistics requires a different level of discipline. It is not a startup for a few months but a state project for a generation.
What Ukraine must decide
The first question is which technologies to develop domestically and which to buy from partners. Full independence is not possible immediately, but gradual movement towards its own component base should be the goal.
The second question is how to combine state enterprises and the private sector. State structures more easily receive direct funding, but private companies often create working solutions faster. Ukraine needs a model where competition does not destroy manufacturers but accelerates the emergence of necessary weapons.
The third question is how to protect production under constant Russian strikes. A missile program of a warring country cannot be built according to peacetime templates. Distributed sites, hidden logistics, backup supply chains, and protection of critical specialists are needed.
The fourth question is political stability. The missile program should not depend on one minister, one budget, or one military campaign. It should be enshrined as a long-term state policy.
Why this is important not only for Ukraine
Ukrainian ballistics can change the balance not only on the battlefield. It can change the very logic of negotiations, the cost of Russian aggression, and the attitude of allies towards Ukraine as a defensive power.
For Israel, this is also an important signal. If Ukraine can build its own long-range program under strikes, it will become an example for all countries that have to live next to aggressive regimes and their proxy networks.
Russia, Iran, and North Korea are already showing that authoritarian states are ready to exchange technologies, ammunition, and experience. The response of democratic countries cannot be built only on statements. It must include industry, production, joint developments, and a willingness to play the long game.
Ukraine needs not just a “missile sword” as a beautiful image. It needs a sovereign strike complex that will become part of the national shield. And if such a system is created, it will indeed move Ukraine into a different league – military, technological, and political.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why are ballistic missiles so difficult to intercept?
They fly on a high trajectory, develop enormous speed in the final phase, and leave air defense systems very little time to react. Complex and expensive anti-missiles are needed to intercept them, which Ukraine constantly lacks.
Can Ukraine create its own ballistics?
It can, but this requires not just one successful project, but a full-fledged industrial program. Engines, guidance systems, electronics, a testing base, funding, serial production, and a long-term state order are needed.
Which foreign experience is most useful for Ukraine?
Several models are important for Ukraine. Israel shows how to build defense under constant threat and risk of isolation. Turkey demonstrates the path from borrowed technologies to independence. South Korea is an example of a systematic missile program under a specific threat. The USA shows how to turn precision weapons into a mass tool of modern warfare.
Why is this important for Israel?
Because the missile technologies of Russia, Iran, and North Korea are already interconnected. Strengthening Ukraine in this area weakens the overall anti-Western and anti-Israeli military contour. For Israel, a strong Ukraine is not only a matter of solidarity but also part of broader regional security.