- June 20, 2026
- 4:44 pm
- World News
After the G7 summit, which took place in French Évian-les-Bains from June 15-17, 2026, the topic of Ukraine once again went beyond the usual formula of “support Kyiv as long as it takes.” Now, a different logic is becoming increasingly clear: if Moscow is not ready for real negotiations, it will be pushed towards them through the cost of war.
This does not mean that diplomacy disappears.
On the contrary, diplomacy is being talked about more and more often. But after more than four years of full-scale war, it becomes obvious: Putin will not stop on his own unless he feels that continuing aggression is destroying not only Ukrainian cities but also the very economic foundation of the Russian military machine.
In the official statement of the G7 leaders, there is talk of supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the intention to enhance the supply of air defense systems, additional complexes, interceptors, and long-range capabilities. There is also a recorded readiness to increase pressure on the Russian military economy, including sanctions against the oil and gas sector.
For Israel, this is not a distant European topic. It is a question of how the democratic world responds to regimes that test the boundaries of what is permissible: Russia in Ukraine, Iran in the Middle East, their partners and dependent regimes in the gray zones between war, blackmail, and trading in fear.
What the G7 really showed
The G7 summit was not an instant turning point, but it showed an important shift in language and priorities.
It’s no longer just about Ukraine standing firm. It’s about Ukraine being able to change the balance of the war. For this, Kyiv needs three things: sky protection, long-range capabilities, and pressure on the sources of Russian military income.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke on the sidelines of the G7 about sanctions and how allies discussed further pressure on Russia. According to Reuters, G7 leaders confirmed their support for Ukraine and agreed to increase pressure on the Russian military economy, including through the oil and gas sector.
This is where the key line of the new stage passes. Until now, Western policy often looked like a reaction to another Russian strike: Moscow hits — Ukraine asks for air defense, missiles, shells, help for energy. Now the logic is gradually turning in the other direction: not only to defend against the consequences but also to hit Russia’s ability to continue the war.
This does not eliminate the risk. Russia is likely to respond with terror against the Ukrainian rear: energy, water, heat, logistics, civilian objects. But that is precisely why strengthening Ukrainian air defense/missile defense becomes not a technical detail but a strategic condition for the entire new phase of the war.
Why air defense for Ukraine is not a defensive detail but a strategic factor
The Israeli audience understands well that air defense is not just a matter of military technology.
When a country lives under the threat of missiles, drones, and ballistics, sky protection means the ability to preserve the economy, cities, hospitals, power plants, transport, and normal civilian life. Israel knows this from its own experience.
For Ukraine, air defense has the same significance, only in an even larger-scale war. If Kyiv receives long-range capabilities but does not receive sufficient protection from retaliatory strikes, Russia will try to break the rear: in winter — energy, in summer — logistics, in any season — civilian infrastructure.
Therefore, the G7 formula is important precisely in conjunction: more air defense, more interceptors, more long-range capabilities. One without the other does not create a sustainable strategy. Together, it turns into an attempt to impose a new cost of war on Moscow.
Why the focus is on the war economy
One of the key scenarios increasingly discussed in expert and political circles is pressure on the economic base of Russian aggression.
Refineries, oil and gas revenues, logistics, military factories, export schemes, and supply chains are not just the economy. They are the fuel of war. From this money, Russia pays the military, produces missiles, purchases components, supports the repressive apparatus, and finances strikes on Ukraine.
That is why sanctions against the oil and gas sector and strikes on objects related to the Russian military economy become part of one picture. The West presses from the outside, Ukraine works on military and industrial infrastructure, and Russian elites begin to understand: the war may cease to be a manageable way to retain power and turn into a threat to their own assets, incomes, and future.
Here it is important not to cross the line between fact and forecast. It cannot be stated that at the G7 a public decision was made to “finish off” the Russian economy. But it can be said otherwise: the official formulations of the G7 and statements after the summit show that pressure on the Russian military economy is becoming a central element of the allies’ policy towards Ukraine.
