War Against Iran and the Lesson of Ukraine: Why George Friedman Considers the Era of Invasions Over

The American-Iranian war has entered its second month, but instead of a quick resolution, the world has seen a completely different picture: the Strait of Hormuz remains under pressure, the issue of the Iranian nuclear program is not closed, and talk of a ground operation increasingly sounds like a political gesture rather than a realistic military scenario. This is the conclusion drawn by George Friedman’s analysis (April 1, 2026).

, which links the events in the Middle East to what the war in Ukraine has already shown.

For the Israeli audience, this assessment is especially important. Israel found itself at the center of a conflict where the classical logic of war — strike, advance, capture, control of territory — works increasingly poorly against a state capable of saturating the space with drones, missiles, and distributed military nodes. And if Ukraine became the first major war of the new era, then the confrontation with Iran, according to Friedman, only confirmed: large invasions no longer guarantee victory and sometimes become almost suicidal decisions.

Why the war did not bring quick results

The US and Israel faced not a local operation, but a new military reality

Friedman sees the main meaning of the current war not in the exchange of strikes as such, but in the initial goal of Washington and Jerusalem. According to his logic, the United States entered the conflict out of fear of Iran’s nuclear potential, and for Israel, this threat is even more acute because in Israeli conditions, strategic depth is minimal, and the cost of one mistake can be incomparably higher than for any major power.

However, the war almost immediately showed the limitations of old scenarios. Bombings did not fully answer the question of where exactly the critical part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is located, and the idea of a pinpoint special forces raid looks, in essence, like a Hollywood fantasy. Iran is not a small country, not a fragmented territory, and not an object for a short demonstrative operation. It is a large state capable of defending space, dispersing forces, and prolonging the conflict so that the cost of a ground invasion becomes politically unacceptable.

The Strait of Hormuz has become not only an economic but also a military problem

A special place in this logic is occupied by the Strait of Hormuz. At first, it seemed that it was primarily about oil, prices, and global trade. But Friedman emphasizes a deeper problem: the blow also affects gas, and therefore — fertilizers, the sowing campaign, and food security in the Northern Hemisphere.

At the same time, the old recipe of ‘opening the strait by force’ no longer looks reliable. Even if key sections of the coast are occupied, this may not be enough when drones dominate the air, and the narrow maritime artery itself remains under constant threat of remote strikes. For insurers, shipping, and energy-importing states, this means one thing: classic military control no longer equals real security of passage.

How Ukraine changed the understanding of modern warfare

Drones made massive ground invasions too costly

One of Friedman’s strongest thoughts is the direct connection between the Ukrainian front and the current war against Iran. In his assessment, it was Ukraine that first showed that the era of massive infantry thrusts, large columns, and deep breakthroughs hits a new technological wall.

If earlier strategic depth allowed for the accumulation of forces, redeployment of units, and deployment of an offensive, now large troop concentrations become convenient targets. Drones, satellite reconnaissance, real-time coordinate transmission, and precision strikes effectively deprive classic invasion of its former logic. It is no coincidence that Friedman separately draws a parallel with Russia’s failures in Ukraine: the massive movement of troops has become too noticeable and too vulnerable.

For Israel, this sounds extremely practical. In a region where distances are shorter and the threat of an instant strike is higher, the conclusion is even harsher: without suppressing enemy reconnaissance, drones, and missile infrastructure, a ground operation turns into a risky adventure. That is why the talk of a ‘decisive invasion’ today increasingly gives way to talk of negotiations, attrition, and technological suppression.

Iran is dangerous not only with missiles but also with its distributed warfare system

Friedman separately notes that the problem with Iran is not only in the political regime and not only in the top of power. Even if the command is struck or part of the centralized system is destroyed, this does not mean the automatic collapse of the entire military machine.

According to his description, the Iranian model relies on distributed nodes, autonomous control sections, and the ability to continue combat operations even after losing part of the center. In other words, the destruction of the political top does not in itself guarantee the collapse of the system. This is the main challenge of the new war: the enemy can maintain the ability to strike even without a classic vertical.

It is here that Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the most important conclusion for the Middle Eastern agenda: Israel and its allies are facing not just a separate state-opponent, but an adaptive military model in which dispersed weapons, local command chains, and drone warfare reduce the value of old notions of ‘quick victory’.

Why negotiations seem almost inevitable

Neither the US nor Iran can afford an endless war

Friedman leads to a thought that may sound unpleasant to many but seems logical: a protracted conflict is unprofitable for both sides. The US does not want a new large ground war in the Middle East, especially one where the score could go to large human and financial losses without a guaranteed result. Iran, in turn, is also unable to indefinitely withstand economic, military, and internal pressure.

Against this background, negotiations no longer look like a sign of weakness. Rather, they become a rational form of exiting a war where complete victory is too costly. According to Friedman’s version, the settlement formula may be relatively clear: Iran’s renunciation of nuclear potential, reduction of pressure from the US, stabilization of the region, and opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Israel in this scheme gets the main thing, but not everything

An important nuance concerns Israeli interests. Friedman admits that Israel may want more than just limiting the nuclear program — for example, a deeper weakening of the regime in Tehran. But he also emphasizes: if the US is not ready to wage war to such a result, Israel alone will not be able to continue this conflict indefinitely.

This is a harsh but realistic conclusion. For Israel in the current situation, the main thing remains not abstract geopolitical triumph, but preventing Iran from acquiring a full-fledged nuclear status. If this is achieved through negotiations, then in a strategic sense, Jerusalem can consider the task partially completed, even if the regime change in Tehran does not occur.

This is the main lesson that Friedman draws from two wars at once — the Ukrainian and the Iranian. The modern battlefield is less and less like the 20th century. Today, invasion no longer guarantees control, numbers do not guarantee a breakthrough, and capturing territory does not guarantee security. Therefore, the new era of wars increasingly leads not to the triumph of occupation, but to attrition, remote pressure, and negotiations, without which even the strongest armies risk getting stuck in a conflict without a clear end.