A Facebook post titled “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” about an alleged secret agreement between Ukraine and Syria and Mossad’s measures has gone viral. We have reconstructed the chain of publications and checked what is confirmed in this story and what remains, to put it mildly, a rumor.
Spoiler: The “news” first appeared in a Telegram channel with 9,000 subscribers.
Author: Pavel Shveiko | NANews
“Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” — this is the sensational question that begins the post, which appeared on Facebook on September 8, 20226, by … let’s call him “author” (why it’s written in lowercase will become clear after reading the article). The reader is then offered not a question, but an almost complete picture: Israel is allegedly alarmed by the “secret cooperation” between Ukraine and Syria, Kyiv is supposed to send UAV instructors, Turkey acts as a mediator, two training centers are being prepared in Yafur and Masyaf, and Mossad is supposedly already developing measures to disrupt the project and prevent Ukrainian specialists from entering Syria.
At the end, there is a link not to a document, statement, or well-known Israeli media, but a short attribution: “reports News of Israel.” This became the starting point of the investigation. We tried to find a publication from such an outlet, trace the text’s timeline, and separately verify each detail.
The “author” himself, judging by the text of the post, is not the source of the information. His post uses text that almost matches the Russian-language version, which by that time was already spreading on Telegram and websites, and he added his own headline “Heirs of Khmelnytsky?” This historical framework connects modern Ukraine with the memory of mass violence against Jews during the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.
None of the found NANews — News of Israel sources from which the story about Syria spread contains such wording.
How “News of Israel” reached Russian Telegram channels and media and then to the “author”
The earliest version of the story we found appeared on September 4 at 13:39 in the Israeli Telegram channel “ללא צנזורה חדשות ישראל בטלגרם” — “News of Israel without Censorship in Telegram”.
Almost all future elements of the story are found here: the alleged secret agreement between Kyiv and Damascus with Ankara’s mediation, Ukrainian UAV instructors, two sites — near Yafur and Masyaf — and possible Mossad actions.
But the original post contains important details that will later begin to change.
The channel does not write about a Mossad document or an Israeli intelligence statement, but about:
“a source whose data is stored in the editorial office, relying on Israeli intelligence reports.”
The publication contains neither the name of this person, nor the reports themselves, nor a second confirmation.
The geography is indicated correctly here: Masyaf is located in the Hama province.
And the wording about Mossad sounds like:
צעדי מניעה וסיכול אפשריים
meaning “possible preventive and thwarting measures”.
The Israeli channel does not report a planned attack on Ukrainians and does not use the expression “destabilizing measures.”
Three days later, the story emerges outside of Israel.
On the morning of September 7, at 08:20, the Azerbaijani Referans publishes material citing “News of Israel”. Here, one of the main “fingerprints” of the subsequent chain appears: Masyaf is already mistakenly located in the Homs province, not Hama.
In the evening, Musavat publishes a similar text. It also cites “News of Israel,” repeats Homs, and writes that Mossad is preparing “preventive and disrupting/thwarting measures” against the centers and the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.
After this, we see a very rapid spread in the Russian-speaking space.
One of the first major nodes discovered is the Russian Telegram channel “Militarist”. On September 7 at 11:07, it publishes the text almost in the form that later reached Facebook:
“Yafur”;
“Masyaf in the Homs province”;
“a direct threat to national security”;
and finally:
“Mossad is developing possible preventive and destabilizing measures…”
At the end, the already familiar:
“reports News of Israel”.
The post received tens of thousands of views.
A few minutes later, this version begins to live its own life.
The Russian Telegram Win-Win publishes almost the same text but adds its own preface:
“Unexpected hint from Mossad”
and the question:
“Do we not know something?”
The error “Masyaf — Homs” is preserved, as are “preventive and destabilizing measures.”
This is an important stage: the message ceases to be just a retelling and receives a political interpretation.
Further, Win-Win begins to be quoted by other Russian-speaking channels.
For example, “First Kharkiv” directly shows the mark Forwarded from Win-Win and reproduces the entire construction — from “unexpected hint” to “News of Israel.”
