On October 24, 2026, the Russian ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov, “participated in the olive harvest” at the Gornensky Convent in Ein Kerem, a district of Western Jerusalem. Along with embassy staff, “olives were harvested” by employees of the Russian representation to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Author: Stas Shifer
October 25, 2026 | NANews — Nikk.Agency
A diplomatic context unexpectedly emerged in the usual monastery event. In October, the olive harvest once again became a cause for conflicts in Judea and Samaria, and Moscow publicly emphasized the participation of its representatives working with the Palestinian side in the event on Israeli territory. Was this just a harvest or a demonstrative political gesture?
What the Russian embassy showed and reported
In the official statement of the Russian embassy, the ambassador with his wife, embassy staff, and representatives to the PNA with family members are listed. Guests were received by Abbess Ekaterina (Chernysheva) with the sisters of the monastery.
The publication describes in detail the monastery tradition: the olive grove has existed since the 19th century, the harvest is collected manually, and olives of the “Manzanilla” and “Caserena” varieties are used for oil and pickling for the monastery meal. The message is accompanied by photographs: the ambassador is busy harvesting, holding a stick for collecting olives.
The embassy did not explicitly declare support for the Palestinians or territorial claims. However, the participation of the representation to the PNA is highlighted separately in the official report. This choice of wording prompts consideration of the circumstances of the event.
Whose land: the history of the Gornensky Monastery
The Gornensky Monastery is located in Ein Kerem, a historic district in the west of Jerusalem, which today is within the municipal boundaries of the city. Here is its exact location on Google Maps.
For Christians, Ein Kerem is associated with the tradition of the meeting of the Virgin Mary with Elizabeth, the mother of John the Baptist. In 1871, the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, Archimandrite Antonin (Kapustin), purchased two houses and an olive plantation here from the local owner Hanna Jelyad. The holdings were then expanded; in 1883, the Church of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God was consecrated, and in 1898, the community received monastery status.
After the 1917 revolution and the division of Russian Orthodox church structures, the ownership of church property became a subject of disputes. After the creation of Israel, on January 28, 1949, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission of the Moscow Patriarchate received the Ein Kerem plots with a total historical area of 228,776 m² by an act of transfer. According to archival data cited by researcher Dmitry Safonov, the document was signed on the Israeli side by I. L. Rabinovich.
In the catalog of the property of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, the monastery is listed as the property of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, the area named in the 1949 documents does not have to coincide with the current registered boundaries: part of the territory was later used for municipal needs. The exact current list of owners and plots can only be established by current data from the Israeli land registry.
This is church property, not automatically the property of the Russian Federation. What its presence in Jerusalem means in terms of state and international law requires a separate explanation.
More about the history of Russian church property and property disputes in Israel can be found in the article “Whose is the Alexander Courtyard in Jerusalem after all?”. There are documents, history, and other examples of similar disputes.
Jerusalem — the united and indivisible capital of Israel: what happened in 1947, 1948, and 1967
Yes, according to Israeli law, Jerusalem is the united and indivisible capital of the State of Israel, having special significance as the historical capital of the Jewish people. This is how the state’s position is formulated: Article 1 of the Basic Law “Jerusalem — the Capital of Israel” of 1980 calls the city “united and indivisible.” In 2018, its status as the capital was also enshrined in the Basic Law “Israel — the Nation-State of the Jewish People.”
International legal assessments of some borders and parts of Jerusalem differ. To avoid mixing them with the history of Ein Kerem, the sequence of events is important.
1947: the international plan that was not implemented
On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 181 on the partition of British Mandate Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. A special international regime — corpus separatum — under UN administration was proposed for Jerusalem. The projected territory included not only the Old City but also Ein Kerem (Ein Karim).
However, the international administration was never created, and the ensuing war led to a different factual configuration of control.
1948–1949: Ein Kerem — on the Israeli side
On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed. During the War of Independence, Israeli forces established control over the western part of Jerusalem, including Ein Kerem. The eastern part of the city, with the Old City and the Temple Mount, came under Jordanian control.
On April 3, 1949, Israel and Jordan signed an armistice agreement. It established the demarcation line known as the Green Line. Ein Kerem was located to the west of it, on the Israeli side. At the same time, the agreement emphasized that the armistice line does not establish final state borders and does not predetermine political settlement.