For NAnews — News of Israel, the Ukrainian aspect is not the only important one here. The question is broader: if an aggressive regime sees that the war is becoming increasingly costly, its behavior changes. If it sees fatigue, fear, and endless delays, it continues to test the world for weakness.
Long-range capabilities change not only the front but also negotiations
Long-range capabilities are not just weapons on the battlefield.
They are a tool that changes the political mathematics of war. As long as Russia can launch missiles with impunity, produce drones, process oil, finance the army, and hide key nodes deep in the rear, it feels space to continue aggression.
When this space narrows, the conversation about negotiations becomes different.
Moscow is used to negotiating as a continuation of blackmail: first capture, destroy, kill, and then offer to “fix reality.” The new logic should be the opposite: first make the continuation of the war too expensive, and only then open a window for a real conversation.
The Trump factor: deal or pressure
A separate topic is Donald Trump’s position.
His political style is often described as a combination of pressure and offering a deal. First, a tough situation is created. Then the other side is offered a beneficial exit. If the exit is rejected, the pressure increases.
Regarding Russia, the problem is that Moscow has long demonstrated an unwillingness to make a real compromise. Putin not only did not stop. He continued the strikes, continued the demands on Ukraine, continued the attempt to force the West to recognize Russian seizures as a new norm.
That is why after the G7, not only the text of the statement is important, but also the change in the atmosphere around the American position. Reuters wrote that at the summit, Trump became noticeably closer to the allies’ position on Ukraine, and European leaders saw in his approach a “real change” compared to previous skepticism.
This does not mean that Washington will automatically switch to the toughest line. But it means that the new aid package to Ukraine and the unlocking of additional support tools have a political chance. Not only as help to Kyiv but as a way to return the US to the role of the main player at the table of future settlement.
If America wants to be among the winners, it cannot allow Europe and Ukraine to independently form a new security architecture and then come to the ready table as an observer.
The EU poses the question more harshly
Europe after the G7 looks more consistent than before.
The European logic is simple: Russia should not receive a reward for aggression. Ukraine must stand firm. Pressure on Moscow must grow. And those who want to participate in the post-war world must help shape victory, not wait for a convenient moment.
Therefore, the question to the US becomes harsher: Washington can be the leader of the process, can be a partner of the process, or can find itself as a country that hesitated too long.
For Trump, this is especially sensitive. He does not like to lose and does not like to look like someone who came late. Therefore, strengthening Ukraine can become for him not only a foreign policy decision but also a matter of personal political logic: to be where victory is being formed.
Why this is important for Israel
Israel should look at the G7 not as a European ceremony but as an indicator of Western behavior in an era of great threats.
Ukraine is at war with Russia. Israel lives under the threat of Iran and its proxies. But between these stories, there is a common line: aggressive regimes closely watch how the democratic world reacts to force, blackmail, and terror.
If Russia can destroy Ukraine for years, and the world only expresses concern, this is read not only in Moscow. It is read in Tehran, Damascus, Pyongyang, and other capitals where the weakness of the West is perceived as an invitation to the next step.
If Russia faces systemic pressure, strengthening of the Ukrainian army, sanctions on the military economy, and political unity of allies, it creates a different signal: aggression becomes too expensive.
For Israel, the Ukrainian experience is especially important because of the air defense topic. Ukraine needs protection from Russian missiles and drones. Israel needs protection from Iranian missiles, drones, and proxy structures. Both countries understand: the sky is not an abstract zone. It is the life of people.
NAnews — News of Israel has repeatedly written that security today cannot be divided into “European” and “Middle Eastern.” The Russian war against Ukraine, the Iranian threat to Israel, energy blackmail, and attacks on civilian infrastructure are different manifestations of one era where authoritarian regimes test how far they will be allowed to go.
Belarus, Armenia, and the weak links of the Russian orbit
Another important question is how strong the Russian sphere of influence remains.
Belarus, Armenia, and other countries that have long been in Moscow’s orbit are becoming part of a broader struggle for the post-Russian space. Russia weakens not only when it loses tanks near Pokrovsk or missiles over Kyiv. It weakens when its allies begin to seek a way out of dependence.
