- June 4, 2026
- 11:14 pm
- World News
Germany suffered a rare and painful diplomatic defeat at the UN. On June 3, 2026, the United Nations General Assembly elected five new non-permanent members of the Security Council for 2027–2028, and Berlin failed to secure a seat from the Western European and Others Group.
For a country that has long claimed to be one of the main defenders of the international order, this was not just an unsuccessful vote. It is a blow to the foreign policy reputation of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government and a signal that support for Ukraine, special responsibility towards Israel, and controversial policies in the Middle East may cost Germany votes in the Global South.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul called the result a “bitter defeat.” He directly linked the failure to Germany’s firm stance in support of Ukraine and its special line of responsibility towards Israel. According to the Foreign Minister, Russia did not want to see such a voice in the Security Council and campaigned against the German candidacy.
What happened at the UN and why Germany lost
The UN Security Council consists of 15 states: five permanent members with veto power — the USA, the UK, France, China, and Russia — and ten non-permanent members elected for a two-year term by regional groups.
On June 3, 2026, the General Assembly selected five countries to join the Security Council from January 1, 2027. From the Western European and Others Group, Germany, Portugal, and Austria competed for two seats.
Portugal and Austria won.
Portugal received 134 votes, Austria 131, and Germany only 104. To be elected, 127 votes were needed. Thus, Berlin not only lost to its competitors but also fell significantly below the threshold.
This is especially painful because Germany has already been a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council six times and has not lost such elections before. This time, the status of a major European power, one of the largest financial donors to the UN, and a key player in the European Union did not help.
The five elected countries — Austria, Portugal, Kyrgyzstan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe — will begin their work in the Security Council on January 1, 2027, and will hold seats until December 31, 2028. They will replace Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia.
Who joined the Security Council instead of Germany
From the Western European group, Portugal and Austria passed. For Berlin, this is the most unpleasant part of the vote because the defeat occurred not in an abstract international race but within a group of allies and partners.
Kyrgyzstan received a seat from the Asia-Pacific region. For the country, this is a historic event: Kyrgyzstan was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time. In this group, the vote was competitive, with Kyrgyzstan surpassing the Philippines after several rounds.
Zimbabwe was elected from the African group, Trinidad and Tobago from the Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The other five non-permanent members — Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Latvia, and Liberia — retain their mandate for 2026–2027. They were elected earlier and will continue to work alongside the new Security Council members.
For Ukraine and Israel, this vote is important not only as a German domestic political story. The composition of the Security Council affects the diplomatic background around wars, sanctions, resolutions, humanitarian issues, investigations, and formulations that are later used in international politics.
Why Berlin links the defeat to Ukraine, Israel, and Russia
Johann Wadephul, after the vote, essentially acknowledged: Germany paid the price for its political positions. He emphasized that Berlin firmly supports Ukraine, and Russia is not interested in the emergence of such a voice in the Security Council. According to the German Foreign Minister, it was no secret that Moscow opposed the German application.
This sounds logical.
After 2022, Germany became one of Ukraine’s most important European donors and military partners. Berlin moved cautiously for a long time, debated the pace of supplies and restrictions, but ultimately took a place among the key countries helping Kyiv defend against Russian aggression.
For Moscow, Germany’s appearance in the Security Council for 2027–2028 would mean an additional strong Western voice on the Ukrainian issue. Given that Russia itself is a permanent member of the Security Council and uses its veto power, it benefits from weakening any candidates who can consistently speak about Russian responsibility for the war.
But Ukraine is only one part of the explanation.
The second part is Israel.
Wadephul separately stated that Germany’s special responsibility towards Israel in the Middle Eastern conflict may have cost Berlin some votes. For Germany, this is a historically sensitive topic: after the Holocaust, Israel’s security remains one of the foundations of German foreign policy identity. But in the UN General Assembly, this position is not always perceived as a moral argument.
Many countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America view Germany’s policy through a different lens. For them, Berlin often appears as a state that speaks very harshly about international law when it comes to Russia and Ukraine but is significantly more cautious in formulating claims against Israel and the USA in the Middle East.
This is where the main diplomatic conflict arises.
Germany wants to be simultaneously a defender of Ukraine, an ally of Israel, an advocate of international law, a partner of the Global South, and a candidate for a more significant role in the UN. But the vote on June 3 showed that combining these roles without losses is becoming increasingly difficult.
The Global South voted not only about Germany
Berlin’s defeat cannot be explained by a single Russian campaign. It could have been an important factor, but not the only one.
Portugal had strong diplomatic ties with Africa and Latin America. Austria built its campaign much earlier and managed to sell its image as a neutral, more convenient European candidate for many countries. Austria announced its candidacy back in 2011, Portugal in 2013, while Germany officially entered the race only in 2020. This gave competitors a significant advantage in behind-the-scenes diplomacy.
In the UN, such things matter.
The vote is secret. Countries can publicly smile, promise support, and talk about partnership, but then choose in the ballot the candidate with whom it is easier to work, who started the campaign earlier, who is less irritating to regional groups, or who better considers the interests of specific states.