In December 1949, David Ben-Gurion declared Jerusalem an integral part of Israel and its eternal capital in the Knesset. State institutions began moving to the western part of the city. The UN, in Resolution No. 303 of the same month, again advocated for an international regime, but it was also not implemented.
1967: East Jerusalem and the unification of the city
During the Six-Day War in June 1967, the IDF established control over East Jerusalem, which was previously under Jordanian rule. In Israel, this is perceived as the reunification of the city and the return of access to holy sites, primarily the Western Wall.
On June 27–28, 1967, Israel extended its law, jurisdiction, and administration to East Jerusalem and adjacent territories. In 1980, the status of the united capital was enshrined in the Basic Law. The UN Security Council, in Resolution No. 478, did not recognize these measures to change the status of the city. In an advisory opinion dated July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice also considered East Jerusalem as part of the territory occupied by Israel in 1967.
Unlike East Jerusalem, Ein Kerem has been under Israeli control since 1948. Therefore, the history of its transition to Israeli administration is not related to the military events of 1967.
What other states recognize and whose right is here
On December 6, 2017, the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, simultaneously stating that this decision does not establish the final borders of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The positions of other states vary; international organizations consider East Jerusalem as territory occupied by Israel in 1967 and refer the question of its final status to political settlement.
This distinction does not turn Ein Kerem into either PNA territory or a Russian enclave. Here, three things need to be distinguished:
- State jurisdiction: Ein Kerem is under Israeli authority; Israeli legislation and municipal administration apply here.
- Private and church property: Monastery plots historically belong to the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission of the Moscow Patriarchate; current titles and boundaries are subject to verification in the Israeli land registry.
- International law: Ownership of real estate by a foreign religious organization does not in itself create the sovereignty of a foreign state and does not grant the plot diplomatic status.
Thus, the Gornensky Monastery can engage in its religious and economic activities in Israel. The nuns are not responsible for Moscow’s foreign policy, and the presence of Russian diplomats does not change the legal ownership of the land.
Why were there employees of the Russian representation to the PNA
The Russian representation to the Palestinian National Authority is located in Ramallah. According to information from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its consular district covers “the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” “Western Jerusalem” is not included in this district.
Moreover, on April 6, 2017, Russia itself announced the recognition of Western Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, while simultaneously supporting “a future Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem.”
Two caveats are necessary here. Employees of the Russian representation in Ramallah are not representatives of the PNA leadership; they are Russian diplomats. And their trip to the monastery, while observing current rules, is not in itself a violation of law or diplomatic norms.
But since the official statement emphasizes their presence, the question arises about the political meaning of such a choice — especially in the context of the current olive season.
Why the olive harvest has become a politically sensitive topic in Judea and Samaria
Judea and Samaria are ancient geographical names associated with Jewish history, kingdoms, and religious centers. In international diplomacy, this territory is more often called the West Bank; the latter name became widespread during Jordanian control in 1948–1967. During the Six-Day War, the territory came under Israeli control, and its final political status remains a subject of disputes.
For Israelis, Judea and Samaria are part of the historical homeland of the Jewish people. For Palestinian families, olive groves are simultaneously a source of income, inherited property, and a tradition of land cultivation. Questions about the ownership of specific plots, access to them, and security become especially acute in the fall when the harvest is collected in a short period.
Israeli settlements, guarded roads, and Palestinian agricultural plots are sometimes located close to each other. The military explains the need for prior coordination of access to some groves by the risks of terrorist attacks, infiltration into guarded areas, and clashes between residents. The IDF must protect Israeli citizens and ensure the security of legitimate economic activities of Palestinians.
According to army data from October 21, 2026, about 100 coordinated olive harvesting events took place with its participation, allowing the collection of tens of tons of harvest. At the same time, farmers and human rights organizations report excessive restrictions, crop thefts, tree damage, and attacks. Not all residents of Israeli settlements should be equated with violators: Israeli security forces detain suspects, including from among radical settlers.
October 2026: specific events
October 7 — Burka and Bizariya, Nablus area. According to UN OCHA, during an attack on olive-picking Palestinians, a 44-year-old man was killed.
October 16 — Abu Falah, Ramallah area. Attackers attacked Palestinian farmers; among the injured was American photojournalist Heidi Levine, working for The Washington Post.
October 17 — Taybeh area. A group of European diplomats visiting the area in connection with the olive harvest season was attacked.
October 19. Israeli police reported the arrest of suspects in attacks on farmers, a journalist, and foreign diplomats as part of Operation “Olive Leaf.”