Even more indicative is the reaction of the large Russian Z-channel “Blue Z Beard” with an audience of over 100,000 subscribers. It gives a direct link to the Win-Win publication and formulates the conclusion itself:
“Syria will develop the UAV direction through Ukraine”,
after which it adds reasoning that Russia has left Syria and “now it’s too late.”
That is, the unconfirmed message is already beginning to be used not as a rumor, but as evidence of the consequences of Russian policy in Syria and Ukrainian penetration there.
The same text appears in the Telegram channel StorMap, retaining all the characteristic features of the Russian version: Yafur, Masyaf in Homs, and the phrase about “preventive and destabilizing measures.”
By 14:20, the story goes beyond Telegram.
The Russian aggregator Pressa24 publishes the full text almost unchanged and, which is especially useful for tracing the chain, directly indicates the source — infantmilitario, that is, the Telegram channel “Militarist.”
Thus, the source can already be traced documentarily:
“Militarist” → Pressa24.
The spread does not end there.
On September 7 at 15:39, the Russian “Military Review” publishes an editorially rewritten news. The mysterious name “News of Israel” disappears, but all key unconfirmed theses are preserved as facts: secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors, two training centers, Masyaf again turns out to be in Homs, and Mossad is allegedly “developing possible measures” against their arrival.
After this, it is the “Military Review” version that begins to multiply on the network as a regular journalistic material.
VPK name reproduces it and directly indicates that the rights to the material belong to “Military Review”.
An almost identical text appears on the websites “Unity”, Nextwar, and other resources. In “Unity,” even the same author — Maxim Svetlyshev — and the same erroneous geography “Masyaf, Homs province” are preserved.
At 16:33, the message is published by the already registered Russian online media “Public News Service”. Here, the degree of confidence increases once again. If the initial Israeli Telegram spoke of an unnamed source, then the PNS begins the text with the words:
“Israeli intelligence agencies have identified secret military cooperation”,
and then reports the agreement as an established fact. The source for these claims is not provided to the reader. The error “Masyaf — Homs” is again preserved.
By evening, the text goes to forums and regional platforms. For example, on the Anapa resource, a user reproduces exactly the Win-Win version with the phrases “Unexpected hint from Mossad” and “Do we not know something?”
Later, another branch of distribution appears. The Telegram channel “World Events Now” at 22:49 publishes this story already with a reference to Storychase.
By this point, it is almost impossible for the reader to establish the original source: one resource refers to “News of Israel,” another — to “Militarist,” a third — to “Military Review,” a fourth — to Storychase.
But the error “Masyaf is located in Homs” allows seeing the kinship of these publications almost like a fingerprint.
In the earliest Israeli version we found — Hama.
In the Azerbaijani version — already Homs.
In “Militarist” — Homs.
In Win-Win — Homs.
In Pressa24 — Homs.
In “Military Review” — Homs.
In PNS — Homs.
If these editors independently received information from different Israeli intelligence sources, the mass reproduction of the same geographical error would be difficult to explain.
It is much simpler to explain that they are working with the same text chain or derivatives from it.
How the message then returned to Hebrew — more cautiously
Against this background, the publication of the Israeli Carmel News looks especially interesting.
There, the story reappears in Hebrew, but with noticeably more cautious wording.
The channel writes several times:
“according to reports”,
calls the cooperation a factor that “may pose a threat”, not an established “direct threat,” and only reports that Mossad:
“is considering possible steps”
to disrupt or thwart the creation of centers and prevent the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.
And Masyaf is again in its real place — in the Hama province.
On September 7 at 23:30, the Arab research center Hadarat reprints exactly this cautious Carmel version and directly indicates the source as “the Jewish site Carmel News”. In the Arabic text, Hama is also correctly stated, and “according to reports” disclaimers are used.
A paradoxical picture emerges.
The story starts in a small Israeli Telegram channel as a message from an anonymous source.
After translation and several reprints, it becomes almost official information from Israeli intelligence in the Russian-speaking space.
Russian Telegram channels add emotional prefaces.
Russian sites turn it into full-fledged news publications.
And when the story returns to the Israeli information space through Carmel News, the wording becomes cautious again: “according to reports,” “may pose a threat,” “Mossad is considering possible steps”.
This is why the Facebook reference to the mysterious “News of Israel” creates a false impression of a much more serious source than the one we managed to find in reality.
