- June 29, 2026
- 12:08 am
- Israel
On June 28, 2026, a recording of the meeting of the project “Understanding Israel“, dedicated to religious movements and sectors in Israel, was released on the World Israel Beytenu channel.
It was not a dry lecture about terms.
The conversation between Sophie Ron-Moria and Levi Tabachnikov was an attempt to explain why it is impossible to truly understand modern Israel without understanding its internal religious and social groups: its politics, army, education, conflicts, elections, culture, and daily life.
The guest of the episode was Sophie Ron-Moria — a lawyer, journalist, publicist, writer, columnist for “Maariv”, and participant in discussions on Channel 9. In the conversation, she was presented as a representative of the national-religious environment, that is, religious Zionism — the sector often called “knitted kippahs” or dati-leumi in Israel.
The host of the meeting was Levi Tabachnikov. He defined the topic as part of the “Understanding Israel” series of meetings of the “Beytenu Olami” project, where various specialists and residents of the country help to understand how Israeli society, the state of Israel, and Jewish life within it are structured. Levi Tabachnikov is a reserve officer of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), a public and political figure. An immigrant from Donetsk (Ukraine), he is actively engaged in volunteer, human rights, and informational activities.
We recommend watching this video in full here it is – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZwmcFy1nQ8: the conversation turned out to be important for understanding how Israel is structured from the inside today — through religion, army, education, work, benefits, and the issue of collective responsibility after October 7.
For those who prefer reading, NANews — Israel News Nikk.Agency prepared extracts from the broadcast: we collected theses, figures, and fragments of the conversation that seemed most important and interesting for understanding the future of the Jewish democratic state.
The main conflict: not only security anymore, but the structure of the state
At the beginning of the conversation, Levi Tabachnikov set the framework: even if we exclude the Arab-Israeli conflict, relations with Muslim countries, and the Palestinian issue, there is a deep polarization felt within the Jewish society of Israel today.
According to him, it is not just about political disagreements, but about different ideas of what Israel should be.
Sophie Ron-Moria responded that over the past 10–15 years, especially after October 7, Israeli society has noticeably shifted to the right. The question of the future of Judea and Samaria, in her assessment, is largely in consensus today: most Israelis oppose territorial concessions.
That is why, according to her, the line of the main internal confrontation has changed.
If earlier the political debate often revolved around the question of creating a Palestinian state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, now, when the majority does not support such an idea, the focus has shifted to something else: what the state of Israel itself should be.
It is about religion and the state, the status of different groups within Jewish society, military service, the education system, work, taxes, rights, and obligations.
Sophie Ron-Moria formulated her personal position very strictly: as a religious Jew since the age of 17, she is categorically against the creation of a religious state in Israel.
She emphasized that precisely as a religious person, she fears theocratic models and wants to do everything possible to prevent Israel from going down this path.
According to her, the current debate is about whether the Jewish state should develop according to the Western democratic model or move towards theocracy. At the same time, she reminded that modern theocratic states today mainly exist in the East and are Muslim.
She separately noted that in recent months the confrontation has especially intensified due to the issue of drafting ultra-Orthodox into the army.
Who is who: secular, traditional, religious Zionists, and Haredim
The conversation highlighted the main groups of Jewish society in Israel: secular, traditional Jews — masortim, national-religious or religious Zionists — dati-leumi, “knitted kippahs”, and ultra-Orthodox — Haredim.
Sophie Ron-Moria immediately clarified an important thing: “knitted kippahs”, religious Zionists, and dati-leumi are the same main group, although there are subgroups and significant differences within it.
To explain, she used an image from her book “Left, Right, Where’s the Side”. In the book, she says, there are chapters on key Israeli conflicts: judicial reform, right and left, ultra-Orthodox, gender segregation, military service, and the internal gradation of religious groups.
One of the chapters is called “Cats and Tigers”.
The meaning of this metaphor is simple: all tigers belong to the cat family, but not all cats are tigers.
Similarly, according to Sophie Ron-Moria, all Haredim are Orthodox, but not all Orthodox Jews are Haredim.
This is an important distinction because in Israeli politics and public discourse, different groups are often deliberately mixed, saying that all religious Jews are the same. Sophie Ron-Moria emphasized the opposite: religious Jews are different, and there is nothing unusual about that.
Haredim: not an ancient norm, but a 19th-century reaction
One of the central theses of the conversation concerned the origin of the Haredim.
