A new statement from the Hezbollah camp shows how closely intertwined Russia’s war against Ukraine, Israel’s confrontation with the Iranian axis, and the struggle for security in the Middle East have become by 2026. In an interview with the propaganda Russian publication RIA Novosti, published on April 13, 2026, as presented there, “the deputy head of the political council of the movement” Mahmoud Komati not only “criticized” Kyiv but directly linked Ukraine with Israel and on this basis formulated support for Moscow.
What exactly did Komati say
In the original RIA, the key fragment sounds extremely direct.
To the question: “Ukraine has repeatedly stated its desire to support and train forces in the region, including the US, to counter Iran’s drones and resistance, what is Hezbollah’s position on this issue and are you aware of the presence of Ukrainian specialists already in the ranks of the Israeli army?”
First, Komati noted an “important” detail: “I do not have exact data” on whether “there are Ukrainian specialists in the Israeli army.”

But then he moved on to a political formula that became the main headline: “Ukraine is an ally of Israel, and Israel is an ally of Ukraine.”
Quote:
“Honestly, I do not have information on whether there are Ukrainian specialists in the Israeli army or not. I do not have exact data. After all, Ukraine is an ally of Israel, and Israel is an ally of Ukraine. As we know, Ukraine is used by Europe in the confrontation with Russia to contain Russian advancement, Russian power, and Russia’s policy in Europe and the world. Therefore, we support Russia in its confrontation with Ukraine. Ukraine cannot even protect itself, cannot defend its sovereignty. How can it participate in the confrontation with the resistance force or Iran? This is absurd.”
For the Israeli audience, not only the tone but also the meaning is important here.
Hezbollah practically no longer separates the Ukrainian issue from the Israeli one. Kyiv, in this logic, is inscribed in the same camp with Israel, the US, and regional opponents of Tehran, and Ukrainian military expertise in combating drones is perceived as part of a broader infrastructure hostile to the Iranian axis. This is no longer a peripheral informational attack but a sign that the Ukrainian factor has begun to be read in the Middle East as an element of a real strategic equation.
Where fact ends and political packaging begins
The strongest part of this story is that Komati’s key words do not need retelling: they are indeed in the original RIA. But equally important is another thing. In the same interview, he directly admits that he does not have confirmed data on the presence of Ukrainian specialists in the Israeli army. This means that his loud political connection is not built on presented evidence but on an ideological conclusion: since Ukraine helps against Iranian drones and works with regional partners, it is already part of the anti-Iranian camp along with Israel.
If Hezbollah supports Russia, this is already an important signal for Israel
In this quote, not only the attack on Ukraine is important, but also another connection. Komati directly says: “Therefore, we support Russia in its confrontation with Ukraine.” This is already an open political position, not a hint.
From this, an unpleasant conclusion follows for Israel. Hezbollah is one of Israel’s most dangerous enemies, and if it publicly names Russia as the side it supports, it means that Moscow, in its perception, is not in a neutral zone but closer to a camp hostile to Israel.
Formally, this is not a direct recognition of an alliance, but politically it sounds exactly like that. Ukraine in Komati’s words is just a pretext. The main meaning is deeper: Israel’s enemy itself shows whom it considers its acceptable and useful support. For Jerusalem, this is no longer abstract geopolitics but a signal that is hard to ignore.
Another fragment of the interview that will definitely interest the Israeli reader
In the same interview, there is another indicative segment, not about Ukraine, but about Hezbollah’s attitude towards Russia. Answering a question about Moscow’s role in Middle Eastern conflicts and the Lebanese-Israeli confrontation, Mahmoud Komati speaks of it in an emphatically favorable manner: “we very positively assess Russia, its policy in the region,” and then adds that Russia “thanks to its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and sincere ties with many Arab countries, including Lebanon, can play a role in the region, and we hope for this.”
Komati then contrasts Moscow and Washington even more harshly. According to him, “today the region is dominated by American hegemony, American aggression, killings, and destruction, as well as a policy of terror,” whereas the US, in his version, “creates obstacles and barriers for any Russian role.” He also claims: “today the US and Trump, in particular, have turned to Russia to influence Iran through it and achieve a ceasefire. Sooner or later they will need Russia.” For the Israeli reader, this fragment is important because one of Hezbollah’s leaders effectively describes Russia as a desirable and politically close player for his camp.
Why did Hezbollah even start talking about Ukraine in such a tone
The reason for this nervous reaction is clear if you look at Kyiv’s statements and international agency publications. Vladimir Zelensky announced Ukraine’s readiness to help the US after a request for support in defending against Iranian drones in the Middle East. Words were cited about the necessary means and the presence of Ukrainian specialists to ensure the security of American bases and military personnel in several countries in the region.
This line then became even more specific.
In an address to the UK Parliament on March 17, Zelensky reported that 201 Ukrainian specialists are already in the Middle East and the Gulf region, another 34 are ready for deployment, and teams are working in the Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and are heading to Kuwait. There he directly said that these specialists know how to protect against “Shaheds,” were sent at the request of partners, including the US, and that Ukraine is ready to offer similar cooperation formats to other reliable allies.
Why this is especially important for Israel
For Israel, there is a much more important plot hidden here than just another sharp quote from Beirut. Over the years of war, Ukraine has accumulated one of the most practical arrays of experience in the world in intercepting “Shaheds,” building cheap anti-drone defenses, and protecting infrastructure from mass attacks. When this experience begins to be exported to the Arab Gulf countries and more broadly into the Middle Eastern security system, it automatically hits the model of pressure that Iran and its proxies have relied on for years. That is why Komati’s words sound not like a random emotion but as a reaction to an unpleasant shift for them.
It is in this context that NAnovosti — Israel News | Nikk.Agency sees the main nerve of the whole story. Before our eyes, Ukraine is ceasing to be just a European warring country for the Middle East and is becoming a supplier of real defense experience against Iranian threats. And Hezbollah, in its language, is already confirming that it perceives this not as a distant diplomatic news but as a direct challenge to its own camp.
What this quote means in a broader context
If you remove the emotions and leave the dry conclusion, the following picture emerges. Komati indeed said: “Ukraine is an ally of Israel, and Israel is an ally of Ukraine.” He indeed added: “Therefore, we support Russia in its confrontation with Ukraine.” And he indeed called “Ukrainian participation” against Iran and “resistance forces” with the words “This is absurd.” But behind this rhetoric lies a quite practical fear: Ukraine is no longer just asking for weapons for itself, but is bringing to the region what is especially sensitive for the Iranian axis — a working defense against cheap and mass drone warfare.
For Israel, this means a simple thing. Any strengthening of the Ukrainian anti-drone presence in the Middle East will increasingly provoke a response not only from Tehran but also from its allies, who have already begun to publicly inscribe Kyiv into the general anti-Iranian camp. This means that such statements should be read not as noise but as an early indicator of how Israel’s enemies are restructuring their own map of alliances and threats.