At the moment, it is most likely that the name News of Israel arose as an English abbreviation or translation of one of the Israeli Telegram resources, rather than as a reference to a major Israeli editorial office with its own investigation.
But an important caveat remains: we managed to reconstruct the earliest available and indexable chain, not to prove that the post on September 4 was the moment of the story’s initial creation. Theoretically, the author of the Israeli Telegram channel could have had an earlier source, a closed chat, or a message that is not indexed now.
Public evidence of this source has not yet been provided.
This does not prove that the initial information was fabricated. But it shows the mechanism of distribution: an unconfirmed message with anonymous attribution is translated, shortened, and amplified several times until it begins to look like an established fact.
Why it is so easy to believe this rumor
Almost all the surrounding context is real.
On April 5, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky indeed made the first official visit to Syria and met in Damascus with President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Office of the President of Ukraine reported a “strong interest in exchanging military and security experience”. On the same day, a new trilateral format Ukraine–Syria–Turkey took place, where security was one of the central topics.
A few days later, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry called this triangle a promising mechanism linking the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Middle East.
Turkey is indeed involved in restructuring the Syrian armed forces. On August 13, 2025, the defense ministers of Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum on joint training and consulting. Reuters reported that the cooperation includes assistance to Syria with weapons, logistical equipment, and military training.
Ukraine has real experience in sending specialists on unmanned systems to the Middle East. In March 2026, Kyiv sent experts to the region’s states to help combat Iranian drones. Ukrainian specialists publicly worked in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.
There is also a Syrian episode.
In December 2024, the Washington Post, citing informed sources, reported that Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced operators and approximately 150 FPV drones to Syrian rebels shortly before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Reuters separately retold this message.
Thus, the very idea of the appearance of Ukrainian UAV specialists in Syria does not seem technically incredible. But plausibility is not yet proof of a specific secret agreement.
Why Yafur and Masyaf appeared in the story
Even two geographical names are chosen to make the story sound convincing.
In Yafur, about 30 kilometers west of Damascus, there really was a military training infrastructure. In September 2019, AFP was present at the base where Russian military advisors were training a new Syrian elite battalion: assault operations, working with weapons, demining, and other tasks.
Therefore, the use of a military facility in the Yafur area for the training of the new Syrian army is infrastructurally possible. But there is no open evidence that a Ukrainian-Syrian UAV center is currently being created there.
With Masyaf, the connection with drones is even more direct.
Masyaf is located in Hama province, not Homs. An investigation by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression states that since 2023, Syrian structures, together with Russian specialists, have been working on the development of FPV drones, and one of the involved facilities was a research center in Masyaf. The focus was on increasing the range, flight time, and payload of the devices.
This area is well known to Israeli intelligence services. Israel has repeatedly attacked the military infrastructure located there. In January 2025, the IDF officially confirmed that in September 2024, Israeli commandos conducted a complex operation in the Masyaf area against an underground precision missile production facility.
So the author of the original message did not name random points on the Syrian map. Both have a military history. This increases the plausibility of the rumor’s construction, but does not confirm its content.
And the conflict between Israel and Turkey is also real
The most convincing part of the overall background appeared literally a few weeks before the current story.
Reuters reported that on August 14, 2026, Mossad chief Roman Hoffman spoke with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani. One of the main topics was the expanding Turkish military presence in Syria — weapons, drones, and the possibility of deploying Turkish forces.
After this, Israel struck the Syrian airbase Abu al-Duhur. The Israeli side expressed concerns that the facility could be used by Turkey. Ankara and Damascus denied the preparation of a permanent Turkish base and spoke of cooperation in training and experience sharing.
The US began promoting a mechanism to prevent direct confrontation between Israel, Turkey, and Syria.
Therefore, the assertion that Israel is closely monitoring Turkey’s military buildup in Syria has a serious factual basis.
It is this reality that allows the story of Ukrainian instructors to be integrated into it almost seamlessly.
What the check did not confirm
As of September 8, 2026, we have not been able to obtain independent confirmation of the five central claims of the disseminated message.
There is no confirmation that Kyiv and Damascus have indeed signed a separate secret agreement on UAVs.