Sophie Ron-Moria opposed the widespread notion that the ultra-Orthodox way of life existed in its current form always, almost since the time of Mount Sinai.
According to her, Haredim in the current understanding is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of Jewish history. Its beginning is associated with the 19th century and the reaction to the emancipation of Jews in Europe, the Napoleonic era, the opportunity for Jews to enter European society, receive education, professions, and attend universities.
Against this backdrop, the Haskalah movement — Jewish Enlightenment — emerged. And the reaction to it was radicalization in the opposite direction.
Sophie Ron-Moria even called the Haredim “reformists” — but not in the sense of a movement to ease religious practice, but as a reform towards a sharp tightening. In her formulation, if Reform Judaism moved towards easing, then Haredim is a reform towards adding prohibitions and restrictions.
She estimated the age of this phenomenon at about 150–200 years, emphasizing that Haskalah and Reform Judaism are even slightly older than the modern ultra-Orthodox movement.
She separately spoke about the radicalization of appearance and norms of modesty.
According to her, Italian Jewish women of the Renaissance looked much like their neighbors in Rome, Verona, and Florence: the wives of wealthy townspeople wore headgear but did not completely cover their hair and could wear open dresses with décolleté.
She also noted that in early 20th-century photographs, the wives of Chabad and Lithuanian rabbis looked very different from modern Haredi women: they wore wide-brimmed hats from under which real hair was visible. Men trimmed their beards short and wore light suits.
In her estimation, the sharp radicalization of appearance and everyday norms began after World War II.
Haredim numbers: how many there are, how they are divided, and where they live
The conversation included an estimate: today in Israel there are about 1,250,000 Haredim, that is, about one and a quarter million.
Moreover, more than 50% of Haredim are under 19 years old.
The reason is high birth rates. The conversation mentioned an estimate of about 6 children per woman.
Within the Haredi sector, Sophie Ron-Moria identified several main groups.
The Lithuanian direction — Litvaks, or Litai — about 29–32%.
Hasidim — about 30–35%.
Eastern, Sephardic Haredim — about 33–35%.
Chabad stands separately. According to Sophie Ron-Moria, Chabadniks are very visible, especially in public spaces, but in Israel, they are about 6%. In the diaspora, they are more noticeable and numerous.
There are also Haredim modernim, or “Haredim light” — about 11%. These are ultra-Orthodox who receive a matriculation certificate, go to study, sometimes serve in the army. Special Haredi military yeshivas already exist for them. The conversation mentioned that this group is close to Modern Orthodox in the USA, and some of these people are immigrants from Europe and the United States, accustomed to a different lifestyle.
The geography of Haredim in Israel was described separately.
In Jerusalem, according to the estimate mentioned, there are almost 300,000 Haredim.
Bnei Brak was named an almost entirely Haredi city.
Beit Shemesh — about 90,000 Haredim.
Modiin Illit — about 76,000.
Beitar Illit near Gush Etzion — about 59,000.
The conversation also mentioned Elad, Ashdod with about 57,000 Haredim, as well as Arad, Petah Tikva, Haifa, and Rehovot, where there are also noticeable Haredi groups.
Why Haredim conflict with Zionism
Levi Tabachnikov asked directly: is there a contradiction between Zionism and the Haredi worldview, and is the conflict between a Zionist Jew and an ultra-Orthodox Jew new?
Sophie Ron-Moria answered: the conflict is not new.
According to her, since the beginning of the Zionist movement, the ultra-Orthodox direction had theological objections to the creation of a Jewish state before the coming of the Messiah.
She referred to the so-called “three oaths” from the Ketubot tractate: “not to ascend ‘as a wall’ to the land of Israel”, “not to overly conflict with the nations of the world”, and “not to hasten the coming of the Messiah”. In the Haredi interpretation, these oaths conflict with Zionism.
This position, according to her, is shared by both Hasidim and Litvaks.
However, the leaders of Agudat Israel signed the Declaration of Independence of Israel. But, as Sophie Ron-Moria explained, they recognized the state more de facto than de jure: not as something that should have been created initially, but as a fact that already exists.
From this, according to her, grows the theological explanation for the refusal to serve in the army.
Sophie Ron-Moria reminded that Maimonides has categories of commanded wars. Among them are the war for the land of Israel and a defensive war. From the perspective of religious Zionists, these categories are relevant today because Israel is waging precisely such wars.
