Missile strike by Russian terrorists on Kyiv on August 20, 2026: the shortage of Patriot proved more important than the percentage of intercepted targets

On the night of August 20, 2026, Russia once again assembled over Ukraine what is conveniently referred to in reports as a “combined strike.” Behind this brief definition were 168 drones, several groups of cruise missiles, “Kalibrs,” ballistic missiles, “Oniks,” “Zircons.” The main direction was Kyiv and the Kyiv region.

By morning, the capital confirmed 12 dead, and another person died in the region. About 40 people were injured. In the Solomianskyi district, the upper floors of a nine-story building were destroyed, and neighboring buildings were damaged. Among the affected objects, the authorities mentioned a school and a children’s hospital. Tens of thousands of consumers remained without electricity.

The Air Forces reported 186 destroyed or suppressed targets. This number looks quite different from the photographs of the house in the Solomianskyi district.

Four days ago, Elena Gunko already analyzed for NANovosti another major Russian strike and the shortage of Patriot missiles. At that time, the discussion was mainly about how Ukraine increasingly faces not the number of launchers supplied, but the ammunition for them. On August 20, this conversation continued after another night with casualties.

“We strike in volleys” — and what remained after this volley

The Russian Ministry of Defense reported in the morning about a “massive strike with high-precision weapons of ground, air, and sea-based.” Moscow claimed that the targets were enterprises related to the production of drone components, a military warehouse, and a logistics facility.

Almost simultaneously, the department’s official channel featured a missile launch with the caption “We strike in volleys.” Another formulation was: “We provide convincing arguments.” The media paid attention to these publications after reports of casualties in Kyiv appeared.

From the photographs of the destroyed high-rise building, it is impossible to determine which specific Russian missile hit there and what target it was assigned before launch. But it is not necessary to see the difference between the morning rhetoric of the Russian military department and what the rescuers were doing at that time.

The composition of the attack is also more interesting than the phrase “massive strike.” Russia did not send a hundred identical objects to Kyiv. In the air, there were simultaneously targets with different speeds, altitudes, and flight profiles. Among the 168 UAVs were reactive Shaheds. Separately, there were Kh-101, “Iskander-K,” Kh-59, eight “Kalibrs,” two “Banderols.” The Air Forces also reported launches of “Iskander-M,” “Oniks,” “Zircons,” and S-400 missiles at ground targets.

Ukraine handled part of this set very well. 145 drones, all eight “Kalibrs,” two “Banderols,” 31 Kh-101, “Iskander-K,” or Kh-59 missiles were destroyed or suppressed.

In the list of confirmed interceptions published by the Air Forces, there were no ballistic “Iskander-M,” “Zircons,” “Oniks,” and S-400 missiles. This does not automatically mean that none of them were intercepted: the Ukrainian report simply did not declare their destruction.

But after this attack, Volodymyr Zelensky was no longer talking about air defense in general. He was again talking about anti-ballistic defense.

Patriot has developed a strange problem: the battery may be there, but the protection is still insufficient

For the Israeli reader, it is important not to confuse several completely different things under the familiar word “air defense.” Intercepting a Shahed, a cruise missile, and a ballistic missile is not the same task. The faster the target and the less time remains after its detection, the narrower the set of systems that can really help.

In Ukraine, one of the main means against Russian ballistic missiles remains the Patriot, primarily with the corresponding PAC-3 interceptors. And for more than a month, the conversation around Patriot increasingly boils down to a rather prosaic question: are there missiles in the launcher.

After the strike on August 20, Zelensky said that the Russians had been preparing it for a long time, combining various types of ballistic and cruise missiles with drones. His next formulation was even more specific: as long as Ukraine has insufficient anti-ballistic capabilities, Russia, in his opinion, will not seriously think about peace.

This is Zelensky’s political assessment. And the shortage of interceptors is quite a material thing.

At the beginning of August, the Ukrainian president already talked about another episode when out of 27 ballistic missiles launched by Russia, only one was intercepted. He primarily linked the reason to the shortage of Patriot missiles. One can argue about how fully public statements reveal the real work of Ukrainian air defense, but the problem with interceptor stocks is confirmed by far more than just Kyiv.