There is no confirmation that the two specific facilities in Yafur and Masyaf are currently being converted specifically for a program involving Ukraine.
There is no confirmation that Ukrainian instructors have been ordered to arrive there.
There is no confirmation from official Israeli structures that Ukraine’s participation in the Syrian program is recognized as a ‘direct threat to national security.’
And finally, there is no independent confirmation that Mossad is developing operational measures specifically against the arrival of Ukrainian specialists.
We did not find such data in Reuters, major Israeli editorial offices, or official statements from Israel, Ukraine, or Turkey.
There is an Israeli Telegram post referencing an anonymous person allegedly relying on intelligence reports. After it, a chain of translations and reprints begins, in which geography, source, and the degree of categoricalness of the formulations change.
Therefore, calling the whole story a proven fake now would be as much an overstatement of the available evidence as calling it confirmed Mossad information.
More precisely: before us is an unconfirmed intelligence-looking throw-in, embedded in a completely real geopolitical context and noticeably amplified during dissemination.
And ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ have already appeared on Facebook. This headline does not add any document, source, or new fact to the story. It preemptively suggests to the reader to perceive the unconfirmed rumor as evidence of a Ukrainian threat to Israel — a conclusion that the data we found does not yet confirm.
Who needs this? The Russian trace that cannot be ignored
At this point, a question arises, without which the investigation would be incomplete: who benefits from convincing Israelis that Ukraine is secretly preparing people in Syria who will be able to launch drones against Israel tomorrow?
We have no evidence that this particular throw-in was launched by a Russian special service. But the Russian trace here cannot be considered a fantasy, if only because Moscow’s operations to influence Israel through information have already been documented by Israeli researchers themselves.
The Institute for National Security Studies in Israel — INSS — described in detail the Russian campaign Doppelganger back in 2024. Researchers found that Russia created copies of Israeli media, spread fake publications through networks, and artificially accelerated them with thousands of accounts on X and Facebook. After October 7, the intensity of Russian operations against the Israeli audience increased.
But for our story, another detail is especially important.
INSS directly wrote that before October 7, one of the goals of the Russian disinformation campaign in Israel was to convince Israeli society not to support Ukraine. Later, the topics expanded to internal Israeli conflicts, the war with Hamas, and Israel’s relations with the US.
In a separate INSS study, specific tools of Russian influence in Israel were analyzed: Doppelganger, promoting materials through Israeli media, and a Telegram group called ‘Ukrainazis’, spreading pro-Russian messages among the Israeli audience. The authors of the study called such activities an increase in the level of Russian hostile activity against Israel.
Another INSS analysis, based in part on materials from an American investigation of Russian influence operations, showed that Moscow sought to influence Israeli public opinion in support of the Russian position in the war against Ukraine. Digital media, social networks, and fabricated content were used for this.
The mechanism is very similar to what we are observing now.
It is not necessary to create a completely fictional story. It is much more effective to take several real elements:
Ukraine is indeed cooperating with the new Syria.
Turkey is indeed helping to rebuild the Syrian army.
Ukraine indeed has extensive experience in drone warfare.
Yafur was indeed used for training Syrian military personnel.
Military developments, including work with unmanned systems, indeed existed in Masyaf.
Israel is indeed concerned about the expansion of Turkish military presence in Syria.
And then one unproven connecting link is inserted between these facts: allegedly there is a secret agreement, Ukrainian instructors are already preparing to go to two specific centers, and Mossad considers their appearance a threat to Israel.
After this, the story begins to work on its own.
The reader no longer needs to write: ‘Ukraine is preparing Syria for war with Israel.’ He should come to this conclusion on his own.
That is why the Facebook post headline ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’ is so important. It translates the story from the realm of modern politics into a historical emotional plane: Ukrainians — Khmelnytsky — pogroms — Jews — now again a threat to Israel.
From the point of view of information impact, the construction is almost perfect.
And here the case of Artem Kirpichenok appears
Against this background, it is impossible to completely ignore another story that is unfolding in Israel literally simultaneously.
Russian-Israeli historian and publicist Artem Kirpichenok was detained by the Shin Bet on August 2, 2026, after arriving at Ben Gurion Airport. On September 4, it became known that he was charged with serious state security offenses. Most of the case materials are under strict publication ban.
