Haifa may be removed from the route between India and Europe: Saudi Arabia is preparing a transport corridor through Syria

The Port of Haifa was supposed to become the main Mediterranean gateway of the corridor between India, the Gulf countries, and Europe. But while Israel awaits normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Ankara, Amman, and Damascus are creating an alternative route that may exclude Israel.

Israel risks losing not just another international infrastructure project.

It’s about the country’s place on the future trade map between India, the Middle East, and Europe, where the Port of Haifa was supposed to be one of the central transition points from rail to sea routes.

However, Saudi Arabia has begun exploring options to change the IMEC corridor — India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. Instead of a line through Jordan, Israel, and Haifa, a route through Syria is being considered, which would allow goods to be delivered from the Gulf states to the Mediterranean or directly to Turkey without crossing Israeli territory.

This was reported by The Jerusalem Post on July 8, 2026, at 20:57. The article by journalist Amichai Stein was updated on July 9 at 18:46. The publication cited two people familiar with discussions in Saudi Arabia. According to them, one of the leading options has become a land corridor through Syria.

This is not yet an official decision by Riyadh and not an approved new map of IMEC. But the discussion is taking place against the backdrop of already signed transport agreements between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan. Therefore, the threat to Israel is no longer theoretical.

What Israel was supposed to gain from IMEC

The memorandum on the principles of creating the IMEC corridor was signed on September 9, 2023, at the G20 summit in New Delhi.

The document was signed by representatives of India, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, France, Germany, and Italy.

Israel itself, like Jordan, was not a party to the memorandum. These two countries were mentioned as territories through which goods were supposed to move between the Gulf and Europe.

The project envisaged two main sections.

The first was to connect Indian ports with the United Arab Emirates by sea.

The second — to connect the Gulf countries with Europe using railways and seaports.

The working scheme looked as follows:

India — UAE — Saudi Arabia — Jordan — Israel — Port of Haifa — Europe.

By rail, goods were to be delivered from Saudi Arabia through Jordan to Israel, after which they would be transshipped onto ships in Haifa and sent to European ports.

The corridor was conceived not only as a transport line. Along the railway route, it was planned to lay electrical and digital cables, as well as a pipeline for exporting clean hydrogen. Thus, Israel’s participation could bring the country not only container transit but also long-term influence on regional energy and communication networks.

At the same time, the 2023 memorandum was initially not a construction contract. The document explicitly stated that it records political commitments but does not create international legal obligations. Participants were supposed to later prepare a technical plan, funding sources, and an implementation schedule.

The Port of Haifa is not separately named in the text of the memorandum. However, Haifa was considered the most logical exit of the route to the Mediterranean and was repeatedly included in the working schemes of IMEC.

Why Haifa could become one of the main hubs of the project

On July 1 and 2, 2026, a special seminar on the development of IMEC was held in Haifa. It was organized by the Center for Maritime Policy and Strategy in conjunction with academic and government structures.

Former US National Security Council director Samantha Sutton, now an employee of the Atlantic Council, stated at the event that Haifa is considered one of the target ports of the corridor. However, the existing infrastructure is insufficient for the anticipated volume of traffic.

According to Sutton’s assessment, the port will need to handle about seven million standard twenty-foot containers per year. The current capacity, which she cited based on port data, is approximately 2.5 million containers.

The Israeli-Jordanian border crossings are also insufficiently prepared. Currently, about 200 trucks can pass through them per day, whereas for the full operation of IMEC, up to 7500 trucks might be needed.

These figures are the assessment of a professional seminar participant, not approved technical parameters of IMEC. But they show the scale of investments that Israel would have to direct to railways, border terminals, warehouses, and port capacities.

That is why the possible exclusion of Haifa means not the loss of an already existing cargo flow — the corridor is not yet operational — but the loss of the prospect of becoming one of the main trade hubs of the Eastern Mediterranean.

While Israel waits, neighbors sign agreements

The alternative route through Syria emerged not only in conversations of unnamed Saudi officials.

During the spring and summer of 2026, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia took several concrete steps to create their own railway system between the Gulf and Europe.

The trilateral agreement of Turkey, Syria, and Jordan was signed on April 7 in Amman during a joint ministerial committee meeting.

The document provides for the development of rail, road, and sea transport, modernization of border crossings, simplification of transit procedures, and the creation of joint technical groups. Turkish Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu specifically spoke about connecting this system with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

On April 21, Jordanian Prime Minister Jafar Hassan presented the development of the railway from the port of Aqaba as part of a broader regional network. According to him, the route should connect Aqaba with Mediterranean ports through Syria and Turkey, and also extend to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

On June 9 in Riyadh, Saudi Transport Minister Saleh Al-Jasser and his Turkish counterpart Abdulkadir Uraloglu signed two new memorandums.

