On October 18, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly accused Russia of cooperating with Iran against Israeli interests and spoke about anti-Semitic bot networks operating against the Jewish state. At the same briefing, he mentioned Ukrainian strikes on the infrastructure of Russia’s “Yandex” and stated that after them, 60% of certain internet activity originating from Russian structures working against Israel disappeared.
Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky
The statement was made in Jerusalem during the presentation of Israel’s new national security concept. The briefing at the Prime Minister’s Office was scheduled for 10:00. On the same day, the government published the main points of the doctrine, prepared with the participation of the Israeli National Security Council (MALAL — a structure under the Prime Minister’s Office). It was not only a discussion about Iran and missiles: Netanyahu included international information warfare among the ten principles of the country’s defense.
Is the tacit ban lifted? Why Israeli politicians started talking about Russia before the elections
As the elections on October 27 approach, the question arises more frequently, including among Israelis themselves: why have parties and political blocs vying for power avoided discussing Putin’s Russia’s cooperation with Iran — a state posing a direct threat to Israel? Why has this connection almost never become a subject of open pre-election discussion?
NAnews has already noted the first changes. On September 16, Yair Lapid directly called Russia an ally of Iran and promised to significantly expand aid to Ukraine if he returns to power. Then, on October 1, Gilad Kariv, a member of the “Democrats” party, after the funeral of 14-year-old Israeli Daniel Umansky, who died from a Russian attack on Kyiv, demanded that Israel side with the citizens of Ukraine.
Now, on October 18, Netanyahu himself — the current prime minister and leader of “Likud” — spoke about Russian cooperation with Iran and anti-Semitic bots.
It turns out to be a remarkable sequence: first Lapid, then a representative of the “Democrats,” now Netanyahu. It’s as if the tacit taboo in Israeli politics on direct discussion of Moscow’s actions is gradually disappearing. There was no official ban, officially, but political caution was quite noticeable.
I wouldn’t be surprised if similar statements start pouring in like a cornucopia in the remaining days of the campaign. After the words of the current prime minister, it will be increasingly difficult for other politicians to pretend that Russian-Iranian cooperation is an issue unrelated to Israel’s security.
But statements are not yet policy. Now it’s interesting to hear from parties and blocs not only assessments of Putin’s actions but also concrete proposals: what does Israel intend to do with Russian influence within the country, how does it plan to respond to military aid to Iran, and what place does it assign to Ukraine in its own security strategy?
Russia and Iran: what Netanyahu said about Putin
During the Q&A session with journalists, the prime minister focused on relations with Moscow. According to Srugim journalist Yossi Ben-Atar, who was present at the briefing, Netanyahu stated that Russia’s cooperation with Iran during the war in Ukraine contradicts Israel’s interests.
He did not announce the termination of contacts with the Kremlin. According to the prime minister, he talks to Putin as needed, Israel expresses its disagreements directly to the Russian side, and interaction continues where common interests remain. Thus, the previous diplomatic line is not canceled. The new aspect is different: the accusation against Moscow was made publicly, in the context of national security.
For Israel, the Russian-Iranian connection is not limited to diplomatic statements. In September, NAnews detailed the C430L program, reported by the Financial Times: Russian specialists were helping Iran work on hypersonic cruise missile technology. This is a concrete example of why Moscow’s military cooperation with Tehran matters for Israeli security, regardless of the current state of Netanyahu’s contacts with Putin.
“The most blatant anti-Semitism”: Russian bot networks against Israel
Separately, the prime minister mentioned internet campaigns. Srugim quotes his words in Hebrew: “יש רשתות, מהלך של בוטים נגד מדינת ישראל באנטישמיות הכי גסה שיכולה להיות”. Translation: “There are networks, bot activity against the State of Israel with the most blatant anti-Semitism possible.”
The context of the response is important: it was specifically about claims against Russia, which Israel, according to Netanyahu, presents to Moscow. This does not mean that every anti-Israeli account is managed from Russia. The prime minister spoke about the existence of organized networks and their activities against Israel.
Bots are programs that automatically post messages, send comments, or perform actions on websites. In information campaigns, fake accounts managed by people can be added to them. Together, they can create a false sense of mass support for a certain position, promote anti-Semitic slogans, and incite conflicts in an already tense society.