But Haredim, according to her explanation, claim otherwise: since the state of Israel, in their opinion, should not have been created before the coming of the Messiah, the wars of the state of Israel are not commanded wars for them.
She also emphasized an important symbolic point: in most ultra-Orthodox synagogues worldwide, prayers are said for the welfare of the countries where these communities live, and often for the welfare of the state of Israel. But in Israel, according to her, the prayer for the welfare of the state of Israel is recited only in the synagogues of “knitted kippahs”, that is, religious Zionists.
It’s not just Neturei Karta: what Sophie Ron-Moria said about the Haredi mainstream
The conversation separately mentioned that skepticism towards the state of Israel is not only the position of the radical group Neturei Karta.
Sophie Ron-Moria said that external observers are often tried to be explained: there are, they say, a few hundred Neturei Karta families, they do not take money from the state, and they express extreme anti-Zionism. But, according to her, the problem is broader.
She gave the example of the “Chinuch Haredi Atzmai” system — independent Haredi education, independent primarily from the state. According to her, this system maintains precisely the approach to the state that she described.
As an example, she told the story of an acquaintance who worked as an inspector at Ministry of Education exams. In the SHAS system schools, which she called less extreme than Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox schools, they sometimes take Ministry of Education exams and receive a partial matriculation certificate.
But before handing out the exam booklets to the children, the administration covered the emblem of Israel with special stickers so that the students would not see it. After submitting the works, the stickers were removed and the booklets were sent back to the ministry.
Sophie Ron-Moria called it absurd that such an education system is funded by the state of Israel.
Working Haredim: why their own mainstream doesn’t like them
A separate part of the conversation was devoted to “Haredim light” and working ultra-Orthodox.
Sophie Ron-Moria said that Haredim modernim are in many ways similar to Modern Orthodox in the USA. They can receive education, work, sometimes serve in the army. But the Haredi mainstream, according to her, treats them harshly and does not like them.
She explained this by saying that the two main ultra-Orthodox parties — SHAS and Yahadut HaTorah — actually represent the interests of non-working ultra-Orthodox.
A working Haredi, according to her, is often considered a second-class community member. He has no full political representation and is even considered less attractive on the marriage market.
In the early 21st century, there was an attempt to create the TOV party — a party of working ultra-Orthodox. It started at the municipal level, but, according to Sophie Ron-Moria, the SHAS party quickly showed it its place and effectively destroyed this project.
She also recalled the Poalei Agudat Israel movement, created in 1922. It was a working Haredi, but at the same time Zionist direction. It existed until the 1980s and then practically disappeared.
Money, army, and the state treasury: where Sophie Ron-Moria sees the solution
One of the questions from the comments concerned a possible plan for regulating relations between the state of Israel and the ultra-Orthodox sector.
Sophie Ron-Moria said that throughout her life in Israel, she waited for Israelis to wake up and start solving this problem. She arrived in Israel in 1989 and called the current moment almost “the coming of the Messiah” in the sense that society is finally beginning to see the problem.
Her solution was formulated simply: stop funding the ultra-Orthodox anti-state education system and the system that encourages adult men not to work and not to serve in the army.
She gave the example of a middle-class reservist with a small child.
According to her, such a reservist, who serves, works, and earns about 15,000 shekels net, may pay about 4,000 shekels a month for daycare.
His ultra-Orthodox peer, who never served in the army, may pay about 400 shekels for the same daycare — 10 times less — thanks to a special discount.
Sophie Ron-Moria emphasized that such a discount in a similar form exists for families where both parents work. But when one of the parents does not work and is considered an “eternal student”, such a benefit effectively exists only for the ultra-Orthodox.
She also said that in total, an ultra-Orthodox family receives about 5,000 shekels a month from the state through various mechanisms: scholarships, discounts, food vouchers, preferential housing acquisition, and other forms of support.
In her opinion, the state of Israel in this situation “shoots itself in the foot”: instead of encouraging those who serve in the army and replenish the treasury, it encourages those who do not serve and do not replenish the budget.
She reminded that Avigdor Lieberman, when he was finance minister, tried to cancel such a discount. The Supreme Court, BAGATZ, did not prohibit the idea in essence but indicated that the benefit could not be canceled immediately because the school year had already begun and suggested postponing the change to the next year. Then the government fell, and the reform was not completed.
Therefore, according to Sophie Ron-Moria, the state needs to stop prioritizing funding for non-working groups.