Regarding Belarus, one must speak cautiously. Scenarios of pressure on Alexander Lukashenko’s regime can indeed be considered in the logic of weakening the Russian military infrastructure around Ukraine. But it cannot be stated without confirmation that specific strikes or operations have already been agreed upon.
It is more correct to pose the question differently: if Moscow uses Belarus as a military, political, and logistical resource, then pressure on this resource becomes part of a big strategy. Not necessarily through direct war. Sometimes it is enough to show Lukashenko that the price of full attachment to Russia becomes higher than the price of distance.
Armenia in this sense shows another example. After disappointment in Russian support, Yerevan began to seek broader external ties. This does not mean an immediate break with Moscow, but it shows a trend: the Russian imperial system is held not by the love of allies but by fear and dependence. When fear decreases, dependence begins to crack.
The theory of the “cornered rat” and the real cost of escalation
Opponents of strong pressure on the Russian Federation often use the image of a “cornered rat”: if you press too hard, Putin will strike back even more terribly.
This argument cannot be completely ignored. Russia indeed remains dangerous. It has missiles, drones, a huge repressive apparatus, a nuclear arsenal, and a willingness to kill civilians.
But it is important to recognize another thing: Moscow has already used almost all the main tools of escalation, except for the most extreme ones.
Russia has already hit energy. Already destroyed cities. Already conducted massive missile attacks. Already blackmailed with nuclear weapons. Already conducted mobilization. Already turned the war into a tool of internal dictatorship.
What remains?
Mass mobilization in the style of “Arise, vast country” is an extremely difficult task for Putin’s Russia. The Soviet Union moved towards a strict command-administrative system for decades. Putin has neither the time, nor the Bolshevik party, nor a real mobilization ideology capable of raising the whole country without risk.
The nuclear scenario is even more dangerous for Moscow itself. China, whose opinion the Kremlin cannot completely ignore, strongly opposes it. For Beijing, nuclear escalation in Europe would mean a blow to global trade, markets, stability, and its own interests.
Therefore, the real Russian response is likely to be familiar: terror against the Ukrainian population, strikes on energy, water, heat, transport, an attempt to break the rear and sow fatigue. That is why the West, if it really wants to pressure the Russian Federation, must simultaneously strengthen the Ukrainian sky.
The main challenge for Ukraine after victory
But the most important part of this story begins not in Moscow, but in Kyiv.
Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield and lose part of the future within itself if, after a huge sacrifice, it remains in the logic of decorative politics, corruption, imitation of reforms, quarrels with allies, and internal self-destruction.
Ukraine’s strategic task is not just to receive a medal for heroism and a bag of gold for effort. The task is to sit at the table of the post-war world as a country that not only stood firm but also became stronger: militarily, engineering-wise, technologically, European, institutionally.
This means that Ukraine must be not only a symbol of resistance. It must become a producer of security.
A country that has an army, industry, air defense, long-range capabilities, strong universities, functioning courts, effective bureaucracy, trust of allies, and a political culture capable of not destroying its own achievements for the sake of a short internal fight.
The main obstacle here is not only Russian missiles. The main obstacle is the internal decorative-parasitic layer that knows how to say the right words but does not know how to build a state. Ukraine of engineers, military, entrepreneurs, volunteers, doctors, teachers, and European culture must defeat not only Moscow but also its own habit of tolerating imitation.
It is not enough to win with Europe — you need to become Europe
After the G7, it became clear: Ukraine has a chance not just to survive but to move into a new political category.
If the West really strengthens air defense, long-range capabilities, sanctions, and pressure on the Russian economy, the war may enter a phase where Moscow, for the first time in a long time, will not only advance but also lose strategic initiative.
But military victory is only the first part of the task.
It is not enough for Ukraine to win with Europe. It needs to become Europe. To be, not to seem.
This means building a state that allies trust. An economy that produces strength. An army that not only defends the country but also becomes part of a new security system. A policy that understands the price of partnership. And a society that after the war will not allow replacing real European transformation with a beautiful facade.
Russia must be brought to sanity. But Ukraine after this must prove an equally difficult thing: that it fought not only for survival but for the right to be one of those who write the rules of the new world.