The first concerns railway infrastructure, technologies, and specialist training. The second — the development of logistics centers and joint management of cargo flows.

The Saudi press directly linked these documents with the creation of a land corridor between the Gulf and Europe through Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.

What has already been built and what is missing

On June 14, Reuters reported new details of the project.

According to Uraloglu, the railway network within Saudi Arabia already reaches the area of the Jordanian border. On the Turkish side, there are lines in the areas of Islahiye, Kilis, and Gaziantep, located near Syria.

The main infrastructure gap is about 400 kilometers on the section between Jordan and the Turkish railway network through Syrian territory.

Turkey plans to invest about 100 million dollars in restoring the line from its border to Aleppo and creating a direct connection with Damascus. The full financial plan has not yet been approved.

The minister named an approximate implementation period of three to four years. The route plans to transport:

• container and other commercial cargo;
• oil and natural gas;
• passengers;
• pilgrims heading for Hajj.

In the future, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and possibly Yemen may join the project.

In fact, a route is being formed:

Saudi Arabia — Jordan — Damascus — Aleppo — southeastern Turkey — Europe.

Another option involves using the Jordanian port of Aqaba, as well as Mediterranean ports in Syria or Turkey.

Which port will ultimately replace Haifa is not yet determined. Among the discussed directions was the Syrian Tartus, but there is no approved international scheme.

Why Israel began to be considered a non-essential link

The initial idea of IMEC was closely tied to the expected normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The corridor was supposed to become the economic foundation of a new regional order: Saudi Arabia would gain access to the Mediterranean, Israel — a land connection with the Gulf countries, and India and Europe — an alternative route reducing dependence on the Suez Canal and unstable sea passages.

But after the start of the war in Gaza, the normalization process was effectively frozen.

According to sources from The Jerusalem Post, it was the war and the lack of progress in Israeli-Saudi relations that forced Riyadh to reconsider the previous concept. Saudi officials began looking for a route that would not depend on political relations with Israel.

Samantha Sutton formulated the situation even more harshly. In her opinion, after the war, many countries in the region began to perceive Israel more as a source of political risks than as a convenient partner. She also linked the resistance to Israel’s participation in IMEC with the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition partners.

This is the assessment of a specific American expert, not the official position of all project participants. However, the actions of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria show that the region is already preparing for a scenario in which Israel will not be an indispensable link.

NAnews — Israel News draws attention: the problem for the country is not only in deteriorating relations with Riyadh. Israel is losing time during which neighbors are building alternative infrastructure, signing intergovernmental documents, and securing their own ports in future trade schemes.

What Haifa will lose

If the Saudi-Turkish route indeed becomes part of IMEC or turns into an independent alternative, Haifa may lose its status as the main western gateway of the corridor.

This would mean:

• a reduction in future investments in port infrastructure;
• loss of potential container flows between India and Europe;
• decreased significance of Israeli railways;
• reduced interest in building a railway crossing between Israel and Jordan;
• loss of part of future energy, digital, and hydrogen projects;
• strengthening Turkey as the main transport intermediary between Europe and the Gulf countries.

Jordan will also have the opportunity to participate in the new corridor, but without the need to direct goods through Israel. Amman will be able to connect Saudi Arabia with Syria and Turkey or use Aqaba as an independent maritime center.

Syria, despite its destroyed infrastructure, gets a chance to return to the regional transit map. For the new leadership in Damascus, this could become one of the largest sources of foreign investment and political legitimacy.

Turkey, in turn, becomes the final land bridge between Asia and Europe — a role that Israel was counting on.

The decision has not yet been made, but the route is already changing

It cannot yet be asserted that Saudi Arabia has definitively excluded Israel from IMEC.

There is no official statement from the Saudi government, no new international memorandum, or approved map of the corridor through Syria. Information about the change in IMEC is still based on The Jerusalem Post publication and two unnamed sources.

However, the alternative railway project already exists independently of these reports.

Agreements are signed. Joint technical groups are being created. Jordan is developing a connection with Aqaba. Turkey is restoring lines near Syria. Saudi Arabia has officially agreed with Ankara on cooperation in the railway and logistics fields.

Therefore, the main question is not whether Riyadh has signed a document excluding Haifa.

The main question is whether Saudi Arabia will still need to include Israel in the project after the route through Syria and Turkey becomes technically feasible.

NAnews — Israel News believes that the story with IMEC shows the cost of foreign policy isolation in specific numbers, railway lines, and future cargo flows.

Countries in the region will not wait indefinitely for normalization with Israel. They are building routes bypassing it.

And if Israel does not restore relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and European partners, Haifa may remain next to the new trade corridor — but outside of it.