GMAHs and the state treasury
The conversation included a question about GMAHs — systems of interest-free mutual assistance and loans within the religious environment.
Sophie Ron-Moria explained that a GMAH is an organized issuance of interest-free loans.
Sometimes such structures exist as amutot, that is, non-profit organizations, and can receive state support. Sometimes they operate without such support.
But, according to her, GMAHs are not the system that supports the ultra-Orthodox world of Israel.
The main system that supports it is the state treasury.
Religious Zionists: “knitted kippahs” and their internal groups
After discussing the Haredim, the conversation moved to religious Zionists — “knitted kippahs”, dati-leumi.
Levi Tabachnikov reminded that this direction did not always exist in its current form, it was formed with difficulty, including through the ideas of Rav Reines and Rav Kook. But Sophie Ron-Moria suggested not delving into history, as it would require a separate two hours, and to move on to the current situation.
The main figure: according to her estimate, there are about 1,400,000 religious Zionists in Israel. That is, there are more of them than Haredim.
Within religious Zionism, she identified three main groups.
The first is Hardal, or Haredi-Dati-Leumi. This direction, in social and religious terms, largely resembles the ultra-Orthodox, but fundamentally differs from them in that it recognizes the state of Israel, serves in the army, and works.
According to Sophie Ron-Moria, Hardal was previously a small direction, but as a large group, it formed around the 1990s. Today, it makes up almost a third of the religious-Zionist sector and is growing faster because such families have more children.
The second group is the mainstream of religious Zionism, about 40–45%.
The third is liberals or modernim, more modern religious Zionists, about 28%.
Sophie Ron-Moria noted that it is more difficult to draw a boundary between the mainstream and liberals, while Hardal stands separately.
Settlers and ‘knitted kippahs’ are not the same thing.
One of the important clarifications in the conversation concerned the common confusion: not all settlers are religious Zionists, and not all religious Zionists are settlers.
Sophie Ron-Moria said that today about 600,000 Israelis live beyond the green line.
Of them, ‘knitted kippahs’ make up a little more than a third.
The rest are secular and traditional Israelis living in large settlements near the green line, such as Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel, as well as about 100,000 Haredim living in places like Beitar Illit and Immanuel.
Even among the settlements themselves, there are different types.
Efrat, Gush Etzion, Elkana were named as more liberal settlements.
Small settlements in the mountains, as well as some settlements in the Hebron area, she said, are more often associated with the Hardal direction.
When asked about the ‘hilltop youth,’ she replied that it is not the same as Hardal. The hilltop youth, she said, stands apart.
Smotrich does not represent all religious Zionists.
Separately, Sophie Ron-Moria explained the political confusion around the ‘Religious Zionism’ party of Bezalel Smotrich.
According to her, this party does not represent the entire religious-Zionist sector, but mainly the Hardal direction.
That is why, in her estimation, Smotrich’s party today balances on the edge of the electoral threshold. If it represented the entire mainstream of religious Zionism, it would enter the Knesset much more confidently.
Sophie Ron-Moria also reminded that many religious Zionists live within the green line: in Jerusalem, Modi’in, Ra’anana, Petah Tikva, in the south of the country, in Sderot, and other places.
Most ‘knitted kippahs,’ she said, do not live in settlements, although many sympathize with the settlement movement.
How to distinguish Hardal from other religious Zionists.
Sophie Ron-Moria explained that Hardal is distinguished primarily by lifestyle.
In Hardal families, she said, gender separation can begin as early as 3–4 years old. They have a strict dress code.
A Hardal man can often be recognized by a larger kippah and a beard.
A more liberal religious Zionist usually has a smaller kippah, and may not have a beard. She gave a personal example: her husband shaves his beard and does not shave only during mourning days when it is not allowed.
Women of different directions of religious Zionism also look different because the dress code within subgroups differs.
At the same time, Sophie Ron-Moria briefly noted that there are also conservative and reform communities in Israel, but they are relatively few, so they were not specifically discussed.
Torah and real life: the religious-Zionist response to Haredim.
Levi Tabachnikov formulated the ideological basis of religious Zionism through three concepts: the Torah of Israel, the land of Israel, and the state of Israel.
Sophie Ron-Moria responded that, considering the relatively new nature of the ultra-Orthodox movement, natural Judaism is not isolation from the world, but Torah im derech eretz, that is, Torah together with real life.