Germany may have relied too much on its status. Berlin emphasized its financial contribution to the UN, participation in peacekeeping missions, support for Security Council reform, and assistance to African countries. But it was not enough.
Money is important in the UN.
But votes are not only for donors.
The Middle East became a separate irritant
Germany’s line on Israel has always been special. For the Israeli audience, this is understandable: Germany cannot discuss Israel’s security as countries that do not bear historical responsibility for the Holocaust do.
But in world diplomacy, such a position causes controversy.
In the spring of 2026, Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke about US and Israeli military strikes on Iran in the context of threats from the Iranian regime, its nuclear and missile programs, support for Hamas, and Hezbollah. Berlin’s official position was built around the fact that the Iranian regime threatens Israel and regional security.
However, critics of Germany in international and expert circles pointed to the other side of the issue: Berlin was not quick to harshly condemn the actions of allies as a violation of international law, whereas in the case of Russia and Ukraine, Germany demands unequivocal responsibility.
For many countries in the Global South, this looks like a double standard.
One can argue whether such an assessment is fair. But in Security Council elections, what matters is not only the candidate’s rightness but how they are perceived by the 193 UN member states.
Germany faced precisely the problem of perception.
What this means for Israel, Ukraine, and the international order
For Israel, Germany’s defeat at the UN is a worrying signal. Not because Berlin will sharply change its policy, but because the vote showed that even a strong European country can lose support if it is considered too close to Israel in the Middle Eastern conflict.
This is especially important against the backdrop of the war with Hamas, the threat from Iran, Hezbollah’s activity, and the general deterioration of attitudes towards Israel in significant parts of international institutions. In the UN General Assembly, Israel has long had a complex position, but now it is clear that the diplomatic cost of supporting Israel also falls on allies.
For Ukraine, the meaning is different but no less serious.
If Wadephul’s words about the Russian campaign are true, then Moscow continues to work not only on the front and not only through disinformation but also through international votes. Russia is trying to reduce the weight of those states that support Kyiv, arm Ukraine, and call the war Russian aggression.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency views this story as an important example of how Ukrainian and Israeli agendas increasingly intersect in one diplomatic plane. Germany found itself between two moral and political obligations: to support Ukraine against Russian aggression and to maintain special responsibility towards Israel. Within the Western world, this may seem natural. But in the UN outside the West, such a set of positions does not always bring votes.
That is why Berlin’s defeat should be read more broadly than just the failure of one campaign.
It is a symptom of a changing international environment.
A blow to Merz and German foreign policy
For Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the failure at the UN was an unpleasant blow. He came to power with a promise to strengthen Germany’s role in the world, speak more firmly, act more confidently, and restore Berlin’s political weight.
But the first major symbolic test at the UN ended in defeat.
The German opposition is already using this result as evidence of the government’s weakness. Critics say that Berlin was overconfident, insufficiently flexible, and failed to conduct a full-fledged campaign among countries that are not part of the Western political circle.
This does not mean the collapse of German diplomacy.
But it means that the previous model no longer works automatically. Germany cannot rely solely on the size of its economy, donor contribution, EU membership, and reputation as a “responsible power.” The world has become tougher, more cynical, and less grateful.
Especially at the UN.
Why the UN Security Council remains important, even when criticized
The Security Council is often criticized for paralysis, veto power, and inability to stop major wars. Russia blocks decisions on Ukraine. The USA often protects Israel from harsh resolutions. China acts in the logic of its own interests. France and the UK no longer have the weight they had after World War II.
But that is precisely why non-permanent seats remain important.
Countries without veto power cannot change the Security Council alone. But they can influence the agenda, formulations, public pressure, coalitions, humanitarian issues, investigations, and diplomatic atmosphere.
If Germany had joined the Security Council for 2027–2028, it could have been a strong voice on Ukraine, sanctions pressure, international law, Israel’s security, the Iranian threat, and UN reform.
Now others will play this role.
Portugal, Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Zimbabwe, and Trinidad and Tobago will enter the body where wars, crises, sanctions, and peacekeeping missions are discussed. Their positions will not always align with the interests of Berlin, Kyiv, or Jerusalem.
The main conclusion: support from allies is no longer free
Germany’s defeat reveals an unpleasant truth of modern diplomacy: a moral position does not always convert into votes.
Support for Ukraine after Russian aggression seems obvious to Europe, Israel, the USA, and countries that understand the danger of imperial war. But for part of the world, it is just one of the conflicts where the West demands principledness while itself falling under accusations of double standards.
Support for Israel for Germany has historical and moral grounds. But in the UN, many states evaluate it through the war in Gaza, strikes on Iran, the Palestinian issue, and their own anti-Western or post-colonial optics.
Germany found itself between these layers.
It did not abandon Ukraine.
It did not abandon Israel.
But it received fewer votes than expected.
For Berlin, this is a “bitter defeat.” For Kyiv and Jerusalem, a reminder that even strong allies face a high diplomatic cost. For the UN, another sign that the organization increasingly reflects not a single “international order,” but the struggle of different world blocs, grievances, interests, and historical traumas.
On June 3, 2026, Germany lost not only to Austria and Portugal.
It lost the illusion that status, money, and the right words alone guarantee the support of most of the world.