On November 7, 2026, the Iranian military information agency DefaPress published an article in which Ukraine is named as a participant in the front against Iran. Kyiv is accused of sending “mercenaries” to the Middle East, cooperating with American and Israeli military forces, supporting armed groups in Syria and Mali, and attacking an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea. The publication ends with a warning about the consequences for Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity.
Author: Lev Varshavsky, NANews
Behind the sharp formulations are events that actually occurred during 2026. Ukrainian specialists are helping Middle Eastern countries counter drones, American military forces are using Ukrainian developments, and a dangerous conflict has already arisen between Kyiv and Tehran after the death of an Iranian sailor.
However, from these facts, the Iranian publication draws conclusions that the presented evidence does not confirm. This is especially true regarding the claim of “mercenaries” and the alleged direct involvement of Ukraine in the war of Israel and the USA against Iran.
Where did the 228 Ukrainian “mercenaries” come from
On March 20, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that 228 Ukrainian specialists in drone warfare are working in Middle Eastern countries. They were sent to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.
According to Reuters, Ukrainian units are helping to protect civilian and critical infrastructure from Iranian Shahed drones. Coordination is handled by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and further cooperation is being discussed at the state level.
For Kyiv, such activities make practical sense. Over the years of the Russian war, the Ukrainian army has accumulated extensive experience in detecting and destroying relatively cheap strike drones. Now this experience is in demand by countries facing similar attacks from Iran.
On April 22, Reuters reported another circumstance. At the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the Ukrainian Sky Map system was deployed. Ukrainian military personnel trained American specialists to work with this platform, which integrates information from radars, acoustic sensors, and other means of detecting aerial targets.
The developer of Sky Map, the Ukrainian company Sky Fortress, has created a network of more than 10,000 acoustic sensors in Ukraine. Thanks to such technologies, it is possible to detect approaching drones earlier and choose interception means without expending costly anti-aircraft missiles on each relatively cheap target.
It is these confirmed facts that DefaPress uses as a basis for accusations. In the Iranian publication, anti-drone assistance is interpreted as Kyiv’s participation in military actions against Tehran.
But the word “mercenaries” has a very specific legal meaning. Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides a set of conditions, including direct participation in hostilities, predominantly mercenary motivation, and the absence of official deployment by the state as a serviceman.
DefaPress does not provide evidence of meeting these conditions. Moreover, officially deployed Ukrainian servicemen and instructors do not become mercenaries just because they work outside Ukraine.
Why Israel appeared in the accusations
On July 23, 2025, the foreign ministers of Israel and Ukraine, Gideon Sa’ar and Andriy Sybiha, met in Kyiv. Following the talks, the parties announced their intention to start a separate strategic dialogue on the Iranian threat.
For Israel, this agreement was directly related to security. Iranian drones and missiles pose a threat to Israeli cities and military facilities. For Ukraine, the same technologies have long been part of Russian strikes on energy, industry, and residential areas.
As a result, the two countries developed a common area of interest: drone detection, reducing interception costs, improving warning systems, and exploring countermeasures against Iranian weapons.
On June 7, 2026, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies INSS published a study by Georgy Poroskun on the expansion of Ukrainian presence in the Middle East.
The author noted Ukraine’s growing role in regional security and recommended that Israel more actively use its practical experience. At the same time, he pointed out the limitations of existing cooperation and the need for cautious professional dialogue between the states.
The Iranian publication refers to the same material but presents Ukrainian-Israeli contacts as evidence of established military interaction against Tehran.
The difference is significant. An agreement on the exchange of information and technologies does not prove the existence of joint command, coordinated offensive operations, or the participation of Ukrainian units in Israeli strikes on Iran.
This is especially important for Israeli readers. Israel is interested in technologies that allow for more effective protection of the population from air attacks. Ukraine has the relevant experience, but military cooperation between the two states has its own political limitations and is not reduced to Iranian accusations.
Syria, Mali, and the Caspian: what Tehran put in one row
DefaPress also refers to events that are not directly related to Israel’s anti-drone protection.
The INSS study states that Ukrainian military intelligence was helping the headquarters of the “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” group in Syrian Idlib with drones back in 2024. These contacts are considered in the context of Ukraine’s opposition to the Russian military presence in Syria.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Kyiv began to develop relations with the new Syrian authorities. On April 5, 2026, Zelensky visited Damascus and met with President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The Iranian publication interprets this story as support for extremist forces in the interests of Israel. However, the cited INSS study does not establish that Ukrainian actions in Syria were carried out at the behest of the Israeli leadership.
Similarly, DefaPress uses a CNN investigation from September 12, 2026. Journalists reported about approximately 15 Ukrainian drone specialists helping rebel forces in northern Mali to resist Russian military forces.