According to her, a Jew should not close himself behind walls out of fear that, looking outside, he will immediately begin to violate commandments.
She asked the question: if the Haredim say that a young man, upon entering the army, will remove his kippah, then what was he taught?
From her point of view, a Jew should be able to live in a world where not everyone is like him and maintain his faith and practice in real life.
As a religious example, she recalled the weekly portion ‘Shlach’ about the scouts. In her interpretation, the scouts largely expressed the approach that would later resemble the ultra-Orthodox: as if it is impossible to observe the Torah and simultaneously be a farmer, a warrior, a person of real life.
Such an approach, she said, was recognized as incorrect.
She also reminded that the Shulchan Aruch states: a man must support his wife and children, not remain a yeshiva student all his life while his wife works.
In her opinion, the lifelong model of ‘yeshiva student until gray hair’ contradicts the original approach of Judaism.
She emphasized: abroad, Jews do not live so massively because there is no state of Israel that could support a large number of yeshiva students all their lives.
Can Hardal become a separate sector?
Sophie Ron-Moria suggested that in 10 years, Hardal might stand out as a separate group.
She explained this with the criterion of marriages: if representatives of the subgroup mainly marry only among themselves, over time, this may become a separate sector.
According to her, today Hardalniks mainly meet and marry Hardalniks, liberals marry liberals, and a liberal can marry a girl from the mainstream. But such marriages between Hardal and liberal religious Zionism are significantly less typical.
Should the state support large Haredi families?
One of the listeners’ questions was whether it is really possible to reduce support for ultra-Orthodox families if they have many children.
Sophie Ron-Moria replied that the criteria for assistance should be the same for all large families — Haredi, religious-Zionist, traditional, or secular.
If a family is poor, social services should help them. But the father, she said, should go to work. If he does not work, he should not receive special benefits just because of belonging to the ultra-Orthodox sector.
She recalled Benjamin Netanyahu’s position when he was finance minister in Ariel Sharon’s government in the early 2000s: if you want to have children, work to support them.
Demography: ‘we are doomed’ or not yet.
Levi Tabachnikov raised the issue of alarming forecasts: many believe that the ultra-Orthodox will sooner or later become the majority, the economy will not withstand, the army will not withstand, and the state will find itself in a dead end.
Sophie Ron-Moria replied that one should not become Cassandra and make definitive demographic forecasts for Israel.
She recalled the story of Shimon Peres, who in 1989, discussing Judea and Samaria, said that if a million immigrants came from the Soviet Union, the issue would look different, but that would never happen. A year or two later, mass aliyah began, and that very million arrived.
Therefore, she said, Israel is a country where geopolitical and demographic forecasts often break. A new aliyah is possible, including from the USA.
But this does not mean that the problem can be ignored. Haredim also need to feed their children, and the system needs to change.
Can Torah study bring innovations to the economy?
One of the listeners asked if Torah study can become a factor in increasing productivity and innovation in Israel’s economy.
Sophie Ron-Moria replied: it can, but only if it is combined with the study of economics, computers, physics, mathematics, and other modern disciplines.
She rejected the widespread myth that a person who has only studied Gemara has trained his brain so much that he can easily catch up with everyone in the big world.
According to her, statistics show the opposite: those from ultra-Orthodox communities who later go to get a profession and education lag about a third behind their peers.
She emphasized that studying Gemara can indeed train thinking, but only in combination with modern education.
As an example, she recalled Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, one of the leaders of Modern Orthodox, who advised young American Jews thinking of becoming rabbis to get a serious education and pursue a doctorate.
Can Haredim serve, work, and remain Haredim?
At the end of the conversation, a key question was raised: if the ultra-Orthodox have to accept the Israeli social contract — education, work, military service, participation in the general system of duties — can they remain Haredim?
Sophie Ron-Moria replied: yes, they can.
She reminded that in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, military vehicles drove through Bnei Brak and took men from synagogues. At that time, a significant part of the ultra-Orthodox served in the army and worked. Families did not have 10–15 children, but 7–8.
According to her, the turning point came after 1977, when Menachem Begin came to power and a system of political confrontation between Likud and Labor arose, in which Haredi parties were constantly ‘bought off.’ It was then, in her estimation, that the quota once introduced by David Ben-Gurion was destroyed.
She also pointed to the diaspora: American Haredim work and remain Haredim. Moreover, in the USA and Europe, living a Haredi life is more difficult than in Israel because there is no such infrastructure and state support as in the Jewish state.
