On November 9, 2026, Bloomberg described an unpleasant scenario for Kyiv: after the Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections on November 3, Donald Trump was politically weakened, yet his decisions could still leave Ukraine without American intelligence, satellite communications, and missile interceptors. Europe pays for weapons, Ukraine produces its own.
Ian Lesser, an expert from the German Marshall Fund, believes that Kyiv will be able to adapt, but such a break will encourage Moscow. An immediate military collapse in the event of a break with Washington is not expected. But the autumn events showed how costly even a week of disruptions can be.
Author: Stas Shifer, NANews
Washington is negotiating with Moscow even before the war ends
On November 5, Trump received Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s special envoy, at the White House. He did not meet with the Ukrainian delegation that was in Washington at the time. After the conversation, the US President spoke of a “big deal” that could concern all of Europe. There is no agreed document or list of concessions yet. Before the negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the US on November 10-11 in Abu Dhabi, France announced the participation of Europeans in discussing security guarantees. Washington will be represented by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
The economic part of rapprochement with Moscow has already taken shape. After a conversation with Putin on October 9, Trump allowed exceptions from sanctions for Russian diesel: 300 thousand tons were promised immediately, 500 thousand in November, and another million later. But the American law prohibiting the import of Russian energy remains a subject of dispute with the administration. Two tankers initially heading to the US changed course; there are no confirmed deliveries. On November 9, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Pankin called the fuel agreement a possible basis for restoring business ties.
Moscow benefits from the principle itself: trading with America without ending the war. But Trump’s defeat in the elections creates obstacles for the Kremlin. Democrats will gain control of Congress in January 2027 and will be able to demand investigations, sanctions, and supplies to Ukraine. Until January, defensive decisions remain primarily in the hands of the White House.
Patriot: permission to sell exists, but there are no ready missiles
Kyiv’s most painful dependency is the Patriot missiles, which shoot down ballistic targets. On October 30, the US approved the sale of 500 PAC-3 interceptors to Ukraine for $2.1 billion (approximately 6.7 billion shekels). Canada, Germany, Norway, and European funds allocated to Ukraine are financing it, but the missiles still need to be manufactured: standard timelines extend to the early 2030s. Kyiv is requesting missiles from the US’s existing stock.
After the start of the US and Israel’s war with Iran, the demand for interceptors increased. European armies themselves are conserving limited stocks. Zelensky spoke of 600 German PAC-2s for delivery in 2027-2028; the German government confirmed an agreement for several hundred, but the figure of 600 was not officially confirmed. The Polish Lockheed Martin facility announced on October 27 is a PAC-3 repair and maintenance center, not a new missile production plant. The promised production of interceptors in Ukraine has not yet started. Zelensky’s advisor on electronic warfare, Sergey Beskrestnov, speaks of a global missile shortage.
Intelligence, Starshield, and the danger of communication disruption
The second dependency is the US intelligence warnings about Russian missile launches, necessary for air defense operations. In October, their transmission was partially interrupted; by October 25, according to Zelensky, it was restored. Europe has satellites, but not a comparable continuous monitoring system. Amid strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure before winter, this is not a technical trifle: on November 7, Ukraine reported that it managed to intercept only four out of 36 launched ballistic missiles.
The satellite communication problem manifested on drones. Starshield speed restrictions — the military SpaceX network, different from the commercial Starlink — disrupted communication on devices moving faster than 160 km/h. The operation was restored to speeds of about 400-420 km/h on October 24-25. Who ordered the restrictions remains a subject of conflicting explanations from the White House and Elon Musk. Ukraine’s contract for Starshield is valid until about mid-2027. The European Bromo project is a coordinated merger of Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales space divisions, not a ready network to replace Starlink. Ukraine’s own satellite infrastructure is incomparable to the American one. Meanwhile, Russia launched 32 “Rassvet” satellites; according to Ukrainian intelligence, they already provide the military with limited communication sessions, although there is no continuous coverage.
Why Israelis should follow the negotiations in Abu Dhabi
Europe is preparing for the consequences: from November 9 to 22, the Koalicja exercises are taking place in Poland — 2,800 military personnel from 11 countries: Britain, France, Poland, Germany, Turkey, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. The future multinational force is intended to support the Ukrainian army after the cessation of hostilities, not an immediate entry into Ukraine. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk emphasizes: the exercises do not mean a quick truce. Moscow demands territorial concessions and restrictions for the Ukrainian army; Kyiv rejects forced neutrality and troop reductions; territorial issues, Zelensky says, can only be discussed by state leaders.
Israelis are familiar with the cost of American missile defense support, although “Hetz,” “David’s Sling,” and “Iron Dome” solve different tasks, and PAC-3 is not a universal munition for all these systems. The US also has its own THAAD complexes and ship interceptors used to protect Israel from Iran. RUSI expert Emily Ferris, working at the University of Haifa, suggests that Washington may justify reducing aid to Ukraine by the needs of the war with Iran or Israeli air defense. It’s about budgetary and production priorities, not a direct dispute between Kyiv and Jerusalem.
NANews previously analyzed reports about Israeli HiSKY satellite terminals on Ukrainian drones: their technical capabilities are confirmed, but their use by the Ukrainian army is not. Alternatives are being sought, but quickly replacing Starshield is impossible. And if the US eases sanctions against Russia without ending the war, the beneficiary will be Iran’s partner — a state with which Israel continues military confrontation. There is no final “big deal,” but the first decisions for which Ukraine has to pay are already in place.