It was on September 4, that is, on the same day when the earliest Israeli publication we found about the ‘secret Ukrainian-Syrian agreement’ appeared, that the Israeli State Prosecutor’s Office announced another extremely unusual case.
According to the data allowed for publication, an Israeli citizen was involved by foreign intelligence structures and participated in foreign influence activity against the State of Israel. The Times of Israel reported this directly in the material about Kirpichenok, but emphasized: due to the publication ban, it is currently impossible to officially establish whether it is about him.
This is an extremely important boundary.
We cannot assert that Kirpichenok worked for Russia.
We also cannot yet assert that the foreign influence case announced by the prosecutor’s office on September 4 is exactly his case.
But there are additional circumstances that make the Russian direction a legitimate question for journalistic investigation.
A family representative of Kirpichenok told Meduza that, according to unofficial information available to the family, he is suspected of contacts with a representative of foreign intelligence. At the same time, the interlocutor separately stated:
‘nothing Arab is visible in the case’
and clarified that, according to their information, it is not about an agent from Iran or Lebanon. After this, the interlocutor himself raised the question of possible Russia.
Kirpichenok, meanwhile, is a citizen of Russia and Israel, has lived in Russia for many years. The Times of Israel also notes that he wrote about Israel and Turkey and that Haaretz characterized him as a participant in a small Russian leftist environment supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The Israeli Russian-language publication Channel 9 has already brought this version directly to the headline: ‘Accused of espionage for Russia: Kirpichenok has already been brought to trial’. But this remains a media report, not a conclusion allowed for publication by the Shin Bet.
And here accuracy is especially important.
One might ask: if it were another Iranian agent network, why does the state maintain such a strict secrecy regime?
This question is logical, as Israel has repeatedly publicly disclosed cases of citizens accused of working for Iranian intelligence in recent years.
But the publication ban itself is not proof of a Russian trace. The Shin Bet and the court can classify a case for many reasons: intelligence methods, the identities of other figures, international cooperation, ongoing operational activities, or information, the disclosure of which could harm state security.
Therefore, the correct conclusion is different.
The version about Russia today looks significantly more serious than simple conspiracy, but remains a version until the publication ban is lifted.
Why these two stories should be considered together
It’s not that Kirpichenok is necessarily connected to the throw-in about Ukraine and Syria. There is currently no evidence of such a connection.
It’s about something else.
Russian influence operations have already been documented in Israel, including those aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.
In early September, the Shin Bet and the prosecutor’s office are simultaneously conducting a strictly classified case about a person who, according to information allowed for publication, foreign intelligence could have used in a foreign influence operation against Israel.
And it is precisely in these same days that a perfectly constructed story for Russian-speaking Israel begins to spread:
Ukraine cooperates with Israel’s enemies.
Ukrainians train the Syrian army.
Mossad is trying to stop them.
And on top — ‘Khmelnytsky’s Heirs?’
Who benefits from such a result?
Russia — quite obviously.
It simultaneously solves several tasks: worsens Israelis’ attitude towards Ukraine, creates the impression that Kyiv is acting against Israel’s security, uses historical Jewish trauma as an emotional amplifier, and shifts attention from Russian-Iranian military cooperation to a fictional or as yet unproven Ukrainian threat.
And this is especially noteworthy now, when Russia itself is deepening military-technical cooperation with Iran. The Financial Times in September 2026 revealed a secret Russian program to help Tehran develop supersonic cruise missiles — weapons potentially of direct significance to Israel’s security.
It turns out to be an almost mirror-like information construction.
Russia is really helping to arm Iran — a strategic adversary of Israel.
But another story is thrown into the information space:
the main potential problem for Israel suddenly becomes Ukrainians who are allegedly going to train Syrians.
We cannot yet prove that it was Moscow that launched this particular story.
But we can already say much more: such a throw-in fully corresponds to the known goals and methods of Russian influence operations against Israel and Ukraine, which Israeli specialists have previously documented.
Therefore, the question now is not only ‘is it true that Ukrainians are going to Masyaf?’.
There is a second question:
is someone trying again to make Israelis see an enemy in Ukraine — at a time when real Russian technologies, specialists, and weapons continue to strengthen Iran?