October 20–21 — Nahalin, Beitar Illit area. Israeli security forces detained participants in the olive harvest, which, according to the IDF, was conducted without the necessary coordination. Among the detainees was American politician Brad Lander. Later, reports emerged that maps published by the Civil Administration did not confirm the necessity of coordination for this particular plot. Thus, assessments of the circumstances of the detention differ.
October 22–24 — Kiryat Arba area. Foreign activists accompanying Palestinian farmers were detained. Five Italian citizens were released; on October 24, the Italian Foreign Ministry reported their return home.
According to the Israeli organization Yesh Din, from September 27 to October 22, 672 incidents were registered in 194 Palestinian communities. The organization includes in its count attacks, obstruction of access to land, thefts, and property damage. This is the organization’s report statistics, not 672 judicially established crimes.
Israeli law and disputes within the Jewish religious tradition
The historical connection of a people with a territory is not the same as an individual’s right to a specific plot. In 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court in case HCJ 9593/04 recognized the inadmissibility of systematically prohibiting Palestinian farmers from “accessing their own land” solely due to threats of attacks. The state is obliged to ensure security and prevent violence; justified temporary restrictions are possible in specific circumstances.
In October 2026, a religious discussion also unfolded. On October 16, Rabbi Dov Lior expressed a position allowing Jews to harvest olives on Palestinian lands based on his interpretation of historical rights. Rabbis of the organization “Tzohar” objected: the prohibition of theft does not depend on the nationality of the owner, and individuals cannot arbitrarily appropriate someone else’s property.
In the book of Deuteronomy (Devarim, 24:20), it is prescribed to leave part of the olive harvest for the stranger, the orphan, and the widow. Differences in interpretations do not negate the need to resolve specific disputes based on law and established property rights.
Why Moscow might have chosen this particular political image
NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency has already drawn attention to the combination of Russian cultural diplomacy and political signals. In the article “Russian Tricolor in Tel Aviv and Hamas in Moscow”, we compared public Russian actions in Israel with Moscow’s contacts with Hamas. And in a previous article by Stas Shifer on Russian influence, we analyzed why the activities of the Russian state should not be mixed with the culture and life of Russian-speaking Israelis.
The Gornensky Monastery has existed since the 19th century, and its religious life should not be equated with the decisions of the current Russian authorities. But the official coverage of the event by diplomats is already part of state activity.
Against the backdrop of the October conflicts around olive groves, the participation of employees of the Russian representation to the PNA can be perceived as demonstrative solidarity of Moscow with the Palestinian side, shown in “Western Jerusalem”. This is a political interpretation, not the stated goal of the organizers.
There is also a simpler explanation: employees of two Russian institutions came with their families to help the monastery harvest. But then why did the embassy consider it significant to specifically name the representation to the PNA? There is no answer in the published statement.
Questions to the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Israeli right-wing parties
At the time of publication, there is no confirmation that the participants in the olive harvest violated Israeli law, used the monastery against the will of its leadership, or directly challenged Israeli sovereignty. The mere presence of Russian diplomats does not provide grounds for accusations.
But the Israeli Foreign Ministry has the right to clarify with the Russian side the nature of the event: was it a regular church event or also a diplomatic gesture? Why was the representation to the PNA specifically noted in the report if the harvest took place in the western part of the Israeli capital?
Questions also arise for the parties “Likud,” “Religious Zionism,” and “Otzma Yehudit”, which regularly emphasize the significance of a united Jerusalem, the historical rights of the Jewish people, and state sovereignty. How do they assess the use of religious sites by foreign diplomats for public diplomacy? Do they see a political component in this case or consider the trip purely a monastery tradition?
The purpose of these questions is not to restrict freedom of religion or the right of diplomats to visit the monastery, but to clarify the nature of the specific event.
Instead of a conclusion
The olive trees of the Gornensky Monastery appeared here during the Ottoman Empire. Since 1948, Ein Kerem has been under Israeli authority; the status of church property does not change this. And the 1967 war did not turn this western Jerusalem district into either Russian or Palestinian territory.
Russian diplomats could have come here simply to help the monastery. But they did it publicly, and the embassy specifically noted the participation of the representation working with the PNA, amid disputes over the olive harvest in Judea and Samaria.
The main question remains open: was this purely a monastery tradition — or did Moscow deliberately use it to demonstrate support for the Palestinian side directly in Israel?
To answer, explanations from the organizers are needed, not assumptions presented as established fact.