“Yandex” and 60%: the exact moment in the speech recording
The phrase about “Yandex” was mentioned in the eighth principle of the doctrine — the struggle for public consciousness, or, in Hebrew, מאבק על התודעה. Netanyahu said that Israel’s adversaries use social networks and that the state needs to create its own means of counteraction, including the use of artificial intelligence.
He then gave an example of a Ukrainian attack on a Russian “Yandex” facility. The prime minister stated the disappearance of 60% of activity originating from Russian structures acting against Israel and added that this episode demonstrates the power of impact on digital infrastructure.
This fragment is in the video recording of the speech, starting at 42:17; the mention of “Yandex” itself is closer to the 43rd minute. In the automatic transcription, the word denoting the type of activity is recognized indistinctly. Therefore, it is more accurate to convey the assessment as “60% of activity,” without substituting it with a statement about 60% of all anti-Israeli publications in the world.
What happened to Russian data centers
Between October 7-11, Ukrainian drones, according to reports of a series of attacks, hit several “Yandex” data processing centers in Russia. Facilities in Sasovo, Ryazan region, Kaluga, and Vladimir regions were mentioned. Service outages affected users and enterprises dependent on Russian cloud infrastructure: from digital payments and transportation to other internet services.
On October 12, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky linked the strikes to a noticeable, in his assessment, decrease in hostile activity and provocations on social networks. On October 18, Netanyahu cited this story within the framework of his own Israeli security concept.
The technical side of the disruptions on October 14 was described by Cloudflare. The company recorded a sharp drop in traffic from “Yandex” search bots and changes in the operation of automated requests from the cloud network, some of which shifted to other providers. These data relate to network traffic, not to a published list of specific anti-Semitic accounts. Netanyahu did not name the methodology for calculating the 60% he mentioned in his speech.
For the Israeli reader, another explanation is important: “Yandex” is not just a search engine. It is a large Russian technological ecosystem with cloud capabilities and many dependent services. Therefore, a strike on a data center can have effects far beyond a single site. However, Netanyahu’s statement does not imply that Israel participated in or coordinated the Ukrainian attacks.
Why information warfare was included in the security doctrine
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency
The announced eighth principle is related to a problem that has been discussed in Israel for several years. In July, NAnews analyzed a report by State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman on countering foreign influence in the digital space. Among other things, it pointed out insufficient interagency coordination and the lack of a single, fully functioning response system to such operations.
With the participation of MALAL and its head Shmuel Ben-Ezra, as reported by the Prime Minister’s Office, a new concept was prepared. If the eighth principle receives practical continuation, the question will not only be about recognizing fakes but also about who is responsible for protecting citizens, working with platforms, and applying AI.
Ten principles: Israel no longer wants to wait for the first strike
Netanyahu began his speech by revising the concepts of the country’s defense after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. In the traditional Israeli system, deterrence, intelligence warning, and repelling attacks played a significant role. Now the prime minister emphasizes threat prevention and proactive actions, including a sudden preemptive strike.
The presented ten principles cover preventing nuclear weapons among Israel’s adversaries, deterrence, intelligence warning, initiative and military cunning, border and rear defense, international alliances, technological and industrial independence, the struggle for public consciousness, achieving victory, and strengthening the internal resilience of society. Above them, the prime minister placed a general requirement: Israel’s superiority in military capabilities, not reliance on the unchanging intentions of neighbors.
In the list of threats, he named nuclear weapons, precision and ballistic missiles, drones and their swarms, cyberattacks, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies, illegal weapons within the country, terror, threats from borders, and international attempts to isolate Israel. He separately emphasized the risk of small drones launched not only from outside but also from Israeli territory.
For protection, the prime minister spoke about buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, building barriers, and strengthening the eastern border — from the Yarmouk River to Eilat. A buffer zone in this context means a territory where Israel seeks to push armed formations away from its populated areas. Regarding Judea and Samaria — as Israel officially calls the West Bank of the Jordan River — he mentioned measures against armed groups and illegal weapons.
Iran: from preventing the nuclear threat to the goal of regime change
The prime minister called Iran the central threat and stated that Israeli operations undertaken have delayed the danger of creating Iranian nuclear weapons and weakened Tehran-supported forces in the region. This is his assessment of the results of the war, not an announcement of the final disappearance of Iranian capabilities.