The report was about a country in West Africa, in the Sahel region, not the Horn of Africa, as mistakenly stated in the Iranian article. CNN described the expansion of Ukrainian opposition to Russian forces beyond Europe. DefaPress uses this information to accuse Kyiv of spreading terrorism.
The most dangerous episode occurred much closer to Iran.
On July 25, 2026, Tehran reported that a Ukrainian strike on an Iranian commercial ship in the Caspian Sea resulted in the death of one sailor and the injury of another. The Iranian side claimed that the ship was carrying civilian cargo. Ukraine reported strikes on Russian military logistics facilities and ships associated with transporting Iranian military cargo.
The circumstances of the specific strike and the nature of the cargo remain a matter of disagreement. But the death of the sailor turned the conflict into a diplomatic crisis.
On July 28, The New York Times reported, citing Iranian and Western officials, that Tehran was considering a retaliatory ballistic missile strike on a Ukrainian Black Sea port. A limited strike on an object was proposed, but even such a strike created the risk of further escalation.
After a phone conversation between Foreign Ministers Andriy Sybiha and Abbas Araghchi, tensions eased. In August, Iranian politician Mohsen Rezaee publicly stated that strikes on three Ukrainian targets had been prepared, but the decision to attack was canceled. No independent evidence of the alleged military plan was presented.
NANews previously detailed the threat of an Iranian strike on Ukraine, as well as Tehran’s attempt to combine Israeli and Ukrainian actions in the Caspian Sea into one political claim.
The November publication of DefaPress continues this line, although it contains no new evidence of preparations for a strike on Ukraine.
Where is Russia in this story and why the Patriot question arose
The Iranian publication practically does not consider the circumstance due to which Ukraine gained such extensive experience in countering Shahed: Russia has been using Iranian-designed drones for years to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
The cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is not limited to these devices.
On April 7, Reuters published information from Ukrainian intelligence about Russia providing satellite images and cyber support to Iran. According to the assessment, Russian satellites monitored military facilities and critical infrastructure in Middle Eastern countries, including American bases.
Western and regional sources confirmed increased Russian satellite activity and reports of image sharing. However, satellite observations alone do not establish all the circumstances of the alleged assistance in target selection.
For Kyiv, this is an additional explanation for the need to cooperate with partners in the Middle East. Russian-Iranian military ties affect Ukraine’s security, and Ukrainian anti-drone technologies become useful to states subjected to Iranian attacks.
There is also a maritime dimension. On November 7, NANews reported the creation of the American Task Force Iron Gate, intended to counter military supplies and sanctioned logistics of Iran.
In our analysis of the Iron Gate project, the Caspian Sea, through which transport routes between Russia and Iran pass, is separately considered. The coincidence of the dates of the American announcement and the DefaPress publication does not in itself prove a connection between them, but it shows how important this region has become for several conflicts simultaneously.
In the concluding part of its article, the Iranian agency addresses a painful issue for Ukraine — the shortage of Patriot missiles.
On October 30, 2026, the USA approved the possible sale of 500 PAC-3 MSE interceptors to Ukraine. Financing is expected from Ukraine’s partners, but the approval of the sale does not mean immediate delivery. Zelensky warned that obtaining some of the weapons could take years.
DefaPress presents the Patriot shortage as Kyiv’s price for helping Americans and Israelis. The causal link here is not proven. The shortage is related to the high consumption of costly interceptors, limited production capacities, and competing needs of several states.
At the same time, Ukraine’s position indeed creates a complex issue for its partners: the country provides in-demand defense technologies while simultaneously experiencing an acute need for weapons necessary for its own defense.
What the new threats mean for Ukraine and Israel
By November 2026, relations between Iran and Ukraine have noticeably changed. In addition to previous disagreements over arms supplies to Russia, direct clashes of interests have arisen in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea.
DefaPress has compiled these events into a single accusatory construct. Ukrainian instructors are presented as mercenaries, anti-drone assistance as participation in the war against Iran, and actions against Russian military interests in Syria and Africa as evidence of Kyiv’s global hostile strategy.
This construct has a political task: to show Ukrainian activities outside Europe as a direct threat to Iran and thereby justify the possibility of retaliatory actions.
However, the publication of the military information agency is not equivalent to an official government decision or an order to the armed forces. There is currently no basis to assert that Tehran has approved a new operation against Ukraine.
For Israel, the situation has practical significance. Any strengthening of cooperation with Ukraine in the field of air defense is now accompanied by the risk of further Iranian pressure on Kyiv. At the same time, refusing to exchange experience would deprive both countries of the opportunity to use technologies that have already proven their usefulness in combating drones.
The previous conflict around the Caspian ship showed that Iranian threats can go beyond informational confrontation and require urgent diplomatic negotiations.
The current publication does not yet indicate the start of a new military crisis. But it shows that Tehran increasingly views Ukraine not only as an opponent of its Russian partner but also as an independent participant in the Middle Eastern security system. And it is this change in attitude that may influence Iran’s further decisions.