NANovosti previously separately analyzed why it is difficult for Ukraine to quickly replace Patriot. Other systems exist, European developments also exist, but replacing already deployed capabilities in the required quantity and at the right moment is much more difficult than picking an analogue from a manufacturer’s catalog.

And here the Ukrainian story runs into the Middle East.

American air and missile defense missiles are needed not only by Kyiv. They are consumed by American forces, necessary for the US’s own reserve, and supplied to allies. After major Iranian attacks, the issue of the American ammunition stockpile ceased to be a professional discussion within the Pentagon.

CSIS in the summer estimated the American stockpile of Patriot interceptors at less than a thousand units, THAAD at about 250. This is not an official Pentagon inventory: exact stocks are classified. But the scale of the subsequent reaction shows well that the problem itself is considered real in Washington.

In August, the US signed an agreement worth more than $3 billion to sharply expand the production of Patriot and THAAD components. Patriot’s production capabilities are planned to be roughly tripled, THAAD’s increased by about four times.

For NANovosti — News of Israel, this part of the story is more important than another comparison of the characteristics of Russian missiles. Ukraine and the Middle East do not literally use the same box of ammunition, but they depend on the same Western industrial base, the same manufacturers, and very long production chains.

Iran found itself in this story not because it is convenient to place it next to Russia

Russian and Iranian military models differ. Israel has Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and other defense echelons; Ukraine builds its system on a completely different combination of Soviet, European, and American complexes. It would be too simple to draw an equal sign between Moscow and Tehran.

But one thing is common in these stories without any journalistic exaggeration. Both Russia and Iran know that an interceptor is a consumable.

No matter how many millions the system on the position costs, after its missile is launched, there is one less on the warehouse. If you simultaneously force the enemy to fend off drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, the question gradually shifts from the characteristics of the complexes to the pace of production of new ammunition.

Russia has been gaining such experience for several years in Ukraine. Iran — in direct confrontation with Israel and the US.

NANovosti — News of Israel previously analyzed the military link between Russia and Iran and how the Ukrainian war is becoming a source of experience for Tehran. This story began largely with Iranian Shaheds for Russia. Now the exchange of interests has long been not limited to the drone itself.

There is also the Strait of Hormuz. It seems like a completely different topic until you look at the method of pressure.

A significant share of the world’s oil trade passes through this route. Iran does not need to physically close the strait for months to create a problem. A stable risk for ships, insurers, and supplies is enough. In political journalism, such a model can quite be called racket on a key waterway: the safety of passage begins to be used as an argument in bargaining.

Russia does not control Hormuz and acts in a different way. It has been creating military pressure directly on a neighboring country for years, including massive strikes on its cities and infrastructure.

The similarity is not in geography, but in the cost of response.

FREYJA appeared after the problem became obvious

After the strike, Zelensky also reminded about the European-Ukrainian project FREYJA. This is a future system to counter ballistic missiles, the work on which Ukraine and a group of European countries officially launched in July 2026.

The project still exists primarily in plans, work distribution, and initial integration solutions. Ukraine expects to provide its own interceptor missile and launcher, European companies — radars, sensors, electronics, and other elements. Major European defense manufacturers are named among the project participants.

The first prototype is expected in the first half of 2027. There is also a declared goal to make the future Ukrainian interceptor significantly cheaper than existing American solutions — less than a million euros. For now, this is precisely the developers’ goal. There is no serial FREYJA with a confirmed price today.

The very fact of the project’s appearance says a lot about what is happening in European defense. Just a few years ago, the task of creating a new anti-ballistic system would have looked like a long-term defense-industrial program. Now developers are discussing a prototype less than a year after the start.

But August Kyiv cannot use the 2027 prototype.

The US is already increasing capacities for Patriot and THAAD. Europe has started its own anti-ballistic project. Ukraine is simultaneously developing cheaper means of destroying drones to avoid using missiles of another class where it can be avoided.

At the same time, new factory capacities have not yet reached the declared volumes. CSIS estimated the production cycles of some modern missiles and their components in dozens of months. Increasing the output of PAC-3 MSE to significantly larger volumes stretches American plans over the coming years.

On the morning of August 20, rescuers in Kyiv continued to clear the aftermath of the night attack. The capital confirmed 12 dead, and another person died in the Kyiv region. Zelensky again requested additional Patriot interceptors. The first FREYJA prototype, according to the current project plan, is expected in the first half of 2027.