The US-Iran deal could be a blow to Russia: why the Middle East is changing the rules of the game again

The planned American-Iranian agreement to cease hostilities and unblock the Strait of Hormuz could become one of the most important news for global politics, energy, and security. For most countries, it looks like a chance to reduce the risk of a major regional war, keep the oil market from panicking, and return at least some control over the situation to diplomacy.

But there is another side to this story.

If the agreement between the US and Iran is indeed signed and then brought to a sustainable format, one of the main losers could be Russia. Moscow has been earning not only from oil, gas, and weapons for many years but also from chaos. The more conflicts around Europe and the US, the easier it is for the Kremlin to divert attention from the war against Ukraine, pressure energy markets, and destabilize Western societies from within.

Why the American-Iranian deal is important not only for the Middle East

The Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East is one of the key routes for global oil trade. Any military escalation around Iran instantly affects prices, insurance rates, shipping, and government decisions from Washington to Brussels, from Tel Aviv to Beijing.

Therefore, the cessation of hostilities and the reduction of the risk of blocking the strait is not just Middle Eastern news. It is a matter of the global economy.

For the US, such a deal could be a way out of a dangerous scenario in which Washington is gradually drawn into a new major war. Any campaign against Iran would require resources, political capital, logistics, ally support, and an explanation to the American public of why, after Iraq and Afghanistan, it is necessary to open a front in the Middle East again.

For Europe, the agreement means a chance to avoid a new energy shock. After the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, European countries have already paid a high price for dependence on unstable suppliers. A new crisis in the Strait of Hormuz could again hit inflation, industry, and domestic politics.

For Israel, the situation is more complicated. On the one hand, reducing the risk of a major regional war is in the interests of the security of millions of people. On the other hand, any US deal with Iran inevitably causes concern in Israel: what exactly will be recorded in the conditions, how will Iranian military capabilities be limited, what will happen to the nuclear program, and how will Tehran’s obligations be controlled.

That is why the Israeli audience should look at this story without illusions. A peace agreement in itself does not guarantee security. But the failure of diplomacy also does not always bring Israel the best result, especially if it leads to rising oil prices, a crisis with the US, and the strengthening of Russia against the backdrop of a new war.

Why chaos in the region is beneficial to Moscow

For Russia, a major war in the Middle East is almost always a gift.

When the region is on fire, Europe faces migration pressure, increased terrorist risks, internal polarization, and new energy problems. The US is forced to shift attention from Ukraine to the Middle East. NATO begins to argue about priorities. Public opinion in the West becomes more irritated, tired, and susceptible to propaganda.

All this the Kremlin has long been able to use.

Russia has been developing hybrid pressure tools for years: disinformation, migration blackmail, support for radical political forces, manipulation of fears, and identity conflicts. Poland has already seen this on the border with Belarus, and Europe as a whole felt the consequences of Middle Eastern crises after 2015.

When the Middle Eastern agenda is transferred to the streets of European cities, Russian propaganda gets the perfect material. It accuses the “collective West,” stirs up Muslim audiences in the Global South, strengthens anti-Israeli and anti-American narratives, while simultaneously pushing Europeans to fatigue from Ukraine.

Therefore, a possible de-escalation between the US and Iran is bad news for Moscow.

It deprives Russia of a scenario in which Washington gets bogged down in a new conflict, Europe argues among itself, oil prices rise, and the war in Ukraine fades into the background.

Why Iran might break free from Russian dependence

Iran made a strategic mistake when it began transferring strike drones, including “Shaheds,” to Russia, which were then used against Ukraine. In doing so, Tehran effectively became part of Russia’s war against Ukrainian cities, energy, and civilian infrastructure.

At the same time, Iran did not receive full protection from the Kremlin.

Moscow used Tehran as a tool, but not as an equal ally. For Russia, Iran is useful as long as it helps pressure the West, distract the US, and supply technology or weapons. But in a real moment of risk, the Kremlin always considers only its own benefit.

Iranian authorities might have seen the situation differently. After the US withdrew from the previous nuclear deal and years of sanctions, the logic in Tehran strengthened: if America is an enemy, then Russia is a natural partner. But this logic poorly accounted for Moscow’s ties with other regional players, including Israel, as well as the Kremlin’s habit of selling support where it is profitable.

If a new American-Iranian agreement opens the way to partial lifting of sanctions, Iran will have a chance to rebuild its foreign relations. This does not mean that Tehran will become an ally of Washington or Europe tomorrow. But even limited market opening will sharply reduce Russia’s monopoly value for Iran.

In the middle of this story, the practical conclusion is especially important for the Israeli audience: NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such topics not as distant geopolitics, but as a chain of decisions that can affect prices, security, Israel’s relations with the US, the war in Ukraine, and the balance of power in the Middle East.

Energy: the main blow to Russian interests

The most painful scenario for Moscow is the return of Iranian oil and gas to the global market.

If sanctions are eased, Iran will be able to sell energy resources more actively. Yes, the main direction for it will likely remain China. But Europe will also be closely watching new diversification opportunities, especially after the experience of dependence on Russian supplies.

For Russia, this means several blows at once.

The first is pressure on prices. The more oil and gas on the market, the harder it is for Moscow to earn from shortages and fear.

The second is the loss of political weight. Russian energy has long been not just a business, but a tool of influence on Europe. The emergence of alternative suppliers reduces this leverage.

The third is the weakening of the Kremlin’s role as an “indispensable partner” for countries under sanctions. If Iran gets a window for trade with the West or at least with a wider circle of buyers, dependence on Moscow will begin to decrease.

For Ukraine, this also matters. The less income Russia has from energy resources, the harder it is to finance the war, buy technologies through bypass routes, and retain allies through raw material schemes.

What this means for Israel, Ukraine, and Europe

A preliminary agreement is not yet a final peace. The path to a final agreement will be difficult, and Russia will have a direct interest in disrupting negotiations at any stage. Moscow benefits from protracted crises, mutual distrust, and situations where all parties are afraid to take the first step.

But if the deal survives, the political landscape will change.

The US will be able to avoid the scenario of an “Iranian Vietnam,” which would be a gift for the Putin regime. Europe will have a chance to reduce energy risks. Iran will have the opportunity to break free from too close dependence on Moscow. Ukraine will see an indirect weakening of Russia’s resource base. Israel will have a complex but necessary reason to reassess its security strategy in the region.

For Israel, the main question is not whether Iran is good. The question is different: which scenario is more dangerous — a controlled deal with strict verification mechanisms or a major war that could draw in the US, raise oil prices, strengthen Russia, and open new fronts of instability.

The answer cannot be simple.

But one thing is clear: the Kremlin is not interested in the stability of the Middle East, but in its ignition. The more conflicts around Israel, Iran, Europe, and the US, the easier it is for Russia to hide its own aggression against Ukraine behind other crises.

That is why a possible American-Iranian agreement is not just news about Tehran and Washington. It is part of a larger struggle over who will control the global agenda: diplomacy and balance of interests or chaos, which Moscow knows how to exploit.

The Vietnam lesson for the US and Iran

History knows examples when former enemies, after a brutal war, moved to pragmatic partnership. US-Vietnam relations went from a bloody conflict to cooperation based on coinciding interests.

The US and Iran are still very far from such a scenario. There is too much distrust, blood, sanctions, regional conflicts, and mutual accusations between them.

But the very possibility of stopping the movement towards a major war is already important.

If Washington and Tehran can secure a preliminary agreement, it will mean not friendship, but a pragmatic pause. For peace, sometimes even this is a significant result. For Russia, such a pause will be bad news because it reduces the space for chaos, on which the Kremlin has relied to build its foreign policy.