During the briefing, Netanyahu went further. According to Srugim, he stated that he instructed security agencies to work towards the fall of the Iranian regime. When asked about Washington’s position, the prime minister replied that the goals he sets do not depend on American consent, and Israel can act independently if necessary.
In the same speech, he also spoke about the need to finally weaken Hamas and Hezbollah. For Israelis, there is a fundamental difference here: striking Iranian military targets, preventing the nuclear program, and changing the political regime are different goals with different consequences. Netanyahu combined them into one strategic picture but did not name the date of a new operation.
Turkey, Trump, and two regional axes
In addition to the Iranian axis, Netanyahu highlighted another regional bloc, which, according to him, is forming around Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The prime minister warned of the risk of these directions converging and the need to seek allies among states also concerned about the changing balance of power.
Answering a question from Srugim, he acknowledged disagreements with US President Donald Trump on Turkey. Netanyahu said that Israeli actions prevented the expansion of Turkish military presence at one of the airfields in Syria and expressed hope to avoid direct confrontation with Ankara.
This clarification is important: the alliance with Washington remains one of the foundations of Israeli security, but the prime minister openly acknowledges that American and Israeli interests are not always identical. At the same time, he calls for developing new regional partnerships.
450 billion shekels, own weapons, and artificial intelligence
A separate block of the speech was devoted to the cost of the new doctrine. Netanyahu spoke about an amount approaching 450 billion shekels, in connection with additional defense spending and future development of forces. He did not present a detailed breakdown of this amount by years and projects at the briefing.
The prime minister insists that Israel should independently produce more ammunition and weapons, strengthen protected production capacities, reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, and be among the leading countries in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and quantum technologies. As an example of the rapid change in the arms market, he mentioned the American company Anduril and new developments in unmanned systems.
In the same part of the briefing, he touched on civil aviation security: after the Flydubai incident, he spoke about the need for additional crew checks and international coordination. This was a separate question from journalists, not related to Russian bots.
Briefing nine days before the elections and opposition reaction
The speech took place against the backdrop of the elections to the Knesset — the Israeli parliament — scheduled for October 27. Even before the event, there was a dispute about journalist access: as News1 reported, some military correspondents did not receive invitations, and Itay Blumental from Kan and Nitzan Shapira from N12 stated they would not attend the briefing. They criticized the selective invitation order.
After the publication of the doctrine, former IDF Chief of Staff and opposition politician Gadi Eisenkot criticized the document as a set of pre-election slogans. This is his political assessment; the Prime Minister’s Office, on its part, presented the concept as the result of updating the strategy after the October 7 attack and the subsequent war.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two events of the same day: the substantive announcement of the new security doctrine and the political polemic around why it was presented now. Questions about the timing of publication do not cancel the content of statements about Russia, Iran, and information operations.
What the speech means for Israel, Ukraine, and Russia relations
Ukraine faces Russian missiles, drones, and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Israel faces threats from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other armed forces in the region. Russian-Iranian cooperation creates a direct technological and political link between these conflicts: weapons, intelligence data, engineering solutions, and the experience of their application do not remain within the confines of one war.
Iranian Shahed and related technologies have appeared in the Russian war against Ukraine, and Russian developments and specialists help Tehran’s military programs. Until now, this interdependence has primarily been the subject of investigations and statements by Kyiv. The October 18 briefing added direct public words from the Israeli prime minister to it.
At the same time, Netanyahu did not declare Russia an official enemy, did not announce the cessation of negotiations with Putin, new sanctions, or military involvement of Israel on Ukraine’s side. Practical decisions in these areas are yet to be assessed separately. I would not call what happened a break with Moscow. But it cannot be reduced to another diplomatic reservation either: the Russian-Iranian connection and anti-Semitic networks are now directly named by the prime minister among Israel’s security problems.
For Israelis, the main question after this speech is quite specific: will a working system to counter foreign information operations follow the recognition of the threat, and will Jerusalem’s policy towards Moscow change? For Ukraine, it is equally important that its strikes on Russian digital infrastructure were mentioned in the Israeli government’s speech as an example of the power of impact on the adversary.
On October 18, Netanyahu maintained a diplomatic channel to Putin but stopped avoiding two topics: Russia’s cooperation with Iran and the activities of Russian anti-Semitic networks against Israel. This, rather than unconfirmed speculations about Jerusalem’s next steps, constitutes the essence of his statement.