Therefore, it is possible to work, serve, and maintain a Haredi identity.
Personal experience of Sophie Ron-Moria.
Sophie Ron-Moria also talked about herself.
In the mid-1980s, when she was 15, she skipped classes and went to the Leningrad synagogue. There she got into Jewish circles, and at 17, she made teshuva and became religious.
She came to Israel in 1989 already as a religious person.
She admitted that Israeli Haredim were a shock to her. Haredim in Leningrad, she said, looked and lived differently.
She also talked about her son. She has three sons, the youngest is now 21 years old. He studies in a military yeshiva, shortly after October 7, he went to the army, fought in Gaza, then returned to the yeshiva and must go back to the army. He serves in combat units.
Sophie Ron-Moria emphasized: it is possible to live like this. Her son did not remove his kippah. None of her three sons removed their kippah.
According to her, if a young man removes his kippah when meeting another world, the question is not to the army, but to what he was taught.
Who is really afraid of change?
One of the last questions concerned the claim that secular or religious Zionists want to ‘break’ the Haredi way of life and force the ultra-Orthodox to stop being themselves.
Sophie Ron-Moria rejected this.
According to her, after October 7, when Israel so urgently needs soldiers, it is impossible to say that the issue of service is only an attempt to remake the Haredim.
She believes that the goal of secular and religious Zionists is not to destroy the Haredi way of life, but to establish fair participation in common duties.
The main fear, in her opinion, is within the Haredi leadership. It is the fear of contact with the outside world and the fear of losing control.
She gave an example of a Haredi college where she wanted to study law about 10 years ago. There was a strict dress code: stockings, sleeves below the elbow, restrictions on earrings, a ban on large jewelry, only pale pink nail polish, a ban on boots. Moreover, the rules applied not only inside the college but also outside.
In her opinion, such rules are needed not because outsiders want to remake the Haredim, but because the system itself is afraid: its women will see another way of life and want the same.
She also recalled the pandemic period when, according to her, ultra-Orthodox leaders demanded that Haredi boys not be housed with ‘knitted kippahs,’ fearing their influence.
The main reason for fear, in her opinion, is that a Haredi who goes to the army returns to the community already less dependent on ultra-Orthodox leadership. He can go to work, can vote for whom he wants, can make decisions independently.
It is the loss of control, she said, that scares the Haredi leadership the most.
After October 7, the position of religious Zionists changed.
In the finale, Levi Tabachnikov asked Sophie Ron-Moria if her position is a minority within the religious-Zionist sector.
She replied that if this question had been asked 5 years ago, she would have said: yes, it is a minority, about the same 27–28% of liberal and modern religious Zionists who do not want the Haredization of Israel.
But after October 7, she said, the situation has changed.
Today, Sophie Ron-Moria believes, most ‘knitted kippahs’ understand that it cannot continue like this.
What was once the position of a liberal minority within religious Zionism has become much closer to the sector’s consensus after the war.
Why this video is important for understanding Israel.
This meeting of the ‘Understanding Israel’ project shows that Israel’s religious map is much more complex than the usual division into ‘secular’ and ‘religious.’
Within the religious world, there are Haredim, religious Zionists, Hardal, mainstream, liberal Dati-Leumi, working ultra-Orthodox, Chabadniks, Litvaks, Hasidim, Sephardic Haredim, and other groups.
But the main conflict that runs through the entire conversation is not only religious.
It is a conflict about the social contract.
Who serves in the army.
Who works.
Who receives education.
Who pays taxes.
Who receives benefits.
Who recognizes the state of Israel not only as a fact but also as a value.
Who is ready to participate in the common fate of the country.
In this sense, the conversation between Sofi Ron-Moria and Levi Tabachnikov is important not only for those interested in religion. It is important for everyone who wants to understand why the debate about the Haredim, the army, and education has become one of the central issues of Israel’s future.
Because behind it lies not only the question of conscription.
Behind it lies the question: what will Israel be — a democratic Jewish state where different groups share common responsibility, or a country where one part of society serves, works, and pays, while the other receives special status and separate rules.
That is why without understanding the religious currents and sectors, it is impossible to understand Israel today.
We recommend watching this video in full here it is – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZwmcFy1nQ8 : the conversation turned out to be important for understanding how Israel is structured today from the inside — through religion, the army, education, work, benefits, and the question of common responsibility after October 7.